13.02.2013 Views

Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

given physical world and our representations of it or our<br />

talk about it – or at least it is a difficult line to draw. That<br />

the ideas of a tree and a base in the game of tag have the<br />

same epistemic footing (to use Quine’s terminology) is a<br />

proposition that we may see coming out of <strong>Wittgenstein</strong>.<br />

And we can most certainly see that there is no discernable<br />

gap between our language-games and the reality with<br />

which they correspond if we perceive that the empirical<br />

world is precisely that which is recognized by our<br />

language-games by their involvement in the games; and<br />

“here we see that the idea of ‘agreement with reality’ does<br />

not have any clear application” (OC, #215) if it is not an<br />

agreement with semantics.<br />

This paper has pursued the notion that the<br />

heavyweight language-based response to skepticism is to<br />

be found in <strong>Wittgenstein</strong> and corroborated by Quine. It has<br />

been shown that should one resort to an understanding of<br />

language as language-games then there is no room for<br />

“strong” skepticism beyond the room allotted for any other<br />

language-game. There may perhaps be even less as we<br />

noted above that the practice of such a game would<br />

amount to expostulations further and further removed from<br />

ways of life and meaning. At the least it has been shown<br />

that it would take a total revision in terms of how meaning<br />

is constructed in order for skepticism to overpower this<br />

language-based response and that, once we recognize<br />

this, there is no need to resort to skepticism or at least it is<br />

even less necessary to consider skepticism than it was<br />

when we suggested before that the best response was to<br />

ignore skeptical concerns.<br />

116<br />

Grounded Action: <strong>Wittgenstein</strong> against Skepticism - Edward Guetti<br />

References<br />

Landesman and Meeks (eds.) 2003 Philosophical Skepticism,<br />

Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.<br />

Sluga and Stern (eds.) 1996 Cambridge Companion to <strong>Ludwig</strong><br />

<strong>Wittgenstein</strong> Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Univeristy Press.<br />

<strong>Wittgenstein</strong>, <strong>Ludwig</strong>, 1972 On Certainty, Denis Paul and G.E.M.<br />

Anscombe, trans, G.E.M. Anscombe and von Wright, eds., New<br />

York, NY: Harper Torchbook.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!