Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

Intercultural Dialogue in Philosophy … - René J. Campis C., Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera
philosophy and finally to science, logic and exact
disciplines.”
As for Blanco, he admits being influenced by Kant:
“My philosophical speculations started under the
influence of Kant and neo-Kantians, without accepting
that doctrine at all, but not knowing how to escape from
it because of a lack of orientation in a purely commercial
environment like Buenos Aires during the period
1912/27.”
After moving to Berlin in 1927, then he went to
Vienna to study philosophy where he attended Schlick’s
seminar (1929-1930. See Lindemann 1944, p. 146. Also
Staedler 2001, p. 235). There they discussed Russell’s
Analysis of matter and modern physics (the theory of
relativity and quantum physics) as well as the foundations
of mathematics. This coincides in time with the meetings of
Schlick, Waismann and Wittgenstein. Having read in
Buenos Aires the works of Poincaré –another coincidence
with Blanco-, whose ideas he thought to be continued by
the philosophy of the Vienna Circle, he soon found that
“the only way out of the abysm of school philosophy was to
apply the method of science to philosophy as well”.
Despite his sympathy for the general positions of the
Circle, he shows his critical distance with respect to
Carnap’s early works (in our opinion, he must have
referred to Psychologie in physikalischer Sprache):
“… I realized that the weakest point of the Vienna Circle,
and especially of Carnap’s point of view, was their
position with respect to psychology that seemed simply
ridiculous to me… Then I started studying psychology…
My doctoral thesis was therefore, dedicated to the
incorporation of psychology as it was practiced in
psychological laboratories, with its diverse methods of
research, to the system of radical empiricism, because
Carnap’s behaviorism, constructed ad hoc for his logical
reconstruction of the world, was not enough for me.”
Finally, Lindemann published Weltgeschehen und
Welterkenntnis in Viena in 1937. A review by Rudolf M.
Rohrer was published in Kantstudien the same year. There
is a reference to Lindemann and Quine having visited
Brazil in 1944 (Dussel, 2003), motivated by the growing
interest there in the works of Russell and logic. Lindemann
also wrote a review of Quine in the Journal of Symbolic
Logic (June 1948). Most of the information on Lindemann
is supplied by himself in his article; other references are
scarce, but this is enough to draw a partial portrait of the
man and his works.
III. Lindemann’s El Círculo de Viena y la
filosofía científica and Blanco´s La filosofía
en América: an intercultural dialogue
In Buenos Aires Lindemann published an article at the
Revista Minerva -a philosophical magazine (1944-1945)
founded by young physicist and philosopher Mario Bunge-
where he gives an account of the Vienna Circle and the
Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. Then came Blanco’s reply. It
contained many criticisms to the general positions of the
circle. Blanco also expands antecedents provided by
Lindemann. The latter refers to Vienna as an environment
where liberal scientific and philosophical ideas had spread
early.
He gives a summary description of the Viennese tradition:
assuming the contemporary trends in philosophy to be
valid, he considers that
“Instead of starting all over again on the base of new
dogmatic metaphysical systems, we’ll obtain constant
progress toward the elaboration of an adequate view of
the world based upon the results of science.”
It is interesting to see some of the points of
convergence and divergence between Blanco y
Lindemann, which will serve as guide to illustrate some
historical ways in which intercultural dialogue between
Europe and Latin America has taken place.
As we have already seen, both authors started their
philosophical speculations from a Kantian point of view,
although not being completely in agreement with Kant.
They also had in common the fact of having read authors
such as Poincaré or Hans Vaihinger. These two authors
moved in an intercultural context with a strong Spanish-
German context.
Both JEB and Lindemann were also related to
commercial activities. It would be an interesting exercise to
analyze this fact in the light of the ideas of Karl Kautsky on
“Trade and Philosophy” in his Foundations of Christianity.
The fact that both used to live in coastal cities is closely
related to these ideas.
On the other hand, both lived for a considerable
time in Europe, an issue which explains the intercultural
dialogue. While Argentina was built upon migrations,
Colombia practically rejected foreign immigration with just
few exceptions, Barranquilla being probably the most
significant one.
As to the differences between our two authors: they
are represented by their intellectual and theoretical
development, especially with respect to their positions on
logic and metaphysics. Despite having some readings in
common, Lindemann identified himself with the trend that
moved towards the reduction of the importance of
metaphysics, while Blanco got stuck in the tradition of
metaphysical systems –those created by a single
individual as his own representation of the world- because
of his appraisal of Kant and Hegel, as we can see in the
following quote:
“It cannot be even dared to compare the logic that
pleases the Vienna Circle by the mere fact of being
innovative with the Critique of Pure Reason, not the
work of a premature genius, but of a mature one… Kant
had not been just satisfied with the sustentation of mere
artificial combinations by means of arithmetical
transpositions as the juvenile genius of Leibniz did, but
with the deepening in the very essence of pure reason.
With it he opened precisely the path of inner experience
that was to prove fruitful with Hegel… Neither the ars
combinatoria of Leibniz nor any of the newest logical
artifices can be compared to Kant’s transcendental or
Hegelian logic.”
This marks a great contrast with Lindemann, who
praised Leibniz, Frege and Russell. Lindemann knew
already that
“Any metaphysical use of logic, for instance, Hegel’s
ontological logic and its derivatives like the logic of
Croce cannot be sustained by any means.”
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