Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

346
Outline of Arguments against Naturalisms: Levels and Classifications - Thomas Sukopp
objectivity and truth (Wagner, Warner). Neurobiological
and other scientific evidence advises us that the world is
partly constructed by our brains. Therefore we should look
closer to internal processes. After a naive copy-model of
cognition we cannot, at any case, come up to objective
knowledge (Löffler).
Main level of the Argument: ontological/ epistemological
in narrower sense
Exponents of the (critical) arguments: Löffler (2005);
Wagner, Warner (2005); Constructivists like W. Singer,
Roth, v. Glasersfeld; Instrumentalists
Frequency/ quality of the arguments: common/
sound
Counter-argument (in note form): The hypotheticalcritical
realism is superior to most other views (explaining,
e.g., the failure of theories etc.). Reality can be separated
from notions of truth and objectivity.
11.
Argument: Antipsychologism: the answer to
epistemological questions is independent from knowledge
about causal relations between mental states of things. It
is also independent from knowledge about cognitive
capacities of human being. Psychological processes
cannot explain or justify epistemic processes.
Main level of the Argument: methodological/
epistemological in narrower sense
Exponents of the (critical) arguments: Eisler;
Kornblith; Goldman (Grundmann)
Frequency/ quality of the arguments: mid/naive
Counter-argument (in note form): Causal relations
are topics of research. They are partly understood. We
desire to revert to causal relations and they are finally
required for accessibility of knowledge.
12.
Argument: Separation of genesis and justification of an
idea is possible: „One should separate the questions
concerning the genesis of an opinion and their justification
at least when we start analysing the structure of our
knowledge; and we need sound arguments if we
nevertheless claim that the answers to both questions are
the same. Obviously, the first question is no genuine
philosophical question, but rather situated in the domain of
empirical psychology. It is anything but self-evident that the
second question has to be located there, and Quine’s
arguments for naturalized epistemology sometimes do not
distinguish these both questions clearly enough”
(Bartelborth 1996, S. 33ff.)
Main level of the Argument: methodological/
epistemological
Exponents of the (critical) arguments: Bartelborth (1996)
Frequency/ quality of the arguments: rare/unconvincing
Counter-argument (in note form): Because empirical
knowledge (genesis) is more important than Bartelborth
and other assume, the strict separation is neither possible
nor required.
13.
Argument: Reason cannot be naturalized. Against
reliabilism, Putnam et al. argue that the sole reliability of an
opinion provides no proper reason for rational justification
of opinions. Rather reason is relative to culture and
language.
Main level of the Argument: epistemological/
metatheoretical
Exponents of the (critical) arguments: Moser,
Yandell (1996); Putnam (1982)
Frequency/ quality of the arguments: common/good
Counter-argument (in note form): Perhaps reason
cannot be naturalized, but it is universal and objective.
14.
Argument: Against logical naturalisms (logical
anthropologisms): naturalism leads into relativism.
Corresponding to naturalism contingent structures in the
brain of species form the basis of our logic, e.g. our ways
to conclude. Against this attempt, Husserl puts forward six
arguments (a similar argumentation is partly offered by
Putnam): the content of a proposition can be true in the
view of one species and wrong in the view of another
species. The proposition „true in the view of one species“
does not make sense in our languages.
Husserl’s paradox: naturalized epistemology thinks
to have found a basal language or a fun-damental
„scheme of thinking“ that is obtained from „nowhere“ and
we have to assume it before it can be justified.
Main level of the Argument: meta-philosophical
Exponents of the (critical) arguments: Haaparanta
(1999); C.S. Peirce; Husserl; Putnam (1982)
Frequency/ quality of the arguments: mid/mid
Counter-argument (in note form): Virtuous circular
conclusion: „relativism” is inevitable if it means that other
species could draw different conclusions from the same
data if their brains were different from our brains. But this
does not change the truth of the conclusion.
15.
Argument: Traditional epistemological questions are
justified (against Kornblith, Quine): an epistemologist
begins with traditional cluster of questions and takes into
account all empirical knowledge that may be useful, e. g.
cognitive sciences.
Main level of the Argument: meta-philosophical
Exponents of the (critical) arguments: S. Haack
(1993); Haaparanta (1999)
Frequency/ quality of the arguments: common/good,
but quite vague
Counter-argument (in note form): This argument
affects only radical naturalists
We see that the best arguments attack fundamental
naturalistic premises (namely methodological,
epistemological und metaphilosophical arguments). They