Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

Derivativeness, production and reacting to the cause
Rosja Mastop, Utrecht University, The Netherlands
1. Introduction
In the autumn of 1937, Wittgenstein wrote several remarks
about the concept of causation, presumably in response to
a paper by Russell published the year before. This
manuscript was published by Rhees in 1976 and has been
studied by a few of Wittgenstein's interpreters but, unlike
several of Wittgenstein's other writings, it has not found its
way into the contemporary debates on the matter.
Wittgenstein's general outlook does appear to have
influenced the debates on causation, but only indirectly so;
mainly via the works of Anscombe and von Wright.
Interestingly, the accounts of causation presented
by these two authors have been generally considered to
be almost diametrically opposed and, moreover, they are
both interpreted as making claims that would be at odds
with Wittgenstein's own views. Anscombe's view is
commonly classified as `primitivist': causation is an
unanalysable yet central idea in our conception of the
world. Von Wright, on the other hand, is considered to be
one of the founders of the manipulability or agency theory,
according to which the causal relation can be (reductively)
analysed in terms of the means-end relation. Furthermore,
on Anscombe's view causation is a relation between
singular events, whereas on von Wright's view it is a nomic
connection implying the validity of strict rules. Third,
Anscombe is said to endorse the view that causal
connections can be observed under favorable conditions.
Von Wright construes the epistemological problem of
knowing causal connections in a Humean way.
(Psillos 2006) defends Anscombe's view, calling it
``Wittgensteinian pluralism'' without explaining this
attribution any further. Von Wright is commonly grouped
with (Collingwood 1940), but not Wittgenstein. In this
paper I want to make a brief comparison between
Anscombe's, von Wright's and Wittgenstein's views on
causation, arguing that, on closer inspection, they are in
fact largely compatible.
2. Derivativeness and production
In her inaugural lecture, Causality and Determination,
Anscombe criticised the traditional view that equates the
concept of causation with that of law-governed
necessitation. Her argument is based on the thought that
we can know causes even if we do not know the law.
Anscombe's account of causation is, accordingly,
singularist.
[...] causality consists in the derivativeness of an effect
from its causes. This is the core, the common feature of
causality in its various kinds. Effects derive from, arise
out of, come of, their causes. (Anscombe 1971, p. 67)
The dependency of an effect on its cause cannot be
traced back to some universal law or causal nexus, and so
it remains unanalysed. Our ``primary knowledge'' of
causation is a knowledge of how to use the word `cause' to
report various scenes and this meaning of the word is tied
in with the meaning of many other words, such as action
verbs and natural kind terms, that it would be impossible to
say what it would mean to add our word `cause' to a `pure
sensation language' in which none of those other words
186
can occur. According to (Sosa and Tooley 1993), in their
introduction to Anscombe's text, Anscombe would be
claiming that ``the relation of causation can be immediately
perceived'' (p. 12). This interpretation is widely shared; cf.
(Schaffer 2003) and (Psillos 2006). However, this claim
cannot be found in her lecture. All that Anscombe commits
to is that we learn to use the word `cause' in reporting what
we observe.
Von Wright's writings on causation are more
extensive and more complex. His analysis starts with a
more Humean point of view: if causation is a matter of
necessary connexion, then how can we ever have
knowledge of causes, granted that we cannot ``peep under
the surface of reality''? According to von Wright, the only
way in which we may come to believe that we can have
knowledge of the counterfactual is via the idea of action.
The statement `I opened the window' implies, not only that
the window opened (the intrinsic result), but also that it
would not have opened if I had not performed the action.
Otherwise, we should rather say ``I held on to the window
as it opened''. Because of this `counterfactual element in
action', the idea of producing a (hypothetical) cause in an
experiment to observe whether the effect follows it,
imposes on a perceived regularity the idea of
counterfactuality.
If a man throughout stood quite passive against nature,
i.e. if he did not possess the notion that he can do
things, make a difference in the world, then there would
be no way of distinguishing the accidental regularity from
the causal one ... Man would simply not be familiar with
the notion of counterfactuality, with the idea of how it
would have been, if ---. This is the ground for saying that
the concept of causal connection rests on the concept of
action. (von Wright 1974, pp. 52-53)
If indeed the relation between the concept of
causation and the performance of testing experiments is a
conceptual one, we can analyse the concept of causation
in terms of the concept of production.
... that p is the cause of q, I have endeavored to say
here, means that I could bring about q, if I could do (so
that) p. (von Wright 1971, p. 74)
This view has been defended more recently by
(Menzies and Price 1993), but it has also been criticised by
a number of authors. (Hausman 1997) thinks that the idea
is circular, because `bringing about' would be a causal
concept itself. This is clearly not the case in von Wright's
account: the result of an action is intrinsic, whereas causal
relations between events are extrinsic.
It is common practice in the literature on the
analysis of causation to distinguish between the theories
that say that causation is a conditional concept, the
theories that say that causation is a (meta)physical
concept and the theories that say it is neither, or nothing at
all. In such a classification, von Wright would be grouped
with the first class and Anscombe with the third. This
classification does not reveal the similarities between their
respective views. Both authors wish to distinguish between
lawlikeness and a concept of dependency that is more
primitive than this: derivativeness for Anscombe and
production for von Wright.