Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

property of being true on the sole basis of the meaning of
a sentence’s constituting expressions? Consider the
sentence “either some ants are parasitic or none are”. Ayer
claims that its truth depends on the meaning of its
constituting expressions alone. So, along with Swinburne’s
terminology, he is committed to maintain that:
“Either some ants are parasitic or none are” is true
solely because “either some ants are parasitic or none are”
means what it does.
Now consider the following instance of the
disquotational schema:
“Either some ants are parasitic or none are” is true
iff either some ants are parasitic or none are.
By substituting (II)’s right-hand side for (II)’s lefthand
side within (I) yield
Either some ants are parasitic or none are only
because “either some ants are parasitic or none are”
means what it does.
(III) entails the following counterfactual:
Had it not been the case that “either some ants are
parasitic or none are” means what it does, it would not
have been the case that either some ants are parasitic or
none are.
(IV) is plainly absurd. So either one denies the
argument’s validity, or one denies one of its premises.
Since the argument depends on (I) and the disquotational
schema alone, and the denial of (I) entails the empiricist’s
defeat, the empiricist must engage in the first strategy.
For instance, the empiricist could question the
transition from (I) to (III). The general motivation behind
this move could be the following. Suppose the empiricist
provided principled reasons for rejecting the transition from
(I) to (III). The proponent of the argument against Ayer’s
definition of analyticity could just use (I) to get at her
problematic counterfactual conclusion. However, (I) is
insufficient to get at this conclusion. (I) just claims that
“either some ants are parasitic or none are” is true solely
because “either some ants are parasitic or none are”
means what it does. The sentence’s meaning what is
does, however, plainly provides just a sufficient condition
for the sentence’s truth. Alternative meaning assignments
could equally suffice for the sentence’s truth. The problem
is that the following principle,
if p solely because q, then had it not been the case
that q, it would not have been the case that p,
is not generally true. It true only if q constitutes both
a necessary and a sufficient condition for p. Accordingly,
left with (I), which just states a sufficient condition, the
proponent of the argument (I) – (IV) is impeded to get at
the problematic counterfactual.
However, how could the empiricist motivate her
rejection of the transition? The empiricist could question
the use of (II) within the context of the argument from (I) to
(IV). The reason is that “solely because” contexts are
plagued by ambiguity: as the following instances arguably
show, they do not identify a unique relation between the
“antecendent” and the “consequent” within the context:
Kennedy is died only because more than one man
fired at him;
J.O. was justified to believe that Kennedy was dead
only because she witnessed the attack;
The Analytic Theory of the A Priori: Ayer’s Argument - Tommaso Piazza
“Kennedy is died” is true only because “Kennedy is
died” means what it does and Kennedy died;
q only because p and if p then q.
identifies what might be called the causal becauserelation;
(b), pace the externalist, identifies what might be
called the epistemic (or normative) because-relation; (c)
identifies what might be called the truth-making because
relation; (d) identifies what might be called the logic
because-relation.
Given the multifarious ambiguity of a “solely
because” context, it shouldn’t be surprising that the
practice of substituting within such contexts may effect
strange consequences; for the substitution of logically
equivalent expressions may not respect the constraint that
the logically equivalent expressions thereby substituted
one for another be of the appropriate category for the
same because-relation to yield non-problematically.
Precisely stated, this constraint could be put as follows:
If P is a “solely because context” which identifies the
R because-relation, and A is the antecedent within P, for
every B such that A iff B the substitution of B for A within P
is legitimate iff B is as good an antecedent for a R
because-relation as A is.
Once (C) is in place, the empiricist could query the
transition from (I) to (III). (III) is yielded by the substitution
of a sentence for a truth-attributing (meta)sentence. Just
the latter can plausibly feature within a truth-making
because context. Therefore the transition from (I) to (III)
should be rejected as based on an illegitimate substitution
infringing the abovementioned constraint regulating
substitutions within “only because” contexts. Since (III) is
necessary to get at (IV), and (IV) is necessary to reject the
empiricist view that analytic truth is not about reality, the
result would be a vindication of the empiricist maxim.
Is it really so? Consider again the general motivation
of the empiricist maneuver. The presupposition is that (I) is
per se insufficient to get at the problematic counterfactual.
That is to say, that it should be logically read in the
following conditional terms:
(IL) if “either some ants are parasitic or none are”
means what it does, then “either some ants are parasitic or
none are” is true.
(IL) is consistent with some other condition’s
determining that “either some ants are parasitic or none
are” is true. Therefore it does not entail the otiose
counterfactual (IV).
Is however (IL) sufficient to ground the empiricist
claim that analytic statements are not about reality? The
empiricist is presenting a principle to the effect that if “p”
means what it does entails that “p” is true, then “p” is true
but not about reality. Consider the statement that “snow is
white”. Given the way the world is, if “snow is white” means
that snow is white, “snow is white” is true. Is however
“snow is white” not about reality? Clearly it is about the real
snow. So (IL) is insufficient to ground the claim that analytic
statements are not about reality.
A better strategy is given by the following modal
reading of (1):
(ILM) necessarily, if “either some ants are parasitic or
none are” means what it does, then “either some ants are
parasitic or none are” is true.
The statement “snow is white” clearly constitutes no
counterexample to (ILM). In other possible worlds snow is
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