Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

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Peter Singer’s Utilitarianism versus Tom Regan’s Rights View. A Comparative Study - Leszek Pyra choice, whereas the second ones mean that one may demand to be treated in a certain way. Both categories of rights correspond to certain duties, but there seems to be no obligatory symmetry between rights and duties. According to Regan the following beings possess rights: those that are 1)free and rational; 2) able to feel pain or pleasure; 3) able to communicate; 4) possess identity felt over a certain period of time. Humans certainly belong to the first category, says the author. Some higher animals, especially mammals, belong to the second category of those holding rights. Mammals possess consciousness, they are perhaps even self-conscious, which is way they should be granted certain rights. Regan evaluates Descartes’s and Darwin’s theories within the context of man’s relation to animals, and notes that Darwin points, and rightly so, to consciousness appearing on different levels in different species, thus proving that there is no gulf dividing humans and animals. As a result the author suggests the extension of the sphere of morality in such a way as to include animals, especially mammals, that are at least one year old. Regan writes: “Perception, memory, desire, self-consciousness, intention, a sense of future – these are among the leading attributes of the mental life of normal mammalian animals aged one or more.” (Regan 1988, 81). Constructing his theory Regan differentiates between inherent value and intrinsic value. The latter may mean certain psychical states, e.g., feeling pleasure. The author assumes, and this seems to be a controversial assumption, that both moral subjects (men) and moral patients (animals) possess inherent value to a similar degree. The criterion of possessing such a value is to be a subject of life. According to the definition: “Individuals are subjects of a life if they are able to perceive and remember; if they have beliefs, desires and preferences; if they are able to act intentionally (...); if they are sentient (...).” (Regan 1988, 264). Regan claims that such a criterion is a condition sufficient for ascribing some inherent value to higher animals. As a result all moral subjects and all moral patients have the right to be treated with respect and not to be harmed. From the rights theory there result some definite rules of man’s behaviour with regard to animals. Rearing animals on so-called factory farms should be stopped as soon as possible. In such factories animals cannot be treated with respect. They are treated instrumentally, and primarily as a renewable source of meat. Hunting and trapping evaluated from the point of view of the rights theory should also cease, which means that the trade of wild animals should be abolished, the fur industry delegalised, and the same be applied to whaling. No special privilages should be given to the endangered species from the point of view of this theory. Animals should not be used for educational exhibitions, in medical/scientific experiments, in toxicity tests. It should be strongly stressed that the above opinion refers to higher animals, primo loco mammals. Regan, similarly as Singer, repeats again and again that the boundaryline between species is very unclear, therefore every doubt should be eliminated so as to favour the interests of animals in case of conflicting interests. Summing up Regan notices that although his theory questions the so far existing, well established sociocultural practices, it is not directed against humans. He writes: “The rights view is not antibusiness, not antifreedom of the individual, not antiscience, not antihuman. It is simply projustice, insisting only that the scope of justice be seen to include respect for the rights of animals.” (Regan 1988, 399). Therefore it seems that the theory under discussion simply extends the sphere of justice. In light of the above considerations radical changes in the so far existing legislation should be introduced as soon as possible. In this context it should be notednote that Regan’s theory is definitely atomistic, as the majority of moral and legislative theories of the past are, and therefore it does not consider the case of endangered species, as some other theories do, for example the holistic ones, as represented by Holmes Rolston III. (Pyra, 2003). 3. A Comparison The consideration of the clash of interests between humans and animals appears in some other theories, for example in Joel Feinberg’s theory. (Feinberg, 1974). Both within Feinberg’s and Singer’s theory the obligation to take care of the good of animals is not conditioned by animals’ inherent value but by taking into account their interests, which can be evaluated and either accepted or discarded as more or less important than human interests. Both Singer and Regan are conscious that their radical theories are, for the time being at least, utopian. But they both think that the sphere of beings to whom rights have been granted in history has become, and is constantly becoming, wider and wider. Some new groups of humans (but all the time humans only!) were gradually granted rights, for example: slaves, convicted men, women, blacks. In this context Regan stresses the fact that law as such recognizes some artificial subjects of law, such as foundations. Therefore it would seem strange to deny animals, especially mammals, some rights. Rights usually correspond to duties, and animals cannot have any duties, but the situation is similar to that one when small children or retarded people cannot bear any duties at all, but nevertheless have different rights. Singer shares a similar opinion in this respect. It seems that there is no symmetry needed between rights and duties as far as legislation is concerned. It should be underlined that both theoreticians, who aspire to constructing a new ecological ethics, are not interested in the problem of endangered species and in the world of plants. Singer constructs his ethics beginning with utilitarian theories, whereas Regan referrs to deontological theories. Singer, unlike Regan, does not grant animals moral rights as such. The Australian philospher tries to convince people to become vegetarians, whereas the American writer thinks that Singer’s utilitarian calculus does not make much sense. Regan is less radical than Singer; he assumes that there are millions of people in the world who live from raising cattle, and should such business stop abruptly they would lose their means of economic survival. In addition to this many other businesses are connected with animal farming; they would most obviously also collapse. Singer assumes that each suffering is bad and each pleasure is good, whereas this is not always true, claims Regan. The ability to feel (sentience) surves as a survival tool and is secondary as far as the existence of individuals is concerned. For example, pain is an indicator showing in what physical condition a given organism is. 267
References 268 Peter Singer’s Utilitarianism versus Tom Regan’s Rights View. A Comparative Study - Leszek Pyra Axfell, James (ed.) 1968, The Educational Writings of John Locke, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bentham, Jeremy 1948, The Principles of Morals and Legislation, New York: Hafner. Feinberg, Joel 1974, “The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations”, in: William T. Blackstone (ed.), Philosophy and Environment, Athens: University of Georgia Press, pp. 43-68. Pyra, Leszek 2003, Environment and Values. Holmes Rolston III’s Environmental Philosophy, Kraków: Akademia Rolnicza H. Kołłątaja. Regan, Tom 1988, The Case for Animal Rights, London – New York: Routledge. Ryder, Richard D. 1974, Speciesism: the Ethics of Vivisection, Edinburgh: Scottish <strong>Society</strong> for the Prevention of Vivisection. Sidgwick H. 1963, The Methods of Ethics, London: Macmillan. Singer Peter, Regan Tom (eds) 1976, Animal Rights and Human Obligations, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. Singer, Peter 1981, The Expanding Circle. Ethics and Sociobiology, Oxford: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Singer, Peter 1995, Animal Liberation, London: Random House.
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Kulturen: Konflikt-Analyse-Dialog C
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Cultures: Conflict-Analysis-Dialogu
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Inhalt / Contents Inhalt / Contents
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Inhalt / Contents Zar'a-Jacob und W
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Inhalt / Contents A Complicated For
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12 Egoism, Coexistence, and the Pos
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A Naturalistic Method for Therapy n
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«views from nowhere»“ (Geertz 2
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Our thesis is that the dichotomy be
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Der Vorrang der Logik vor der Metap
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sein [muss]“(TB 24.7.16), so wie
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24 Jenseits des nichtzweifelnden Be
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Intercultural Dialog and Mathematic
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References 28 Intercultural Dialog
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While half a muffin is still a piec
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References Abrahams, Gerald 1952 Th
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Hence Wittgenstein states: “Not,
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About “die letzte Zusammenfassung
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Groag remembers to have had in wint
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Surprisingly enough, the late Wittg
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Wittgenstein and Kripke’s Skeptic
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5. Concluding remarks For Wittgenst
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Here something strange happens, how
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attribution of beliefs and the inte
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Ist meine eigene Weltanschuung thir
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Literatur: 52 Ist meine eigene Welt
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54 An economist’s reflections on
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56 An economist’s reflections on
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How to Make Opposite Ends Meet? Ays
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Intercultural Dialogue in Philosoph
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62 Intercultural Dialogue in Philos
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64 On Siamese Twins and Philosophic
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Wittgenstein on Frege on Connective
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Where to seek for the ‘Uniquely I
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Searles Naturalismus: Eine seiner S
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72 Searles Naturalismus: Eine seine
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structures that tend to shade off i
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Probleme der interkulturellen Philo
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Literatur 78 Probleme der interkult
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group theory for obtaining the basi
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Radical Interpretation and Intercul
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References Davidson, Donald 1984 In
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86 Indeterminismus freier Willensen
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Is naturalism progressive? A natura
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References 90 Is naturalism progres
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practice with the philosophers’ (
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Against Their Own Intention: Proble
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96 Against Their Own Intention: Pro
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Recognising Beauty : On The Intercu
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100 Recognising Beauty : On The Int
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102 Trendwende in der Evolution? Ni
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Postmodernismus als Argumentationst
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106 Postmodernismus als Argumentati
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Freud-Jung controversy: a failed in
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wishes, anxiety, guilt and hatred,
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References Freud, Sigmund (1912-13)
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of water beneath a glacier and any
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given physical world and our repres
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would be a further substratum on wh
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Wittgenstein and the Language of Re
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The fact that religious attitude is
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3. Potentials and limitations of de
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Es gibt keinen Dissens, es gibt nur
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128 Es gibt keinen Dissens, es gibt
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akademischem Charakter, natürlich
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132 Wittgenstein's Paperwork. An Ex
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Substance and Attribute in the Cont
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136 Substance and Attribute in the
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understands the patient's worldview
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Reflections on Ethics and Cultural
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cultures, unless they fail to heed
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identisch ist. Charakteristischerwe
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Nachdenken über Gewissheit - Zur A
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152 Nachdenken über Gewissheit - Z
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154 Zar'a-Jacob und Walda-Heiwat ü
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Wittgenstein on consciousness in
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158 Wittgenstein on consciousness i
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Normalität vs. Naturalität Das er
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Did you do something wrong if you c
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References 164 Did you do something
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zustandekommt. Der Pyrrhoneer ist g
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Wittgenstein’s “notorious parag
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Instead, Gödel always gives a redu
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our view, this plurality of remarks
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Designation and Ontological Commitm
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176 Designation and Ontological Com
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For one thing, those who appeal to
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On the Impossibility of Solitary Pe
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For instance, it takes creative mor
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184 Wittgensteins Philosophieren f
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Derivativeness, production and reac
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4. Conclusion To conclude, Anscombe
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Our concept of non-compositionality
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„Patamou“ oder „El poder de l
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Literatur Breinbauer, Ines Maria 19
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Persons can also have beliefs about
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Wittgenstein, Cavell, and the Fall
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culture in which laws of the intell
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elated in a world-picture. This I d
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Reservations to Human Rights Treati
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legal jargon calls its “objective
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Worin besteht nun dieser Zusammenha
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Do We Really Need Relativism About
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MacFarlane’s and Kölbel’s view
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It follows from this approach that
Page 217 and 218: Die Relativität von Gewißheiten K
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Page 221 and 222: 220 Natural Language and its Speake
Page 229 and 230: Der Beitrag einer „Logik der Phil
Page 231 and 232: 230 Der Beitrag einer „Logik der
Page 233 and 234: einer ausgesprochen lockeren Sprach
Page 235 and 236: Wittgenstein, Waismann and Non-Eucl
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Page 239 and 240: 238 Cultural Alterity and Unilatera
Page 241 and 242: Die Opazität der Oberfläche: Witt
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Page 245 and 246: 244 A Perspective of Dialogical Eng
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Page 249 and 250: The Analytic Theory of the A Priori
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Page 253 and 254: 252 Experience and social norms in
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Page 259 and 260: 258 Regaining the Sense of the Trac
Page 261 and 262: Brandom on Holism, Communication, a
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Page 265 and 266: 264 Action and Morality: A Reflecti
Page 267: Peter Singer’s Utilitarianism ver
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Page 273 and 274: Spiel der Sprache und Sprachspiel -
Page 275 and 276: 274 Spiel der Sprache und Sprachspi
Page 277 and 278: 276 ‘The riddle does not exist’
Page 279 and 280: Zur dringend notwendigen Revision d
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Page 289 and 290: If we can learn a social practice,
Page 291 and 292: Keine Anschauungsgrade besitzt hing
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Page 297 and 298: 296 Against cultural identity: a fa
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Page 301 and 302: 300 Kann eine Person als Urheber ih
Page 303 and 304: Substanz, Kausalität und Freiheit
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Page 307 and 308: verstehen). D.h.: das Verstehen ein
Page 309 and 310: Towards an Intercultural Phenomenol
Page 311 and 312: 310 Towards an Intercultural Phenom
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Abweichung in seinem Sprachgebrauch
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kind of mythology (cf. Wittgenstein
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Social Criticism through Internal a
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Interkulturelle Philosophie in Russ
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326 Interkulturelle Philosophie in
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Wissenschaft begnügen und daher nu
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Das, was er in seinem Brief an Herm
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Essence/Attribute in Islamic Philos
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Konvergenzen in grundlegenden Prinz
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individuellen Freiheit (Stelzer 200
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experience gives an epistemological
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The Fraissè Theorem and Goodman’
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3.5) i) Sentences satisfied by elem
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Outline of Arguments against Natura
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346 Outline of Arguments against Na
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Reason, red in tooth and claw: natu
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Importantly, where Pascal saw in hu
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352 The Significance of Intercultur
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354 Wittgenstein, the artistic way
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A Neo-pragmatist Approach to Interc
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358 A Neo-pragmatist Approach to In
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360 A Neo-pragmatist Approach to In
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Aber der Löwe spricht eben nicht!
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364 Aber der Löwe spricht eben nic
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366 From Anti-Metaphysics to Non-Py
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Respective Justice through Thick an
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Normativity and Novelty Tine Wilde,
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References Baz, Avnar: 2000, ‘Wha
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374 Towards an Intercultural Phenom
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Das Problem des metaphysischen Subj
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378 Das Problem des metaphysischen
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380 Das Problem des metaphysischen
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