Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

296
Against cultural identity: a family resemblance perspective on intercultural relations - Marina Sbisà
this word. Besides being discussed from both the
theoretical and the interpretive point of view in philosophy
(e.g. Bambrough 1961; Baker and Hacker 1980: 185-208;
Travis 1989: 240-292) and inspiring linguistic and
psycholinguistic research on prototypes (since Rosch and
Mervis 1975), family resemblance has been applied to the
discussion of several notions of a social or cultural interest
(see e.g. Nicholson 1994 on gender). I am interested in
exploring how family resemblance applies to cultural
identity and, beyond it, intercultural relations. In this
exploration, I will rely on the reading of §§65-76 of the
Investigations I have sketchily outlined above (I am aware
it would require further discussion, but I cannot argue for it
in detail in this paper).
3. Cultural identities in a family
resemblance perspective
There are various ways of using family resemblance to
criticize socially accepted beliefs and expectations about
cultural identities.
A first kind of use comes in when we realize that
individuals that are said to fall under a certain collective
identitary denomination of a cultural kind never match
exactly its alleged defining features. Just as there are
kinds of bird closer to the prototype associated with the
word "bird" and kinds of bird more and more peripheral
with respect to it (ostrichs, penguins, even Archaeopteryx),
there are individual, personal identities that best reflect the
prototype associated with a certain cultural denomination
and personal identities more and more marginal with
respect to it. So we start seeing how wrong it is to force
people to strive for a "pure" cultural identity (under pain of
being excluded from that cultural identity altogether). This
approach, however, does not deny the reality of cultural
identities: their nature becomes that of psycho-social
models. People might still feel inadequate if they fail to
perfectly match one such model.
A second kind of use comes in when we realize that
collective identitary denominations of the cultural kind do
not correspond to perfectly defined models, but are
themselves grounded in
family resemblance relations. The use of family
resemblance proposed above focused on the cultural
identity of individuals, and therefore on instances or tokens
of cultural identity as opposed to types. But types of
cultural identity are themselves difficult to define and
delimit. To start with, how finely should they be cut? is
there one Western cultural identity, or many? are there a
North-American cultural identity and an European one? but
why not cut North-American cultural identity more finely, to
cope with ethnic differences, South and North, and what
not? Why not cut European cultural identity into national
identities or identities connected with ethnos or
environment? and what about, say, Jewish identity? If I
think of the region in which I live, I am tempted to assign to
my town, Trieste, a peculiar cultural identity (in virtue of its
history, literature, etc.), but at a closer look there are at
least two such cultural identities (connected, respectively,
with the Italian-speaking majority and the Slovenespeaking
minority) (see Sbisà and Vascotto 2001). There
seems to be no fixed end to the search for pure, perfectly
defined types of cultural identity: no one is such. So why
not analyze types of cultural identity into their manifold
dimensions and admit that any value assigned to any of
these dimensions contributes to connecting that type of
cultural identity with other types of cultural identity along a
specific chain of resemblances, so that no single clear-cut
border is given? In this way, we start seeing that no
cultural identity is completely isolated. But this approach
can still allow for the idea that there are clear-cut
distinctions, if not among peripheral cases, at least
between prototypical cores. There is clearly no overlap
between, say, the bird prototype and the reptile prototype,
even if being a bird and being a reptile split each into many
interconnected subtypes some of which may appear as
borderline cases.
But a third step can still be taken, especially if we
see family resemblance as deconstructing the very notion
of a concept, thus depriving concepts of any kind of
existence qua things. In this perspective, cultural identities
(at the type level) are no more existent things than
concepts. There is nothing more about "being a C..." apart
from collocating oneself, along each of a certain number of
the relevant dimensions of cultural identity, in a position
similar to that of other individuals accepted as Cs by the
relevant audience. Descriptions of types of cultural identity
("A C is...") are not descriptions, more or less accurate, of
something existing, but either context-driven
generalizations from individuals accepted as Cs or
contributions to the construction of stereotypes or models,
which in turn do not aim at reflecting reality, but have a
more or less apparent normative function.
4. How to cope with troubles
The most widespread attitude as regards intercultural
relations is still inspired (to echo Wittgenstein's way of
speaking in such passages as §71, §88, §§99ff.) by an
ideal of perfect delimitation. A change of attitude, adopting
the family resemblance perspective, would enable us to
cope with the troubles we have initially described and
perhaps prevent some of them from arising.
(1) Failures in intercultural communication. The family
resemblance perspective has no problem in
acknowledging difficulties in intercultural
communication and appreciating the importance of
the acknowledgement of each other's difference and
autonomy. This does not mean that it presupposes
generalized incommensurability; on the contrary, it
allows for understanding and comparison, albeit not
thanks to a unique recipe, but to the several partial
paths, tracing specific chains of resemblances, that
can be opened on occasion in the landscape of
cultural differences.
(2) Worries for the preservation of one's cultural identity
and of cultural differences. These worries have no
longer any point, at least as regards the cultural
identities of individuals. Whatever cultural identity
each individual happens to possess, whether "pure"
or hybrid, whether close to those of the most
prototypical members of the relevant cultural group
or quite peripheral, he or she has a right to possess
it. Hybrid identities, which raise lots of problems
both at the individual and at the social level when
we search for the perfect delimitation of cultural
identities, are recognized as being, not the
exception, but the rule. The family resemblance
perspective enables us to defend cultural identities
and differences from globalization processes,
without falling prey to normative stereotypes.
Possible worries for the right of cultural communities
(as opposed to individuals) to their own cultural
identity can be addressed indirectly (for recognition
of rights to communities would reintroduce claims to
the perfect delimitation of cultural identities) on the