Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

Substance and Attribute in the Controversy Between the Two
Greatest Western Philosophers (Leibniz and Spinoza): *
Leibniz’s Critique of Spinoza’s Argument for Pantheism (Ethics, th.
14) in his Remarks on Benedict de Spinoza’s Ethics (part I, Of God)
Tomasz Kakol, Nicholas Copernicus University, Poland
1. Introduction
Ethics proved in geometrical order by Benedict de Spinoza
is undoubtedly one of the most interesting philosophical
works of European culture. One can even say that if the
ideal of mathematical (Russell) or formal or exact
philosophy should be made real some day, it should
(setting aside the fact that contemporary formal means
were of course unavailable to Spinoza) take the form of
Spinoza’s main work. As a book of such importance, it
comes as no surprise that Ethics has had many
commentators. Among them, especially great philosophers
deserve our attention. One of them is Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibniz.
In the current article I would like to present and
comment on fragments of Leibniz’s critical remarks on the
first part of Ethics: Remarks on Benedict de Spinoza’s
Ethics (part I, Of God). As indicated in the title of this
article, I shall focus on the notions of substance and
attribute.
In what follows I shall rely on Leibniz’s text up to
theorem 14 (i.e., to the proof of pantheism), and I shall
also omit certain portions of Remarks unnecessary for the
topic.
2. G.W. Leibniz, Remarks on Benedict de
Spinoza’s Ethics (part I, Of God) 1
Definition 1. The cause of itself is that whose essence
involves existence.
Definition 2. Is unclear, since, as he says, a thing, which
can be limited by another thing of the same kind, is finite.
What does it mean that a thought is limited by another
thought? Is any thought bigger than another thought? As
he says that a body is limited, when another body, bigger
than it, can be conceived. Add below, theorem 8.
Definition 3. Substance is that which is in itself and is
conceived through itself. This definition is also unclear.
What does ‘to be in itself’ mean? Then, one should ask,
whether inclusively or exclusively Spinoza joins these
phrases: ‘to be in itself’ and ‘to be conceived through
itself’; that means, would he like to say: substance is that
which is in itself, and which is conceived through itself as
well; or would he like substance to be something about
which these two are true, namely, that it is in itself and that
it is conceived through itself. Or will it be necessary to
prove that something which has the first, also has the
second, though, contrary to it, it would seem that there are
things which are in themselves, even if they are not
conceived through themselves. And this is how people
1 G. W. Leibniz, Ad Ethicam B. d. Sp. Pars prima de DEO, as translated by TK.
The original text is taken from: Leibniz 1978 (this is a reprint of Berliner edition
from 1875), Vol. I, pp. 139-150. Words in square brackets come from me.
According to Gerhardt, Leibniz received one exemplar of Spinoza’s Opera
Posthuma at the beginning of 1678 (p. 116, footnote; p. 119). These remarks
come also from this year.
134
usually conceive substances. He adds: substance is
something the concept of which doesn’t need the concept
of another thing, from which it must be formed. But here
also lies the trouble, since in the next definition he says
that attribute is perceived of substance by the intellect as
constituting its [i.e. substance’s] essence. So the concept
of attribute is necessary to form the concept of substance.
If you said that attribute is not a thing, whereas you require
at least from substance not to need the concept of another
thing, I say: one should explain now what is called ‘a thing’
in order to understand the definition, and in what sense
attribute is not a thing.
Definition 4. Is also unclear, since attribute is something
that is perceived of substance by the intellect as
constituting its [i.e. substance’s] essence. A question
arises whether by ‘attribute’ he understands every
reversible predicate, or every essential predicate –
reversible or not – or every essential first predicate, that
means, not requiring the proof from substance. See def. 5.
Definition 5. Mode (modus) is that which is in another thing
and through which it is conceived. So it seems that it
differs from attribute in that attribute is of course in
substance, though is conceived through itself. And here,
after adding this explanation, the obscurity of def. 4
disappears.
Definition 6. As he says, I define God as the absolutely
infinite being, or substance constituted by infinite
attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite
essence. One should show that these two definitions are
equivalent; otherwise one cannot substitute one for
another. They will be equivalent provided that it is
demonstrated that in reality there are many attributes or
predicates which are conceived through themselves; and,
in addition to that, that many attributes can coexist.
Besides, every definition is imperfect (even if it can be
correct and clear), if having understood it one can doubt
whether the thing defined could be possible. And this
definition is such; for still, one can doubt whether being
having infinite attributes is not incoherent. (…)
A1. 2 Everything which is, is either in itself or in
another
A4. The cognition of an effect depends on the
cognition of the cause and involves it [i.e. the cognition of
the cause].
A5. Things having nothing mutually in common
cannot be mutually understood through one another.
(…)
Theorem 1. Substance is by its nature prior to its
affections, i.e., modes, since (according to def. 5) Spinoza
holds that by affections of substance he understands
modes. Yet he hasn’t explained what ‘to be by its nature
prior’ means, hence, this theorem cannot be proved. (…)
2 From Spinoza’s axioms I shall mention only the following three: - TK.