Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society
Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society
Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society
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5. Conclusion<br />
We briefly glanced at two points of view on the influence of<br />
the mind on perception. One of them goes back to<br />
Descartes and presupposes that mind and body are<br />
absolute independent, because perception fulfilled by the<br />
body is free from the mind’s influences. The second view<br />
was founded in the philosophy of science by Francis<br />
Bacon, who showed that we do not become free from the<br />
influences of the mind when we perceive. The first position<br />
considers the perception as reflection, or copy of reality,<br />
the second one acknowledges that perception always<br />
depends on former experience, available knowledge and<br />
so on.<br />
Both positions have some followers and, to sum up,<br />
let me once again name some corollaries of acceptance<br />
for one or the other position.<br />
Perception as mirrowreflection<br />
The scientific fact is<br />
reliable evidence<br />
The truth value of a<br />
proposition can be<br />
established by the<br />
confrontation with<br />
experience<br />
A single statement can be<br />
justified<br />
The meanings of some<br />
names are established by<br />
ostension<br />
Senses are objective and<br />
different speakers can<br />
grasp the same senses<br />
and transmit a given<br />
thought to other speakers<br />
Two Viewpoints On Perception: Possibility of Dialog - Anna Storozhuk<br />
Perception as action<br />
The scientific fact is a<br />
subject of the historical<br />
development.<br />
The truth value of a<br />
proposition depends on the<br />
observation conditions.<br />
holism<br />
Indetermination of ostension<br />
Indetermination of<br />
perception by data<br />
Indetermination of theory be<br />
the facts<br />
The results of recent scientific investigations give<br />
arguments in support of Bacon’s view on the influence of<br />
the mind on perception. This position is not appreciated by<br />
some philosophers because to explain the mechanism of<br />
the influence it is necessary to take a whole series of<br />
arbitrary assumptions. The physiology and psychology<br />
data allow us to throw light on the mechanism although<br />
many gaps still remain.<br />
The basic part of philosophical concepts is defined<br />
with the assumption that perception is a representation of<br />
reality. Although the viewpoint that perception is active has<br />
been finding more and more followers lately, and many<br />
philosophers have been making important remarks about<br />
theory-ladenness, a systematic analysis of the observation<br />
concept has yet to be carried out.<br />
* With support of the Grant of President of Russian<br />
Federation MK-1650. 2005. 6.<br />
References<br />
Bacon, F. 2000 The New Organon. Cambridge.<br />
Galison, P.L. 1987 How Experiments End. Chicago.<br />
Descartes, R. Rules for the Direction of Our Native Intelligence in:<br />
Descartes: Selected Philosophical Writing (Cambridge, 1988).<br />
Fleck, L. 1979 Genesis and Development of a Scientific fact.<br />
Chicago.<br />
Hanson, N.R. 1958 Patterns of Discovery. Cambridge.<br />
Quine, W. V. 1950 “Identity, ostension, and hypostasis”, Journal of<br />
Philosophy 47, pp. 621-633.<br />
Quine, W.V. 1951 “Two dogmas of empiricism”, Philosophical<br />
Review 60(1), pp. 20-43.<br />
Radder, H. 1996 In and About the World: Philosophical Studies of<br />
Science and Technology. New York.<br />
Russell, B. 1997 An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. London.<br />
Tarski, A. 1956 The concept of truth in formalized languages, in:<br />
Logic, Semantics Metamathematics: Papers from 1923 to 1938.<br />
Translated by J.H. Woodger. Oxford.<br />
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