Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

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References Egoism, Coexistence, and the Possibility of Altruism: A Rortyan Failure - Joaquín Jareño Alarcón Gauthier, David 1998 Egoísmo, Moralidad y Sociedad Liberal, Barcelona: Paidós, pages 67-117. Jonas, Hans 1995 El Principio de Responsabilidad, Barcelona: Herder. Nagel Thomas 2004 La Posibilidad del Altruismo, México: FCE. Rorty, Richard 2005 Cuidar la Libertad, Madrid: Trotta. Rorty, Richard 2002 Filosofía y Futuro, Barcelona: Gedisa. Rorty, Richard 2001 Contingencia, Ironía y Solidaridad, Barcelona: Paidós. Rorty, Richard 2000a El Pragmatismo, una Versión, Barcelona: Ariel. Rorty, Richard 2000b Verdad y Progreso. Escritos Filosóficos 3, Barcelona: Paidós. Rorty, Richard 1998 “¿Quiénes Somos? Universalismo Moral y Selección Económica” Revista de Occidente 210, 93-107. Rorty, Richard 1996 Objetividad, Relativismo y Verdad, Barcelona: Paidós. Rorty, Richard 1993 Ensayos sobre Heidegger y Otros Pensadores Contemporáneos. Escritos Filosóficos 2, Barcelona: Paidós. Rorty, Richard 1983 La Filosofía y el Espejo de la Naturaleza, Madrid: Cátedra. 13
A Naturalistic Method for Therapy not for Science Marilena Andronico, University of Ferrara, Italy Wittgenstein’s interest in the connection of language games and forms of life as has often been rightly interpreted as "anthropologism". However, this characterization doesn’t help us understand the goal of his philosophical analysis. On the contrary, it seems to make such an understanding harder, for we expect his philosophical work to bring forth anthropological statements. But, as is well known, this is not the case. Wittgenstein rejects all confusion of philosophy with empirical or philosophical anthropology. What then is anthropologism for? I would like to show that Wittgenstein's anthropologism can be put in the proper perspective if it is seen as an attempt to deal with the complex phenomenon of language from a naturalistic viewpoint. For Wittgenstein, our ways of classifying things or languages have become “become [second] nature to us” (BPP II 678) so that the method which makes it possible for us to represent or describe them will itself be naturalistic. 1. Beginning in the thirties, Wittgenstein's anthropological turn takes two distinct directions: on the one hand, the analysis of language is given an anthropological twist; on the other hand, Wittgenstein directly engages with anthropology in the narrow (and conventional) sense in his reflections on Frazer's Golden Bough. Here I will not be dealing with these latter thoughts, as I believe that they depend on Wittgenstein's adoption of an anthropological standpoint in philosophy. I would like to show that there is a deep connection between such a standpoint and the therapeutic purpose of Wittgenstein's philosophical activity. According to Dale Jacquette, Wittgenstein's anthropologism consists in (1) the discovery of a plurality of different kinds of words and propositions, as opposed to the Tractatus' semantic reductionism; (2) frequent references to the organic, historical and cultural nature of language as a developing body of linguistic practices or language games; (3) the crucial role of the pragmatic concept of a language game as an activity internal to a form of life (Jacquette 1999: 168; see 1998). Anthropologism carries out the program outlined in the first few pages of Blue Book, bringing the question „What is meaning?" back to earth. We could also say that it shapes the enterprise that is outlined in Philosophical Investigations, 107, going back "to the rough ground", regaining the "friction" that was lost in the attempted inquiry into "the crystalline purity of logic". 2. However, characterizing Wittgenstein's philosophy in anthropological terms does not make it easier to understand it: on the contrary, it seems to complicate such an understanding. The nature of philosophical inquiry is not made any clearer, for alongside the adoption of an anthropological standpoint we find the explicit rejection of all identification of philosophy with anthropology, and a definite and declared lack of interest in everything that professional anthropologists are usually interested in. If we use the ethnological approach does that mean we are saying philosophy is ethnology? No it only means we are taking up our position far outside, in order to see the things more objectively. (CV 45e) Because of the frequent reference to the intertwining of language games and forms of life, the reader is led to the false expectation that sooner or later truths will be 14 stated, either empirical or philosophical, concerning the relation of language and forms of life. In this respect, however, he is bound to be disappointed: Wittgenstein clearly declares that the kind of philosophy he is up to does not set itself the task of stating truths, be they empirical or philosophical (i.e., metaphysical). Thus, there are interpreters 1 who take issue with Wittgenstein for not fully understanding the value of his own references to the natural and cultural features that go together with the use of language, i.e., the features that are supposed to define the anthropological standpoint. 3. Wittgenstein's interest in the relation of language and forms of life is regarded (1) either as an attempt at a pragmatic or praxeological grounding of language. As Jacquette points out, what is outstanding in the later Wittgenstein's treatment of language and language games is his aiming at an extra-semantic – pragmatic or praxeological – foundation of language use within a form of life; or (2) as an exploration of the transcendental conditions for the possibility of language, thought and rationality (as with such transcendentalist interpreters as Williams 1974 and Lear 1986). Now, I do not wish to rule out that either reading of the anthropological standpoint may be possible or philosophically fruitful. However, neither interpretation can account for Wittgenstein's explicit claims concerning the nature of philosophy, that it does not generate discoveries or produce explanations (PI 126), be they causal, historical, or metaphysical. That philosophical truths should be stated does not agree with philosophy's therapeutic point, i.e., with the suggestion that philosophical problems should disappear thanks to the achievement of a clearer view of language (PI 133). 4. By contrast, the therapeutic point of Wittgenstein's philosophy is accounted for in John McDowell's "quietist" interpretation of anthropologism (McDowell 1992). For McDowell, Wittgenstein does not mean to take programmatic steps toward some style of positive philosophy just because he mentions customs or forms of life. Wittgenstein's remark “What has to be accepted, the given, is – so one could say – forms of life" (PI II p.226) is not to be interpreted as a “philosophical response ... to supposedly good questions about the possibility of meaning and understanding, or intentionality generally”; instead, “his point is to remind us that the natural phenomenon that is normal human life is itself already shaped by meaning and understanding” (McDowell 1992: 50-51). However, if Wittgenstein had wanted to say that there is a natural phenomenon, normal human life, which is imbued with meaning and understanding, one, wonders why he did not say so in so many words. Again, McDowell's "quietist" interpretation has Wittgenstein say either too little or too much. Too much, if the very general notion of "normal human life" (McDowell) is unqualifiedly assumed as the locus where therapeutic efforts converge or as an unproblematic notion on which we all agree. For if the notion's features and range of application are not specified, how could it fail to be just another metaphysical notion (some kind of foundation or transcendental limit)? 1 As a rule, this criticisim is raised by naturalistic interpreters such as Conway 1989, Pears 1995.
Page 2 and 3: Kulturen: Konflikt-Analyse-Dialog C
Page 4 and 5: Cultures: Conflict-Analysis-Dialogu
Page 6 and 7: Inhalt / Contents Inhalt / Contents
Page 8 and 9: Inhalt / Contents Zar'a-Jacob und W
Page 10: Inhalt / Contents A Complicated For
Page 13: 12 Egoism, Coexistence, and the Pos
Page 17 and 18: «views from nowhere»“ (Geertz 2
Page 19 and 20: Our thesis is that the dichotomy be
Page 21 and 22: Der Vorrang der Logik vor der Metap
Page 23 and 24: sein [muss]“(TB 24.7.16), so wie
Page 25 and 26: 24 Jenseits des nichtzweifelnden Be
Page 27 and 28: Intercultural Dialog and Mathematic
Page 29 and 30: References 28 Intercultural Dialog
Page 31 and 32: While half a muffin is still a piec
Page 33 and 34: References Abrahams, Gerald 1952 Th
Page 35 and 36: Hence Wittgenstein states: “Not,
Page 37 and 38: About “die letzte Zusammenfassung
Page 39 and 40: Groag remembers to have had in wint
Page 41 and 42: Surprisingly enough, the late Wittg
Page 43 and 44: Wittgenstein and Kripke’s Skeptic
Page 45 and 46: 5. Concluding remarks For Wittgenst
Page 47 and 48: Here something strange happens, how
Page 49 and 50: attribution of beliefs and the inte
Page 51 and 52: Ist meine eigene Weltanschuung thir
Page 53 and 54: Literatur: 52 Ist meine eigene Welt
Page 55 and 56: 54 An economist’s reflections on
Page 57 and 58: 56 An economist’s reflections on
Page 59 and 60: How to Make Opposite Ends Meet? Ays
Page 61 and 62: Intercultural Dialogue in Philosoph
Page 63 and 64: 62 Intercultural Dialogue in Philos
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64 On Siamese Twins and Philosophic
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Wittgenstein on Frege on Connective
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Where to seek for the ‘Uniquely I
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Searles Naturalismus: Eine seiner S
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72 Searles Naturalismus: Eine seine
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structures that tend to shade off i
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Probleme der interkulturellen Philo
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Literatur 78 Probleme der interkult
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group theory for obtaining the basi
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Radical Interpretation and Intercul
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References Davidson, Donald 1984 In
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86 Indeterminismus freier Willensen
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Is naturalism progressive? A natura
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References 90 Is naturalism progres
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practice with the philosophers’ (
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Against Their Own Intention: Proble
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96 Against Their Own Intention: Pro
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Recognising Beauty : On The Intercu
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100 Recognising Beauty : On The Int
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102 Trendwende in der Evolution? Ni
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Postmodernismus als Argumentationst
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106 Postmodernismus als Argumentati
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Freud-Jung controversy: a failed in
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wishes, anxiety, guilt and hatred,
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References Freud, Sigmund (1912-13)
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of water beneath a glacier and any
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given physical world and our repres
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would be a further substratum on wh
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Wittgenstein and the Language of Re
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The fact that religious attitude is
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3. Potentials and limitations of de
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Es gibt keinen Dissens, es gibt nur
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128 Es gibt keinen Dissens, es gibt
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akademischem Charakter, natürlich
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132 Wittgenstein's Paperwork. An Ex
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Substance and Attribute in the Cont
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136 Substance and Attribute in the
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understands the patient's worldview
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Reflections on Ethics and Cultural
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cultures, unless they fail to heed
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identisch ist. Charakteristischerwe
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Nachdenken über Gewissheit - Zur A
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152 Nachdenken über Gewissheit - Z
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154 Zar'a-Jacob und Walda-Heiwat ü
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Wittgenstein on consciousness in
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158 Wittgenstein on consciousness i
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Normalität vs. Naturalität Das er
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Did you do something wrong if you c
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References 164 Did you do something
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zustandekommt. Der Pyrrhoneer ist g
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Wittgenstein’s “notorious parag
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Instead, Gödel always gives a redu
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our view, this plurality of remarks
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Designation and Ontological Commitm
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176 Designation and Ontological Com
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For one thing, those who appeal to
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On the Impossibility of Solitary Pe
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For instance, it takes creative mor
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184 Wittgensteins Philosophieren f
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Derivativeness, production and reac
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4. Conclusion To conclude, Anscombe
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Our concept of non-compositionality
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„Patamou“ oder „El poder de l
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Literatur Breinbauer, Ines Maria 19
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Persons can also have beliefs about
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Wittgenstein, Cavell, and the Fall
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culture in which laws of the intell
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elated in a world-picture. This I d
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Reservations to Human Rights Treati
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legal jargon calls its “objective
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Worin besteht nun dieser Zusammenha
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Do We Really Need Relativism About
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MacFarlane’s and Kölbel’s view
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It follows from this approach that
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Die Relativität von Gewißheiten K
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egierig aufgegriffen werden, insbes
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220 Natural Language and its Speake
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Der Beitrag einer „Logik der Phil
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230 Der Beitrag einer „Logik der
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einer ausgesprochen lockeren Sprach
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Wittgenstein, Waismann and Non-Eucl
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importance, since it appears no les
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238 Cultural Alterity and Unilatera
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Die Opazität der Oberfläche: Witt
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unserer Sprachspiele durch unsere R
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244 A Perspective of Dialogical Eng
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Double Meant is not Double Good: A
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The Analytic Theory of the A Priori
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not white, so the fact that “snow
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252 Experience and social norms in
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Can there be such thing as a “hop
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feeling that was both thought or fe
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258 Regaining the Sense of the Trac
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Brandom on Holism, Communication, a
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interpersonal communication is real
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264 Action and Morality: A Reflecti
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Peter Singer’s Utilitarianism ver
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References 268 Peter Singer’s Uti
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Wittgenstein affirms that what ‘g
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Spiel der Sprache und Sprachspiel -
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274 Spiel der Sprache und Sprachspi
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276 ‘The riddle does not exist’
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Zur dringend notwendigen Revision d
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280 Zur dringend notwendigen Revisi
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282 • dass einem die Ressourcen z
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Deuten - Missverstehen - ‚Blasphe
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286 Deuten - Missverstehen - ‚Bla
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If we can learn a social practice,
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Keine Anschauungsgrade besitzt hing
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Life’s Infinite Variations: Wittg
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another culture is also the sign of
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296 Against cultural identity: a fa
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Kann eine Person als Urheber ihrer
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300 Kann eine Person als Urheber ih
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Substanz, Kausalität und Freiheit
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Im abschließenden Teil des Vortrag
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verstehen). D.h.: das Verstehen ein
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Towards an Intercultural Phenomenol
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310 Towards an Intercultural Phenom
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feel envy towards his brother witho
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idges chronological distances; for
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Sprache im interkulturellen Dialog
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Abweichung in seinem Sprachgebrauch
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kind of mythology (cf. Wittgenstein
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Social Criticism through Internal a
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Interkulturelle Philosophie in Russ
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326 Interkulturelle Philosophie in
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Wissenschaft begnügen und daher nu
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Das, was er in seinem Brief an Herm
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Essence/Attribute in Islamic Philos
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Konvergenzen in grundlegenden Prinz
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individuellen Freiheit (Stelzer 200
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experience gives an epistemological
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The Fraissè Theorem and Goodman’
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3.5) i) Sentences satisfied by elem
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Outline of Arguments against Natura
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346 Outline of Arguments against Na
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Reason, red in tooth and claw: natu
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Importantly, where Pascal saw in hu
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352 The Significance of Intercultur
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354 Wittgenstein, the artistic way
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A Neo-pragmatist Approach to Interc
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358 A Neo-pragmatist Approach to In
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360 A Neo-pragmatist Approach to In
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Aber der Löwe spricht eben nicht!
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364 Aber der Löwe spricht eben nic
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366 From Anti-Metaphysics to Non-Py
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Respective Justice through Thick an
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Normativity and Novelty Tine Wilde,
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References Baz, Avnar: 2000, ‘Wha
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374 Towards an Intercultural Phenom
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Das Problem des metaphysischen Subj
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378 Das Problem des metaphysischen
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380 Das Problem des metaphysischen
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Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

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