Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

More documents

Recommendations

Info

4. Intercultural Argumentation I will now apply the gained insights to intercultural argumentation. Cultures are groups of persons. An argumentation situation AS is intercultural iff the two persons belong to different cultures. My view is that the following three theses hold: 1. Within one culture there dominates one view about justification and rationality i.e. typical representatives of one culture have similar beliefs about justification and rationality concerning argumentation. 2. Cultural processes like education by parents, in school or at universities are responsible for the dominating views about justification and rationality within a culture. 3. It is possible that in different cultures different views about justification dominate i.e. it is possible that typical representatives of different cultures have different beliefs about justification and rationality. I will firstly investigate argumentations within one culture and secondly focus my attention on intercultural argumentations. The central thesis about the subjective aspects of argumentation states that an argumentation in a subjectively ideal argumentation situation is successful iff both persons have the same beliefs about justification and rationality. Furthermore argumentation situations tend to be subjectively rational. The first thesis above states that typical representatives of one culture have similar beliefs about justification and rationality. Hence it follows: If an argumentation situation is not intercultural, P1 normally argues successfully in the sense that P2 believes the conclusion of the argument because of the argument. The reason why P1 argues successfully is firstly that P1 and P2 act to the best of their knowledge and secondly that P1 and P2 have the same beliefs about justification and rationality. The argumentation is successful, no matter whether the argument is in fact rational and whether its premises are in fact justified. Objective facts are not relevant for the success of argumentations within one culture. If the second thesis is true, cultural respectively educational processes are responsible for it. On the Limits of Intercultural Argumentation - Guido Melchior For intercultural argumentation holds: If different views about justification and rationality dominate in two cultures, typical members of the two cultures have different beliefs about rationality and justification. If an argumentation situation is subjectively ideal and the two persons act to the best of their knowledge, P2 believes the conclusion of Ai because of Ai iff P1 and P2 have the same beliefs about the justification of the premises and about the rationality of the argument. Since argumentation situations tend to be subjectively ideal, it holds: If an argumentation situation is intercultural, P1 normally argues successfully in the sense that P2 believes the conclusion of the argument because of the argument iff in both cultures the same views about justification and rationality dominate. There are different possibilities, why an intercultural argumentation can fail. One reason is that a person is simply that narrow minded that she does not accept the arguments of a representative of a different culture no matter if she regards the arguments as rational or not. This thesis states that even if both persons act to the best of their knowledge and are willing to accept arguments which are presented in an intercultural argumentation, the argumentation will only succeed if the two cultures share the same concepts about justification and rationality. In this sense the possibilities of intercultural argumentation are limited. Good will and open mindedness is not sufficient. These consequences are general. Therefore they also hold for representatives of scientifically orientated cultures in which the scientific picture of justification and rationality dominates, i.e. they also hold for us. If we argue to a person of a different culture or if she argues to us and if we both act to the best of our knowledge we both will only argue successfully if also the other person is a member of a scientifically orientated culture. The fact that we as well as others are open minded and act to the best of our knowledge does not guarantee successful intercultural argumentation. 197
Wittgenstein, Cavell, and the Fall of Philosophy Thomas Meyer, Temple University, USA Over the past fifteen years of his interpretive writing, Stanley Cavell has returned on numerous occasions to an articulation of the Emersonian themes of our fall and recovery, themes he finds animating the later years of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophical work. On Cavell’s account, the notion of a fall from out of the dynamic and engaged condition of our participation in our cultural discourses and practices, a notion Ralph Waldo Emerson explores in the essays at the heart of his contribution to romanticism, captures a series of dynamics that accompany the manner of descent into philosophy which Wittgenstein carefully describes in his later writings. For Cavell, this striking and, as of his earlier The Claim of Reason, rather unanticipated interpretive turn, carries a number of consequences for the proper reading of Wittgenstein’s engagement with the philosophical tradition. Wittgenstein’s diagnosis of a cycle of collapse into philosophical nonsense offers, for Cavell, a prospect of a return, however fleeting, to the everyday, a return from our avoidance and abandonment, and a turn towards the attunements and criteria of our meaning and understanding. In portraying Emerson and Wittgenstein’s analogous projects in philosophy, Cavell strikingly locates in Wittgenstein’s work a conception of culture, and of its distinctive philosophical modes of variation, that links Wittgenstein to a broad range of figures writing as it were in the philosophy of culture. Wittgenstein, along with Emerson, diagnoses a pattern of cultural decline and sundering from our meaningful engagement, to which his own work provides a distinctive form of response. Throughout Cavell’s discussion, however, neither Emerson’s conception of the dynamism of the laws of our intellect, nor Wittgenstein’s treatment of the Weltbild manifest in our practice, modify the return as Cavell has rendered it. Indeed, both Emerson and Wittgenstein may be able to contribute to a more detailed presentation of the cultural participation to which we return, through their writing, one that reestablishes a layer of engagement between the individual and the universal, that of the immanence of engaged participation, which Cavell seeks to describe. As we recover from the fall into philosophy, for Wittgenstein, we return properly not only to criteria but also to a picture of the world from which we have been sundered, one animating our practices, inhabiting our ways of acting, and engaging us with the commitments and beliefs that sustain us. Cavell’s argument for an analogy between Wittgenstein and Emerson conceives of their shared philosophical task as one of restoring their readers to a participation in a common cultural enterprise from which they have fallen, a common to which they are unable otherwise to return. On Cavell’s account, the details of this fall and reconstitution concern the loss of engagement in meaningful discourses or practices, primarily evidenced for Emerson in a stagnant culture of conformity, and for Wittgenstein in the emptiness of disengaged assertion that accompanies the degradation of philosophical discourse into nonsense. Cavell sees the alternate sides of this phenomenon registering their presence in a parallel development: In Emerson’s terms, the sides may be called those of self-reliance and conformity; in Wittgenstein’s terms, those of the privacy and emptiness of assertion he calls 198 metaphysical, and the dispersal of this empty assertiveness by what he calls leading words home, his image of thinking (Cavell [1995] 28). To Cavell, the contrast of static conformity in Emerson’s account with the dynamism of self-reliance provides a framework within which to place the moments and movement of Wittgenstein’s later work. Wittgenstein, as Cavell renders his writing, draws philosophers away from the disengaged machinations of skepticism or metaphysics, and back towards meaning in a setting of mutual attunement. Both thinkers find their readers adrift from practical or discursive engagement, and fallen into exile. Wittgenstein’s promise of “peace” or “rest” after restlessness is, in his practice, something lost almost as soon as it is found, not a promise that projects a realm of refuge, so his philosophical stance of contradiction and dissatisfaction in effect assumes an independence from whatever world this imperfect one turns out to be (Cavell [2005] 202). Wittgenstein’s treatments of philosophy trace the wrong turnings he finds in the tradition, and directs us onward toward a reengagement, however momentary, in an ordinary that still may be fraught with further philosophical movements. Cavell sees the perspicuity of Wittgenstein’s contributions as emanating from a form of engagement that can be representative for the experience of others, enacting himself a process of return from philosophical entanglement in which Wittgenstein stands for humanity itself. Cavell includes himself, along with Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin, and even Emerson, among the practitioners of philosophical autobiography. Philosophers who proceed as Austin suggests will not be much interested to poll others for their opinion about such crossroads. Then why do such philosophers say “we” instead of “I”? … Their basis is autobiographical, but they evidently take what they do and say to be representative or exemplary of the human condition as such. … Can it be seen that each of us is everyone and no one? Emerson famously stakes the oscillation: “I am God in nature; I am a weed by the wall” (“Circles”) (Cavell [1994] 8-9). On Cavell’s model, we are drawn back to engagement in the discourses and practices of our culture through the work of a philosophical autobiography that stakes itself in its own engagement rather than an edifying metaphysics. What may seem a hopelessly individual process of confession takes on a universal validity, and draws us to be exemplars of engagement and meaning likewise ourselves. Cavell therefore offers us a return in which we regain individual meaningfulness and the possibility of representative universality. As his reading of Emerson stands, Cavell at times appears to conflate two understandings of the departure from conformity Emerson often is careful to distinguish. Merely passing over into episodes of enlightenment strikes Emerson as an incomplete, and sometimes perfunctory gesture of recovery from our fall, when what Emerson calls us towards rather is a dynamic alignment with the flow of nature through which our engagement with the discourses and practices of our culture is maintained. Oscillating
Page 2 and 3:
Kulturen: Konflikt-Analyse-Dialog C
Page 4 and 5:
Cultures: Conflict-Analysis-Dialogu
Page 6 and 7:
Inhalt / Contents Inhalt / Contents
Page 8 and 9:
Inhalt / Contents Zar'a-Jacob und W
Page 10:
Inhalt / Contents A Complicated For
Page 13 and 14:
12 Egoism, Coexistence, and the Pos
Page 15 and 16:
A Naturalistic Method for Therapy n
Page 17 and 18:
«views from nowhere»“ (Geertz 2
Page 19 and 20:
Our thesis is that the dichotomy be
Page 21 and 22:
Der Vorrang der Logik vor der Metap
Page 23 and 24:
sein [muss]“(TB 24.7.16), so wie
Page 25 and 26:
24 Jenseits des nichtzweifelnden Be
Page 27 and 28:
Intercultural Dialog and Mathematic
Page 29 and 30:
References 28 Intercultural Dialog
Page 31 and 32:
While half a muffin is still a piec
Page 33 and 34:
References Abrahams, Gerald 1952 Th
Page 35 and 36:
Hence Wittgenstein states: “Not,
Page 37 and 38:
About “die letzte Zusammenfassung
Page 39 and 40:
Groag remembers to have had in wint
Page 41 and 42:
Surprisingly enough, the late Wittg
Page 43 and 44:
Wittgenstein and Kripke’s Skeptic
Page 45 and 46:
5. Concluding remarks For Wittgenst
Page 47 and 48:
Here something strange happens, how
Page 49 and 50:
attribution of beliefs and the inte
Page 51 and 52:
Ist meine eigene Weltanschuung thir
Page 53 and 54:
Literatur: 52 Ist meine eigene Welt
Page 55 and 56:
54 An economist’s reflections on
Page 57 and 58:
56 An economist’s reflections on
Page 59 and 60:
How to Make Opposite Ends Meet? Ays
Page 61 and 62:
Intercultural Dialogue in Philosoph
Page 63 and 64:
62 Intercultural Dialogue in Philos
Page 65 and 66:
64 On Siamese Twins and Philosophic
Page 67 and 68:
Wittgenstein on Frege on Connective
Page 69 and 70:
Where to seek for the ‘Uniquely I
Page 71 and 72:
Searles Naturalismus: Eine seiner S
Page 73 and 74:
72 Searles Naturalismus: Eine seine
Page 75 and 76:
structures that tend to shade off i
Page 77 and 78:
Probleme der interkulturellen Philo
Page 79 and 80:
Literatur 78 Probleme der interkult
Page 81 and 82:
group theory for obtaining the basi
Page 83 and 84:
Radical Interpretation and Intercul
Page 85 and 86:
References Davidson, Donald 1984 In
Page 87 and 88:
86 Indeterminismus freier Willensen
Page 89 and 90:
Is naturalism progressive? A natura
Page 91 and 92:
References 90 Is naturalism progres
Page 93 and 94:
practice with the philosophers’ (
Page 95 and 96:
Against Their Own Intention: Proble
Page 97 and 98:
96 Against Their Own Intention: Pro
Page 99 and 100:
Recognising Beauty : On The Intercu
Page 101 and 102:
100 Recognising Beauty : On The Int
Page 103 and 104:
102 Trendwende in der Evolution? Ni
Page 105 and 106:
Postmodernismus als Argumentationst
Page 107 and 108:
106 Postmodernismus als Argumentati
Page 109 and 110:
Freud-Jung controversy: a failed in
Page 111 and 112:
wishes, anxiety, guilt and hatred,
Page 113 and 114:
References Freud, Sigmund (1912-13)
Page 115 and 116:
of water beneath a glacier and any
Page 117 and 118:
given physical world and our repres
Page 119 and 120:
would be a further substratum on wh
Page 121 and 122:
Wittgenstein and the Language of Re
Page 123 and 124:
The fact that religious attitude is
Page 125 and 126:
3. Potentials and limitations of de
Page 127 and 128:
Es gibt keinen Dissens, es gibt nur
Page 129 and 130:
128 Es gibt keinen Dissens, es gibt
Page 131 and 132:
akademischem Charakter, natürlich
Page 133 and 134:
132 Wittgenstein's Paperwork. An Ex
Page 135 and 136:
Substance and Attribute in the Cont
Page 137 and 138:
136 Substance and Attribute in the
Page 139 and 140:
Page 141 and 142:
Page 143 and 144:
understands the patient's worldview
Page 145 and 146:
Reflections on Ethics and Cultural
Page 147 and 148: cultures, unless they fail to heed
Page 149 and 150: identisch ist. Charakteristischerwe
Page 151 and 152: Nachdenken über Gewissheit - Zur A
Page 153 and 154: 152 Nachdenken über Gewissheit - Z
Page 155 and 156: 154 Zar'a-Jacob und Walda-Heiwat ü
Page 157 and 158: Wittgenstein on consciousness in
Page 159 and 160: 158 Wittgenstein on consciousness i
Page 161 and 162: Normalität vs. Naturalität Das er
Page 163 and 164: Did you do something wrong if you c
Page 165 and 166: References 164 Did you do something
Page 167 and 168: zustandekommt. Der Pyrrhoneer ist g
Page 169 and 170: Wittgenstein’s “notorious parag
Page 171 and 172: Instead, Gödel always gives a redu
Page 173 and 174: our view, this plurality of remarks
Page 175 and 176: Designation and Ontological Commitm
Page 177 and 178: 176 Designation and Ontological Com
Page 179 and 180: For one thing, those who appeal to
Page 181 and 182: On the Impossibility of Solitary Pe
Page 183 and 184: For instance, it takes creative mor
Page 185 and 186: 184 Wittgensteins Philosophieren f
Page 187 and 188: Derivativeness, production and reac
Page 189 and 190: 4. Conclusion To conclude, Anscombe
Page 191 and 192: Our concept of non-compositionality
Page 193 and 194: „Patamou“ oder „El poder de l
Page 195 and 196: Literatur Breinbauer, Ines Maria 19
Page 197: Persons can also have beliefs about
Page 201 and 202: culture in which laws of the intell
Page 203 and 204: elated in a world-picture. This I d
Page 205 and 206: Reservations to Human Rights Treati
Page 207 and 208: legal jargon calls its “objective
Page 209 and 210: Worin besteht nun dieser Zusammenha
Page 211 and 212: Do We Really Need Relativism About
Page 213 and 214: MacFarlane’s and Kölbel’s view
Page 215 and 216: It follows from this approach that
Page 217 and 218: Die Relativität von Gewißheiten K
Page 219 and 220: egierig aufgegriffen werden, insbes
Page 221 and 222: 220 Natural Language and its Speake
Page 229 and 230: Der Beitrag einer „Logik der Phil
Page 231 and 232: 230 Der Beitrag einer „Logik der
Page 233 and 234: einer ausgesprochen lockeren Sprach
Page 235 and 236: Wittgenstein, Waismann and Non-Eucl
Page 237 and 238: importance, since it appears no les
Page 239 and 240: 238 Cultural Alterity and Unilatera
Page 241 and 242: Die Opazität der Oberfläche: Witt
Page 243 and 244: unserer Sprachspiele durch unsere R
Page 245 and 246: 244 A Perspective of Dialogical Eng
Page 247 and 248: Double Meant is not Double Good: A
Page 249 and 250:
The Analytic Theory of the A Priori
Page 251 and 252:
not white, so the fact that “snow
Page 253 and 254:
252 Experience and social norms in
Page 255 and 256:
Can there be such thing as a “hop
Page 257 and 258:
feeling that was both thought or fe
Page 259 and 260:
258 Regaining the Sense of the Trac
Page 261 and 262:
Brandom on Holism, Communication, a
Page 263 and 264:
interpersonal communication is real
Page 265 and 266:
264 Action and Morality: A Reflecti
Page 267 and 268:
Peter Singer’s Utilitarianism ver
Page 269 and 270:
References 268 Peter Singer’s Uti
Page 271 and 272:
Wittgenstein affirms that what ‘g
Page 273 and 274:
Spiel der Sprache und Sprachspiel -
Page 275 and 276:
274 Spiel der Sprache und Sprachspi
Page 277 and 278:
276 ‘The riddle does not exist’
Page 279 and 280:
Zur dringend notwendigen Revision d
Page 281 and 282:
280 Zur dringend notwendigen Revisi
Page 283 and 284:
282 • dass einem die Ressourcen z
Page 285 and 286:
Deuten - Missverstehen - ‚Blasphe
Page 287 and 288:
286 Deuten - Missverstehen - ‚Bla
Page 289 and 290:
If we can learn a social practice,
Page 291 and 292:
Keine Anschauungsgrade besitzt hing
Page 293 and 294:
Life’s Infinite Variations: Wittg
Page 295 and 296:
another culture is also the sign of
Page 297 and 298:
296 Against cultural identity: a fa
Page 299 and 300:
Kann eine Person als Urheber ihrer
Page 301 and 302:
300 Kann eine Person als Urheber ih
Page 303 and 304:
Substanz, Kausalität und Freiheit
Page 305 and 306:
Im abschließenden Teil des Vortrag
Page 307 and 308:
verstehen). D.h.: das Verstehen ein
Page 309 and 310:
Towards an Intercultural Phenomenol
Page 311 and 312:
310 Towards an Intercultural Phenom
Page 313 and 314:
feel envy towards his brother witho
Page 315 and 316:
idges chronological distances; for
Page 317 and 318:
Sprache im interkulturellen Dialog
Page 319 and 320:
Abweichung in seinem Sprachgebrauch
Page 321 and 322:
kind of mythology (cf. Wittgenstein
Page 323 and 324:
Social Criticism through Internal a
Page 325 and 326:
Interkulturelle Philosophie in Russ
Page 327 and 328:
326 Interkulturelle Philosophie in
Page 329 and 330:
Wissenschaft begnügen und daher nu
Page 331 and 332:
Das, was er in seinem Brief an Herm
Page 333 and 334:
Essence/Attribute in Islamic Philos
Page 335 and 336:
Konvergenzen in grundlegenden Prinz
Page 337 and 338:
individuellen Freiheit (Stelzer 200
Page 339 and 340:
experience gives an epistemological
Page 341 and 342:
The Fraissè Theorem and Goodman’
Page 343 and 344:
3.5) i) Sentences satisfied by elem
Page 345 and 346:
Outline of Arguments against Natura
Page 347 and 348:
346 Outline of Arguments against Na
Page 349 and 350:
Reason, red in tooth and claw: natu
Page 351 and 352:
Importantly, where Pascal saw in hu
Page 353 and 354:
352 The Significance of Intercultur
Page 355 and 356:
354 Wittgenstein, the artistic way
Page 357 and 358:
A Neo-pragmatist Approach to Interc
Page 359 and 360:
358 A Neo-pragmatist Approach to In
Page 361 and 362:
360 A Neo-pragmatist Approach to In
Page 363 and 364:
Aber der Löwe spricht eben nicht!
Page 365 and 366:
364 Aber der Löwe spricht eben nic
Page 367 and 368:
366 From Anti-Metaphysics to Non-Py
Page 369 and 370:
Respective Justice through Thick an
Page 371 and 372:
Normativity and Novelty Tine Wilde,
Page 373 and 374:
References Baz, Avnar: 2000, ‘Wha
Page 375 and 376:
374 Towards an Intercultural Phenom
Page 377 and 378:
Das Problem des metaphysischen Subj
Page 379 and 380:
378 Das Problem des metaphysischen
Page 381:
380 Das Problem des metaphysischen
show all

Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?