Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

kind of mythology (cf. Wittgenstein 1975, §95). The use of
the term ‘mythology’ reflects the fact that our world-picture
cannot be justified or supported by argument, because it is
what makes justifications and arguments possible: “But I
did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of
its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of
its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against
which I distinguish between true and false” (Wittgenstein
1975: §94). It must be stressed that what ultimately
explains the fundamental role of certain propositions or
beliefs is not, according to Wittgenstein, an epistemic
process or mechanism, but their intimate connection with
our practices. It is the form of life that determines what
must be taken for granted. As Wittgenstein puts it: “Giving
grounds […] comes to an end; - but the end […] is our
acting, which lies at bottom of the language-game”
(Wittgenstein 1975: §204). By stressing the
epistemological significance of world-pictures and forms of
life as the necessary background of our epistemic
processes and by calling the attention to the irreducible
diversity of world-pictures and forms of life, Wittgenstein
seems again to open the door to relativism.
Until now I have gathered signs of relativism in
Wittgenstein’s thought. In the remaining of the text I will
argue that his putative relativistic ideas are simply an
expression of epistemological contextualism and that his
contextualism should not be confused with relativism. In
the first place, it is important to stress that, from a
Wittgensteinian standpoint, it is possible to accommodate
the possibility of cross-cultural communication even in
cases where the participants in the dialogue belong to
quite different cultures. Languages owe their intelligibility
to the practices with which they are interwoven and these
practices may vary significantly from culture to culture, but
mankind shares a common biological nature that
constitutes the basis of our social or cultural practices.
Therefore, it is reasonable to believe in the existence of
commonalities in human behaviour that make it possible to
understand other people; “The common behaviour of
mankind is the system of reference by means of which we
interpret an unknown language” (Wittgenstein 1958, §206).
In fact, at the level of intercultural communication we can
rely on shared or similar practices as a basis for cultural
dialogue. When the practices that we try to understand
seem too remote from our culture, we can try to assimilate
them through social training. Intercultural communication
may face serious difficulties in the absence of a common
background of practices, but it seems reasonable to think,
in the light of the precedent considerations, that initial
difficulties can be gradually overcome.
Not only can we understand other cultures; we can
also criticize them. To illustrate this point, we can quote the
following passage of On Certainty, where Wittgenstein
says that he would combat people who prefer an oracle to
a physicist:
609. […] Is it wrong for them to consult an oracle and be
guided by it? – If we call this ‘wrong’ aren’t we using our
language-game as a base from which to combat theirs?
[…]
612. I said I would ‘combat’ the other man, – but
wouldn’t I give him reasons? Certainly; but how far do
they go? At the end of reasons comes persuasion.
(Wittgenstein 1975, 80-81)
Since Wittgenstein claims that members of
significantly different cultures cannot overcome their
divergences and reach a consensus on the basis of
reasons, it may seem, at first sight, that this passage
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Wittgenstein and the Problem of Cultural Relativism - Rui Silva
constitutes evidence for a relativistic interpretation of
Wittgenstein. However, the metaphor of combat is
incompatible with the permissiveness that is usually
associated with relativism. Moreover, Wittgenstein’s
conception of cultural combat does not exclude rational
arguments. He does not say that the presentation of
reasons is useless in the context of drastic cultural
differences; he only says that in these cases the power of
rational arguments is limited and we have to resort
ultimately to persuasion. We must note that, in opposition
to what we would normally expect from a relativist,
Wittgenstein does not resign himself to the diversity of
opinions and cultures. In On Certainty, there is another
related passage, where Wittgenstein mentions people who
thought, in opposition to the science of his time, that it was
possible (at that time) to get to the moon, and offers the
following conclusion: “If we compare our system of
knowledge with theirs then theirs is evidently the poorer
one by far” (Wittgenstein 1975, §286). Again, this is far
from being a relativistic claim.
The key for understanding Wittgenstein’s stance on
cultural relativism is provided by the contextualist account
of knowledge and justification that is developed in his later
work, particularly in On Certainty. Like foundationalist
theories of epistemic justification, contextualism accepts
the existence of basic beliefs. However, unlike
foundationalist epistemologies, Wittgenstein does not
conceive of basic beliefs as immediately justified or selfjustifying
beliefs: “At the foundation of well-founded beliefs
lies belief that is not founded” (Wittgenstein 1975, §253).
What gives basic beliefs their privileged status is the fact
that they are vital presuppositions of our language-games
and inquiries. The chains of reasons and justifications
must come to an end, but the foundation of knowledge is,
as we have seen, non-epistemic: it is our form of life, our
social training, our practices. As a result, and again in
opposition to traditional foundationalism, Wittgenstein
claims that what counts as a fundamental belief may vary
from context to context.
In spite of acknowledging that standards for justified
belief are context-dependent, a contextualist is not
condemned to relativism, because nothing prevents him or
her from criticizing rival belief systems and even aspects of
his or her world-picture. Standards of justification can be
challenged and criticized both from the inside and the
outside of a world-picture. In each particular context our
critical reflection necessarily takes for granted some
propositions, but these presuppositions of our inquiries are
not, in principle, immune to challenge and rejection. The
claim that justification is context-dependent does not entail
relativism, but only that justification is an ongoing and
open-ended process, always dependent on certain
assumptions. If we consider, with Williams (2001, 225),
that a relativist is a “disappointed foundationalist”, we can
even say that contextualism is incompatible with relativism.
To conclude, I would like to draw a parallel between
Gadamer and Wittgenstein, because the latter’s
conception of understanding as a fusion of horizons can
be considered a contextualist antidote against cultural
relativism. In fact, and in accordance with epistemological
contextualism, Gadamer claims that it is not possible to get
outside our cultural horizon or inherited background of
intelligibility, but instead of surrendering to relativism, he
describes cross-cultural communication as a dialogic quest
for truth that may well culminate in a correction of
prejudices and in a transformation of horizons.
Wittgenstein does not mention explicitly the notion of
fusion of horizons, but he could integrate it easily in his