Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

Peter Singer’s Utilitarianism versus Tom Regan’s Rights View. A Comparative Study - Leszek Pyra
choice, whereas the second ones mean that one may
demand to be treated in a certain way. Both categories of
rights correspond to certain duties, but there seems to be
no obligatory symmetry between rights and duties.
According to Regan the following beings possess
rights: those that are 1)free and rational; 2) able to feel
pain or pleasure; 3) able to communicate; 4) possess
identity felt over a certain period of time. Humans certainly
belong to the first category, says the author. Some higher
animals, especially mammals, belong to the second
category of those holding rights. Mammals possess
consciousness, they are perhaps even self-conscious,
which is way they should be granted certain rights. Regan
evaluates Descartes’s and Darwin’s theories within the
context of man’s relation to animals, and notes that Darwin
points, and rightly so, to consciousness appearing on
different levels in different species, thus proving that there
is no gulf dividing humans and animals.
As a result the author suggests the extension of the
sphere of morality in such a way as to include animals,
especially mammals, that are at least one year old. Regan
writes: “Perception, memory, desire, self-consciousness,
intention, a sense of future – these are among the leading
attributes of the mental life of normal mammalian animals
aged one or more.” (Regan 1988, 81).
Constructing his theory Regan differentiates
between inherent value and intrinsic value. The latter may
mean certain psychical states, e.g., feeling pleasure. The
author assumes, and this seems to be a controversial
assumption, that both moral subjects (men) and moral
patients (animals) possess inherent value to a similar
degree. The criterion of possessing such a value is to be a
subject of life. According to the definition: “Individuals are
subjects of a life if they are able to perceive and
remember; if they have beliefs, desires and preferences; if
they are able to act intentionally (...); if they are sentient
(...).” (Regan 1988, 264). Regan claims that such a
criterion is a condition sufficient for ascribing some
inherent value to higher animals.
As a result all moral subjects and all moral patients
have the right to be treated with respect and not to be
harmed. From the rights theory there result some definite
rules of man’s behaviour with regard to animals. Rearing
animals on so-called factory farms should be stopped as
soon as possible. In such factories animals cannot be
treated with respect. They are treated instrumentally, and
primarily as a renewable source of meat. Hunting and
trapping evaluated from the point of view of the rights
theory should also cease, which means that the trade of
wild animals should be abolished, the fur industry
delegalised, and the same be applied to whaling. No
special privilages should be given to the endangered
species from the point of view of this theory. Animals
should not be used for educational exhibitions, in
medical/scientific experiments, in toxicity tests. It should be
strongly stressed that the above opinion refers to higher
animals, primo loco mammals. Regan, similarly as Singer,
repeats again and again that the boundaryline between
species is very unclear, therefore every doubt should be
eliminated so as to favour the interests of animals in case
of conflicting interests.
Summing up Regan notices that although his theory
questions the so far existing, well established sociocultural
practices, it is not directed against humans. He
writes: “The rights view is not antibusiness, not
antifreedom of the individual, not antiscience, not
antihuman. It is simply projustice, insisting only that the
scope of justice be seen to include respect for the rights of
animals.” (Regan 1988, 399). Therefore it seems that the
theory under discussion simply extends the sphere of
justice. In light of the above considerations radical
changes in the so far existing legislation should be
introduced as soon as possible.
In this context it should be notednote that Regan’s
theory is definitely atomistic, as the majority of moral and
legislative theories of the past are, and therefore it does
not consider the case of endangered species, as some
other theories do, for example the holistic ones, as
represented by Holmes Rolston III. (Pyra, 2003).
3. A Comparison
The consideration of the clash of interests between
humans and animals appears in some other theories, for
example in Joel Feinberg’s theory. (Feinberg, 1974). Both
within Feinberg’s and Singer’s theory the obligation to take
care of the good of animals is not conditioned by animals’
inherent value but by taking into account their interests,
which can be evaluated and either accepted or discarded
as more or less important than human interests.
Both Singer and Regan are conscious that their
radical theories are, for the time being at least, utopian.
But they both think that the sphere of beings to whom
rights have been granted in history has become, and is
constantly becoming, wider and wider. Some new groups
of humans (but all the time humans only!) were gradually
granted rights, for example: slaves, convicted men,
women, blacks. In this context Regan stresses the fact that
law as such recognizes some artificial subjects of law,
such as foundations. Therefore it would seem strange to
deny animals, especially mammals, some rights. Rights
usually correspond to duties, and animals cannot have any
duties, but the situation is similar to that one when small
children or retarded people cannot bear any duties at all,
but nevertheless have different rights. Singer shares a
similar opinion in this respect. It seems that there is no
symmetry needed between rights and duties as far as
legislation is concerned.
It should be underlined that both theoreticians, who
aspire to constructing a new ecological ethics, are not
interested in the problem of endangered species and in the
world of plants.
Singer constructs his ethics beginning with utilitarian
theories, whereas Regan referrs to deontological theories.
Singer, unlike Regan, does not grant animals moral rights
as such. The Australian philospher tries to convince
people to become vegetarians, whereas the American
writer thinks that Singer’s utilitarian calculus does not
make much sense. Regan is less radical than Singer; he
assumes that there are millions of people in the world who
live from raising cattle, and should such business stop
abruptly they would lose their means of economic survival.
In addition to this many other businesses are connected
with animal farming; they would most obviously also
collapse. Singer assumes that each suffering is bad and
each pleasure is good, whereas this is not always true,
claims Regan. The ability to feel (sentience) surves as a
survival tool and is secondary as far as the existence of
individuals is concerned. For example, pain is an indicator
showing in what physical condition a given organism is.
267