Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

Towards an Intercultural Phenomenology? – Objectivity,
Subjectivity and the Constitution of Otherness
Eva Schwarz, University of Graz, Austria
I
Husserlian phenomenology mainly deals with the relation
between world and subject. Thus, transcendental
phenomenology is concerned with the conditions of the
possibility of any reference to the world. The methodical
operation of the phenomenological reduction brings to the
fore the transcendental structures which are already
effective, but nevertheless non-thematic in the natural
attitude.
Even if we accept the methodological considerations
so far, 1 one could ask whether there are not serious
problems with regard to the topic of intersubjectivity in
general and the topic of interculturality in particular. It has
repeatedly been objected that Husserlian phenomenology
has to be regarded as a quasi-solipsism which cannot do
justice to the experiential fact of intersubjectivity at all (Apel
1973, 83). Against this, I want to argue the following:
Certainly, the performance of the reduction entails a
restriction to the sphere of immanence. This, however, has
to be seen as a purely methodical operation which implies
no ontological consequences whatsoever. To put the world
into brackets simply means to put the validity of the world
out of action. This implies that after the reduction the
negation or even the questioning of the world becomes an
impossibility for the phenomenologist. Thus, in her
analysis, she is neither – as objected – restricted to an
inner sphere of privacy (introspection), nor to a mere
description of “absolute” giveness. Rather – as Husserl
has extensively discussed in three volumes of the
“Husserliana” and in the fifth Cartesian meditation – the
performance of the reduction reveals the close relationship
between subjective and intersubjective constitution. In
order to support this, Husserl suggests the thought
experiment of the primordial reduction (Husserl 1950, 124
ff): To perform this thought experiment means to remove
from one’s experience all that which refers to other egos.
This means to critically reflect upon all experiential
phenomena which transcend the purely subjective
constitution with regard to their intentional content. To put
it differently: Obviously we are able to mark certain
phenomena as objectively given in opposition to others.
But every time we mark something as “objectively given”,
the intentional content of “objectivity” entails the necessity
of intersubjective reference and constitution. Therefore
Husserl eventually came to the result that transcendental
subjectivity in its full complexity is transcendental
intersubjectivity (Husserl 1959, 129).
Another line of critique was articulated from within
the phenomenological movement itself: Even if it is
possible to account for the importance of intersubjectivity
on a theoretical level, one could wonder whether it is
possible to do justice to this topic on the level of facticity,
i.e., on the level of the concrete encounter with the Other.
Does – as objected for example by Maurice Merleau-Ponty
in his lecture about Husserl’s “Origins of Geometry”
(Merleau-Ponty 2002) – phenomenology run the risk of
falling prey to unjustified idealizations in performing the
1 For further clarifications of the methodological prerequisites of this essay cf.
the essay of Harald A. Wiltsche in this volume.
308
reduction? Is this seemingly abstract account of
intersubjectivity even a violation of the phenomenological
maxim “to the things themselves”? Does this – if it is the
case – endanger the possibility of an “intercultural
phenomenology”? 2
II
If one asks for an “application” of transcendental
phenomenology to “concrete” problems of interculturality,
one has to define the concept of concreteness to which
one is referring. The problem of the Other as it is posed by
phenomenology is a genuine philosophical issue. Under
normal circumstances we trust in our ability to recognise
the Other as an Other, without ever reflecting upon this.
However, there are deviant situations which motivate a
certain “breach” of this tacit confidence: Consider the
extreme example of a comatose patient but also the
encounter with a culturally different Other whose reactions
possibly do not meet our expectations. Situations like
these can motivate a certain change of attitude which can
be regarded as a “mundane prototype” of the
phenomenological reduction (Husserl 1954, 141 ff). We
could start wondering how an Other is given to us under
normal circumstances. Furthermore, we could start asking
what the difference between “normal” and “deviant”
situations exactly is and how our tacit confidence in the
possibility of “normal” understanding could be justified at
all. Thus, within the phenomenological attitude we
suspend this tacit confidence (together with all other
presuppositions of the natural attitude) and restrict
ourselves to the modes in which the Other is given in direct
intuition.
To ask for the givenness of an Other means to ask
for the constitution of an Other. Obviously, there is a
remarkable difference between the constitution of an Other
and for instance the constitution of physical objects. A
coffee cup is always given in adumbrations, i.e., in an
interplay of presence and absence. Similar to this, an
Other is also given in time and space, i.e., certainly via her
body she is given as a physical object. The coffee cup as
well as the human body transcend every possible mode of
subjective reference. Naturally, this is not the whole story:
Whereas “givenness in adumbrations” in the case of the
coffee cup means that we are always able to transfer every
absent aspect into a present one (e.g. in changing our
perspective or in manipulating the coffee cup), this is not
the case with respect to all relevant dimensions of a
concrete Other. So, how can we account for this dimension
of the Other which is generally absent to us?
One classical strategy do deal with the problem at
hand is the “simulation theory of other minds” that provides
us with an argument from analogy: One could argue that
all which is directly given is the relation between my mental
states and my corresponding bodily behaviour (e.g.
2 Within this essay „intercultural phenomenology“ is understood as a
transcendental meta-science that provides a reflective basis for certain
empirical investigations. “Intercultural phenomenology” in this sense does not
aim at mediating between different cultures but rather accounts for the
conditions of possibility of reflection on intercultural dialogue as such (cf.
Mohanty 2000; Orth 1984; Waldenfels 1998).