Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

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as to how social a theory of, e.g., mind or meaning one can develop on the basis of Wittgenstein. But it also suggests that no purely individualistic account can serve as an alternative to an overly social one. To include Wittgenstein in these philosophical discussions means to think beyond this dichotomy. References Wittgenstein, L. 2002 The Big Typescript (BT), Frankfurt a.M.: Zweitausendeins Wittgenstein, L. 1984 Culture and Value (CV), Chicago: Chicago UP Wittgenstein, L. 2000 “Manuscript 154” (MS 154), in: Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. The Bergen Electronic Edition, Oxford: Oxford UP Wittgenstein, L. 1995 Philosophical Investigations (PI), Oxford: Blackwell Wittgenstein, L. 1998 Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology I & II (RPPi & ii), Oxford: Blackwell Wittgenstein on the Relationship Between Individual and Community - Chantal Bax 35
About “die letzte Zusammenfassung” Luciano Bazzocchi, University of Pisa, Italy I On 22 October 1915 Wittgenstein wrote to Russell, teling him that was doing a satisfactory job of synthesis in treatise form, which would be finally fit for publication. Publication could not take place before Russell looked at the work, and thus this would only be possible after the war. But he could not survive: therefore he invited Russell, in this case, to ask for all his manuscripts, among which he would base the final summary written in pencil on loose sheets. 1 Taking in consideration this letter in his "Historical Introduction" to the first edition of Prototractatus, von Wright does not think that speaking about a “last" version implies that there must have been at least another one, and that at the time there existed two "Zusammenfassungen"; it can be only derived from this - he supposes - that the Prototractatus note-book, preliminary drawing up of the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus, in turn had at least one predecessor (Wittgenstein 1971, 6). Von Wright thought that the Prototractatus was composed immediately before the final version, in summer 1918; with much caution, and it was only 30 years later that McGuinness (McGuinness 2002) came to the conclusion that both of von Wright theses are wrong. On October 1915 already two prototypal versions of the Abhandlung existed, and one of these was the Prototractatus (more exactly, the first pages of Prototractatus note-book). 2 In the dating of literary works, one usually agrees to consider the moment of completion, imagining a sequential process on whose end the entire job is dated. But there are cases that break off the outline and completely puzzle the classic interpreter. The Prototractatus note-book is one of these, because it accompanies the entire composition of the Abhandlung, from 1915 to 1918, and in every moment, by virtue of its structure and the ingenious expedient of its numbers, it turns out to be up-to-date. In fact the modifications that followed over the course of time consist in adding new propositions and do not consider the already written text. Since material organization is based upon the decimal numeration, the note-book does not require any rewriting and it is indeed in every moment the exact documentation of itself. It happens therefore that it turns out to be prior to as well as later than October 1915. Not in the banal sense of a work in progress, and therefore of indeterminate and insignificant dating, but rather in the sense that in every moment the Prototractatus is a last copy. It is enough to read it watching to the numeration, and not to the physical order of the phrases. Apart from this, the composition order is totally different from the sequence in which we are accustomed to reading the Tractatus: to say, the cardinal propositions 1 – 6 are all on the first page of the notebook; the "comments" that 1 „Ich habe in der letzen Zeit sehr viel gearbeitet und, ich glaube, mit gutem Erfolg. Ich bin jetzt dabei das Ganze zusammenzufassen und in Form einer Abhandlung niederzuschreiben. Ich werde nun keinesfalls etwas veröffentlichen, ehe Du es gesehen hast. Das kann aber natürlich erst nach dem Kriege geschehen. Aber, wer weiß, ob ich das erleben werde. Falls ich es nicht mehr erlebe, so lass Dir von meinen Leuten meine ganzen Manuskripte schicken, darunter befindet sich auch die letzte Zusammenfassung mit Bleistift auf losen Blättern geschrieben. Es wird Dir vielleicht einige Mühe machen allen zu verstehen, aber lass Dich dadurch nicht abschrecken“. (Wittgenstein 1980, p.74) 2 Until 1996, McGuinness thought that Prototractatus notebook started after October 1915, on the basis of the lose sheets version (McGuinness 1989, p.39; Wittgenstein 2 1996, p.IX). 36 Wittgenstein gradually adds can be connected to whichever previously inserted proposition. Such a topdown technique of drawing up gives to the work a second, valuable characteristic: it is also, in every moment, complete. It can have more or less details, a comment in one or in another point, but it appears always virtually finished, totally readable. This particularity is doubly loved by Wittgenstein, who risks life in any moment and who, in any case, always thought he was destined to die a premature and unexpected death. Nevertheless, in October 1915 Wittgenstein claims to have constructed a still better version than the Prototractatus notebook, a representation method on melted sheets which he advises Russell to take mainly into consideration as "last summary". II We can reasonably assume that on October 1915 the notebook reached the separation line on page 28 (on 121 in total): the "original" part of the treatise, which was not resumed from previous manuscripts, was nearly completely carried out and comprised all the entire structure and various detail coppers. What did the letzte Zusammenfassung suggest to Russell to possess more? Here McGuinness puts forward an important hypothesis (McGuinness 2002), that nevertheless neglects Wittgenstein’s overall sense. He imagines that the version on loose sheets contained the same propositions of the notebook, but in numeration order, exactly as the final typescript. McGuinness thinks that later on Wittgenstein wrote up other versions ordered by decimals, some on typescript, some on intermediate note-book, some on melted sheets. But in so doing he disregarded the fundamental structural difference between the notebook and the typescript, on one side, and melted sheets, on the other. A drawing up in tightened decimal order is sequential by definition, and demands a sequential support. Loose sheets are of opposite nature, have the faculty and the aim to be put in different orders and they certainly do not introduce any advantage; they demand indeed sagacity and attention in order not to be melted and for the sequence not to disappear. Why then does Wittgenstein choose just a melted sheets support, as he specifies to Russell? If we place such question, McGuinness hypothesis isn’t tenable. Can we think that at the moment Wittgenstein did not have a normal notebook and predisposed just for Russell a package of sheets that goodness knows in which order and after how many passages would have reached him? Imagining the route of the sheets from Wittgenstein to Russell, we can approach the kernel of the objection. In this type of interpretation one is inclined to discuss only one side of the semantic of "the last": that is, the reference to a temporal order, to a question of “before” and “after”. It is neglected instead the observer point of view: when something turns out "last", and how longer eventually it can remain such. Since that was a letter in which Wittgenstein speaks about his recent work, it was considered obvious that “die letzte Zusammenfassung” was “the last” only at that time when Wittgenstein writes the letter. Obviously - thinks who has in mind a normal sequential copy - very soon die letzte Zusammenfassung
Page 2 and 3: Kulturen: Konflikt-Analyse-Dialog C
Page 4 and 5: Cultures: Conflict-Analysis-Dialogu
Page 6 and 7: Inhalt / Contents Inhalt / Contents
Page 8 and 9: Inhalt / Contents Zar'a-Jacob und W
Page 10: Inhalt / Contents A Complicated For
Page 13 and 14: 12 Egoism, Coexistence, and the Pos
Page 15 and 16: A Naturalistic Method for Therapy n
Page 17 and 18: «views from nowhere»“ (Geertz 2
Page 19 and 20: Our thesis is that the dichotomy be
Page 21 and 22: Der Vorrang der Logik vor der Metap
Page 23 and 24: sein [muss]“(TB 24.7.16), so wie
Page 25 and 26: 24 Jenseits des nichtzweifelnden Be
Page 27 and 28: Intercultural Dialog and Mathematic
Page 29 and 30: References 28 Intercultural Dialog
Page 31 and 32: While half a muffin is still a piec
Page 33 and 34: References Abrahams, Gerald 1952 Th
Page 35: Hence Wittgenstein states: “Not,
Page 39 and 40: Groag remembers to have had in wint
Page 41 and 42: Surprisingly enough, the late Wittg
Page 43 and 44: Wittgenstein and Kripke’s Skeptic
Page 45 and 46: 5. Concluding remarks For Wittgenst
Page 47 and 48: Here something strange happens, how
Page 49 and 50: attribution of beliefs and the inte
Page 51 and 52: Ist meine eigene Weltanschuung thir
Page 53 and 54: Literatur: 52 Ist meine eigene Welt
Page 55 and 56: 54 An economist’s reflections on
Page 57 and 58: 56 An economist’s reflections on
Page 59 and 60: How to Make Opposite Ends Meet? Ays
Page 61 and 62: Intercultural Dialogue in Philosoph
Page 63 and 64: 62 Intercultural Dialogue in Philos
Page 65 and 66: 64 On Siamese Twins and Philosophic
Page 67 and 68: Wittgenstein on Frege on Connective
Page 69 and 70: Where to seek for the ‘Uniquely I
Page 71 and 72: Searles Naturalismus: Eine seiner S
Page 73 and 74: 72 Searles Naturalismus: Eine seine
Page 75 and 76: structures that tend to shade off i
Page 77 and 78: Probleme der interkulturellen Philo
Page 79 and 80: Literatur 78 Probleme der interkult
Page 81 and 82: group theory for obtaining the basi
Page 83 and 84: Radical Interpretation and Intercul
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86 Indeterminismus freier Willensen
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Is naturalism progressive? A natura
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References 90 Is naturalism progres
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practice with the philosophers’ (
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Against Their Own Intention: Proble
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96 Against Their Own Intention: Pro
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Recognising Beauty : On The Intercu
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100 Recognising Beauty : On The Int
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102 Trendwende in der Evolution? Ni
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Postmodernismus als Argumentationst
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106 Postmodernismus als Argumentati
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Freud-Jung controversy: a failed in
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wishes, anxiety, guilt and hatred,
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References Freud, Sigmund (1912-13)
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of water beneath a glacier and any
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given physical world and our repres
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would be a further substratum on wh
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Wittgenstein and the Language of Re
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The fact that religious attitude is
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3. Potentials and limitations of de
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Es gibt keinen Dissens, es gibt nur
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128 Es gibt keinen Dissens, es gibt
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akademischem Charakter, natürlich
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132 Wittgenstein's Paperwork. An Ex
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Substance and Attribute in the Cont
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136 Substance and Attribute in the
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understands the patient's worldview
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Reflections on Ethics and Cultural
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cultures, unless they fail to heed
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identisch ist. Charakteristischerwe
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Nachdenken über Gewissheit - Zur A
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152 Nachdenken über Gewissheit - Z
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154 Zar'a-Jacob und Walda-Heiwat ü
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Wittgenstein on consciousness in
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158 Wittgenstein on consciousness i
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Normalität vs. Naturalität Das er
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Did you do something wrong if you c
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References 164 Did you do something
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zustandekommt. Der Pyrrhoneer ist g
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Wittgenstein’s “notorious parag
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Instead, Gödel always gives a redu
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our view, this plurality of remarks
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Designation and Ontological Commitm
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176 Designation and Ontological Com
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For one thing, those who appeal to
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On the Impossibility of Solitary Pe
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For instance, it takes creative mor
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184 Wittgensteins Philosophieren f
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Derivativeness, production and reac
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4. Conclusion To conclude, Anscombe
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Our concept of non-compositionality
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„Patamou“ oder „El poder de l
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Literatur Breinbauer, Ines Maria 19
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Persons can also have beliefs about
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Wittgenstein, Cavell, and the Fall
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culture in which laws of the intell
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elated in a world-picture. This I d
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Reservations to Human Rights Treati
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legal jargon calls its “objective
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Worin besteht nun dieser Zusammenha
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Do We Really Need Relativism About
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MacFarlane’s and Kölbel’s view
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It follows from this approach that
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Die Relativität von Gewißheiten K
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egierig aufgegriffen werden, insbes
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220 Natural Language and its Speake
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Der Beitrag einer „Logik der Phil
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230 Der Beitrag einer „Logik der
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einer ausgesprochen lockeren Sprach
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Wittgenstein, Waismann and Non-Eucl
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importance, since it appears no les
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238 Cultural Alterity and Unilatera
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Die Opazität der Oberfläche: Witt
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unserer Sprachspiele durch unsere R
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244 A Perspective of Dialogical Eng
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Double Meant is not Double Good: A
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The Analytic Theory of the A Priori
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not white, so the fact that “snow
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252 Experience and social norms in
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Can there be such thing as a “hop
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feeling that was both thought or fe
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258 Regaining the Sense of the Trac
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Brandom on Holism, Communication, a
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interpersonal communication is real
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264 Action and Morality: A Reflecti
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Peter Singer’s Utilitarianism ver
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References 268 Peter Singer’s Uti
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Wittgenstein affirms that what ‘g
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Spiel der Sprache und Sprachspiel -
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274 Spiel der Sprache und Sprachspi
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276 ‘The riddle does not exist’
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Zur dringend notwendigen Revision d
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280 Zur dringend notwendigen Revisi
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282 • dass einem die Ressourcen z
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Deuten - Missverstehen - ‚Blasphe
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286 Deuten - Missverstehen - ‚Bla
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If we can learn a social practice,
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Keine Anschauungsgrade besitzt hing
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Life’s Infinite Variations: Wittg
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another culture is also the sign of
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296 Against cultural identity: a fa
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Kann eine Person als Urheber ihrer
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300 Kann eine Person als Urheber ih
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Substanz, Kausalität und Freiheit
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Im abschließenden Teil des Vortrag
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verstehen). D.h.: das Verstehen ein
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Towards an Intercultural Phenomenol
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310 Towards an Intercultural Phenom
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feel envy towards his brother witho
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idges chronological distances; for
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Sprache im interkulturellen Dialog
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Abweichung in seinem Sprachgebrauch
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kind of mythology (cf. Wittgenstein
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Social Criticism through Internal a
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Interkulturelle Philosophie in Russ
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326 Interkulturelle Philosophie in
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Wissenschaft begnügen und daher nu
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Das, was er in seinem Brief an Herm
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Essence/Attribute in Islamic Philos
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Konvergenzen in grundlegenden Prinz
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individuellen Freiheit (Stelzer 200
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experience gives an epistemological
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The Fraissè Theorem and Goodman’
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3.5) i) Sentences satisfied by elem
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Outline of Arguments against Natura
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346 Outline of Arguments against Na
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Reason, red in tooth and claw: natu
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Importantly, where Pascal saw in hu
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352 The Significance of Intercultur
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354 Wittgenstein, the artistic way
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A Neo-pragmatist Approach to Interc
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358 A Neo-pragmatist Approach to In
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360 A Neo-pragmatist Approach to In
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Aber der Löwe spricht eben nicht!
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364 Aber der Löwe spricht eben nic
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366 From Anti-Metaphysics to Non-Py
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Respective Justice through Thick an
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Normativity and Novelty Tine Wilde,
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References Baz, Avnar: 2000, ‘Wha
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374 Towards an Intercultural Phenom
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Das Problem des metaphysischen Subj
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378 Das Problem des metaphysischen
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380 Das Problem des metaphysischen
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Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

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