Preproceedings 2006 - Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

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Towards an Intercultural Phenomenology? – Objectivity, Subjectivity and … - Eva Schwarz whenever I am in pain, I am crying; whenever I am happy to see my friend, I am smiling) on the one side and the bodily presence of the Other on the other side (Gordon 1986; Heal 1986). As we can see, the relation between me and the Other is asymmetric: “Mental states” and “behaviour” on the one side, but only “behaviour” on the other. Therefore, why not infer that if there is behaviour then there have to be mental states too? Correspondingly, one could state, that whenever the Other is crying, it is possible to infer that the Other has to be in pain as well. However, this “argument from analogy” is highly problematic: First of all, we should critically ask whether this argument is a valid argument at all. If it were true that I had knowledge about the relation between my own mental states and my behaviour, what would that mean for the relation between me and the Other? Strictly speaking, if I could make a direct inference between my own mental states and my own bodily behaviour – which would seem to require already a third-person-perspective on my body – all I could infer is a relation between my mental states, my behaviour and the behaviour of the Other. I cannot see why this argument should provide us with an account of someone else’s mental states or – to say it differently – why the Other should not be a marionette of my own mental states (Zahavi 2005, 148 ff). Apart from these absurd formal consequences, from a phenomenological viewpoint one has to ask whether the fact of recognising an Other is a matter of inference at all: Is it really the case that there is a sharp distinction between my mental states and my bodily behaviour? After the phenomenological reduction was performed, certainly not. What is given in direct intuition are not “mental states” and “bodily behaviour”, but meaningful situations, actions and smiling friends. The distinction between “mental states” and “behaviour” is a theoretical one which has to be bracketed in order to gain the phenomenological attitude. Even more than that: Within the phenomenological attitude, the Other is not given to us as a “bodily mantle” which makes us wonder whether there are mental states “in it”. First and foremost, the Other is given to us as the intentional content “Other”, i.e. as my neighbour, my friend, the stranger from a foreign culture. In order to recognise an Other, the differentiation between “mental states” and “behaviour“ is misleading. It makes it impossible to recognize an Other as an “other Self”, by paving the way to the Other as an object. In encountering an Other we do not apply any knowledge about analogies and inferences. Otherwise, we could not explain for instance, why babies recognise their mother even at an age where one would not expect them to be in possession of theoretical concepts of that kind (Fuchs 2000, 275 ff). However, what is the scope of these phenomenological insights? One could critically ask whether phenomenology gives us better explanations than for instance the “argument from analogy”. Against such objections, one has to bear in mind that phenomenology does not aim at explanations of this kind at all. Rather, phenomenological analysis critically reflects upon the convictions, other theories already presuppose in formulating their questions and answers. To put it differently: Phenomenology helps us to limit the scope of meaningful scientific inquiry without transgressing the boundaries to positive science. III Consequently, a phenomenologist is concerned with an investigation of the intentional content “otherness”, in reflectively detaching herself from the involvement in concrete situations in which “otherness” appears (Husserl 1959, 106-108). Thus, as a phenomenologist one is interested in the essential structures of intersubjective encounters: concrete encounters with Others may differ with respect to various aspects (e.g. the degree of cultural foreignness, the aspect of language etc.) but there have to be certain meaning-structures which allow us to recognise an Other as an Other. Maybe the most important insight of a phenomenological analysis is that the intentional content “Other” cannot be reduced to the constitutional abilities of the Ego, i.e. to my constitutional acts. First and foremost, the Other is constituted as constituting, i.e. as an acting, perceiving etc. alter Ego. Referring to the “argument from analogy”, the relation between Ego and alter Ego is indeed asymmetric, but in a very special sense. On the most basic level, it is no relation of knowledge versus inaccessibility, but rather of mutual constitution. In recognising the Other as an Other, I have to recognise myself as an Other for the Other. However, at first sight this may seem trivial. One could argue that the acceptance of this reciprocity does not help us in solving the urgent question of how to gain access to an Other. But from a phenomenological point of view this question is not only inadequate, it disguises the very phenomenon of otherness. To recognise the Other as an Other, i.e., to constitute the Other as constituting means to accept that I cannot have the experiences of the Other. Having the experiences of the Other would mean to be the Other. Seen from this viewpoint, the search for an access to something which is supposed to be behind the façade of otherness is to miss the genuine phenomenon of otherness. It is needless to say that this entails some important consequences for the question of interculturality: First of all, on this most basic level every Other is a “radical Other”, i.e., there are no “shades of otherness”. On the level of phenomenological investigation my neighbour is by no means less foreign than a tribesman I have never seen before. Certainly, this does not hold true for our every-day encounters: By birth we are embedded in an all-embracing horizon of language, of social, historical, personal and cultural structures. This horizon regulates the encounter with our neighbour much more effectively than the encounter with a tribesman. However, the scientific description of this horizon, the question of translatability etc. are empirical questions which do not lie within the scope of transcendental-phenomenological inquiry. Phenomenological investigation is concerned with the conditions of the possibility of such horizons; it is concerned with the relation between self, Other and world, i.e., with those structures which are always presupposed when we recognise someone as an Other within certain horizons and contexts. In following these methodological decisions, phenomenology takes up a position which can account for the fact of cultural relativity but escapes relativism. To account for the otherness of the Other means to accept the fact the no Other will ever be fully transparent to us. On the empirical level of description, translation and understanding there is always the possibility of error and refutation. But this does not lead us to a relativist position. In dealing with errors, refutations and misunderstandings we already presuppose a tacit level of transcendental structures which make it possible to even recognise 309
310 Towards an Intercultural Phenomenology? – Objectivity, Subjectivity and … - Eva Schwarz cultural differences. These transcendental structures (e.g. intentionality, embodiment, inner time- consciousness, activity and passivity etc.) provide us with a framework which makes the picture of the “many worlds” meaningful without sacrificing the enterprise of objective science. References Apel, Karl-Otto 1973 Transformation der Philosophie. Bd. 2: Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft, Frankfurt a. Main: Suhrkamp Fuchs, Thomas 2000 Leib, Raum, Person. Entwurf einer phänomenologischen Anthropologie, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta Gordon, Robert M. 1986 “Folk psychology as simulation”, Mind and Language 1, 158-71 Heal, Jane 1986 "Replication and functionalism", in: Jeremy Butterfield (ed.), Language, Mind, and Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 135-50 Husserl, Edmund 1950 Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge, ed. by Stephan Strasser, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (Husserliana vol. I) Husserl, Edmund 1954 Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie, ed. by Walter Biemel, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (Husserliana vol. VI) Husserl, Edmund 1959 Erste Philosophie (1923/24), Zweiter Teil: Theorie der Phänomenologischen Reduktion. ed. by Rudolf Böhm, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (Husserliana vol. VIII) Mohanty, Jitendra Nath 2000 The Self and its Other. Philosophical Essays, New Delhi: Oxford University Press Merleau-Ponty, Maurice 2002, Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, ed. by Leonard Lawlor with Bettina Bergo, Evanston: Northwestern University Press Orth, Ernst Wolfgang 1984 “Probleme der Kulturphilosophie und der Kulturanthropologie in der Phänomenologie”, in: Lester Embree (ed.) Essays in Memory of Aron Gurwitsch, Washington: The University Press of America Waldenfels, Bernhard 1998 “Homeworld and Alienworld”, in: Ernst Wolfgang Orth and Chan-Fai Cheung (eds.) Phenomenology of interculturality and life-world, München: Alber (Phänomenologische Forschungen; Sonderbd.) 72-88 Zahavi, Dan 2005 Subjectivity and Selfhood. Investigating the First- Person Perspective, Cambridge and London: The MIT Press
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Kulturen: Konflikt-Analyse-Dialog C
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Cultures: Conflict-Analysis-Dialogu
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Inhalt / Contents Inhalt / Contents
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Inhalt / Contents Zar'a-Jacob und W
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Inhalt / Contents A Complicated For
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12 Egoism, Coexistence, and the Pos
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A Naturalistic Method for Therapy n
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«views from nowhere»“ (Geertz 2
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Our thesis is that the dichotomy be
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Der Vorrang der Logik vor der Metap
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sein [muss]“(TB 24.7.16), so wie
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24 Jenseits des nichtzweifelnden Be
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Intercultural Dialog and Mathematic
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References 28 Intercultural Dialog
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While half a muffin is still a piec
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References Abrahams, Gerald 1952 Th
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Hence Wittgenstein states: “Not,
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About “die letzte Zusammenfassung
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Groag remembers to have had in wint
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Surprisingly enough, the late Wittg
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Wittgenstein and Kripke’s Skeptic
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5. Concluding remarks For Wittgenst
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Here something strange happens, how
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attribution of beliefs and the inte
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Ist meine eigene Weltanschuung thir
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Literatur: 52 Ist meine eigene Welt
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54 An economist’s reflections on
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56 An economist’s reflections on
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How to Make Opposite Ends Meet? Ays
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Intercultural Dialogue in Philosoph
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62 Intercultural Dialogue in Philos
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64 On Siamese Twins and Philosophic
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Wittgenstein on Frege on Connective
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Where to seek for the ‘Uniquely I
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Searles Naturalismus: Eine seiner S
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72 Searles Naturalismus: Eine seine
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structures that tend to shade off i
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Probleme der interkulturellen Philo
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Literatur 78 Probleme der interkult
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group theory for obtaining the basi
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Radical Interpretation and Intercul
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References Davidson, Donald 1984 In
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86 Indeterminismus freier Willensen
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Is naturalism progressive? A natura
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References 90 Is naturalism progres
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practice with the philosophers’ (
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Against Their Own Intention: Proble
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96 Against Their Own Intention: Pro
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Recognising Beauty : On The Intercu
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100 Recognising Beauty : On The Int
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102 Trendwende in der Evolution? Ni
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Postmodernismus als Argumentationst
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106 Postmodernismus als Argumentati
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Freud-Jung controversy: a failed in
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wishes, anxiety, guilt and hatred,
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References Freud, Sigmund (1912-13)
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of water beneath a glacier and any
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given physical world and our repres
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would be a further substratum on wh
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Wittgenstein and the Language of Re
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The fact that religious attitude is
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3. Potentials and limitations of de
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Es gibt keinen Dissens, es gibt nur
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128 Es gibt keinen Dissens, es gibt
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akademischem Charakter, natürlich
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132 Wittgenstein's Paperwork. An Ex
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Substance and Attribute in the Cont
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136 Substance and Attribute in the
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understands the patient's worldview
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Reflections on Ethics and Cultural
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cultures, unless they fail to heed
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identisch ist. Charakteristischerwe
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Nachdenken über Gewissheit - Zur A
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152 Nachdenken über Gewissheit - Z
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154 Zar'a-Jacob und Walda-Heiwat ü
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Wittgenstein on consciousness in
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158 Wittgenstein on consciousness i
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Normalität vs. Naturalität Das er
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Did you do something wrong if you c
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References 164 Did you do something
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zustandekommt. Der Pyrrhoneer ist g
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Wittgenstein’s “notorious parag
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Instead, Gödel always gives a redu
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our view, this plurality of remarks
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Designation and Ontological Commitm
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176 Designation and Ontological Com
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For one thing, those who appeal to
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On the Impossibility of Solitary Pe
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For instance, it takes creative mor
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184 Wittgensteins Philosophieren f
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Derivativeness, production and reac
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4. Conclusion To conclude, Anscombe
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Our concept of non-compositionality
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„Patamou“ oder „El poder de l
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Literatur Breinbauer, Ines Maria 19
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Persons can also have beliefs about
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Wittgenstein, Cavell, and the Fall
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culture in which laws of the intell
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elated in a world-picture. This I d
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Reservations to Human Rights Treati
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legal jargon calls its “objective
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Worin besteht nun dieser Zusammenha
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Do We Really Need Relativism About
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MacFarlane’s and Kölbel’s view
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It follows from this approach that
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Die Relativität von Gewißheiten K
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egierig aufgegriffen werden, insbes
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220 Natural Language and its Speake
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Der Beitrag einer „Logik der Phil
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230 Der Beitrag einer „Logik der
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einer ausgesprochen lockeren Sprach
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Wittgenstein, Waismann and Non-Eucl
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importance, since it appears no les
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238 Cultural Alterity and Unilatera
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Die Opazität der Oberfläche: Witt
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unserer Sprachspiele durch unsere R
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244 A Perspective of Dialogical Eng
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Double Meant is not Double Good: A
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The Analytic Theory of the A Priori
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not white, so the fact that “snow
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252 Experience and social norms in
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Can there be such thing as a “hop
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feeling that was both thought or fe
Page 259 and 260: 258 Regaining the Sense of the Trac
Page 261 and 262: Brandom on Holism, Communication, a
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Page 265 and 266: 264 Action and Morality: A Reflecti
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Page 269 and 270: References 268 Peter Singer’s Uti
Page 271 and 272: Wittgenstein affirms that what ‘g
Page 273 and 274: Spiel der Sprache und Sprachspiel -
Page 275 and 276: 274 Spiel der Sprache und Sprachspi
Page 277 and 278: 276 ‘The riddle does not exist’
Page 279 and 280: Zur dringend notwendigen Revision d
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Page 289 and 290: If we can learn a social practice,
Page 291 and 292: Keine Anschauungsgrade besitzt hing
Page 293 and 294: Life’s Infinite Variations: Wittg
Page 295 and 296: another culture is also the sign of
Page 297 and 298: 296 Against cultural identity: a fa
Page 299 and 300: Kann eine Person als Urheber ihrer
Page 301 and 302: 300 Kann eine Person als Urheber ih
Page 303 and 304: Substanz, Kausalität und Freiheit
Page 305 and 306: Im abschließenden Teil des Vortrag
Page 307 and 308: verstehen). D.h.: das Verstehen ein
Page 309: Towards an Intercultural Phenomenol
Page 313 and 314: feel envy towards his brother witho
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Page 321 and 322: kind of mythology (cf. Wittgenstein
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Page 349 and 350: Reason, red in tooth and claw: natu
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Page 353 and 354: 352 The Significance of Intercultur
Page 355 and 356: 354 Wittgenstein, the artistic way
Page 357 and 358: A Neo-pragmatist Approach to Interc
Page 359 and 360: 358 A Neo-pragmatist Approach to In
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360 A Neo-pragmatist Approach to In
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Aber der Löwe spricht eben nicht!
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364 Aber der Löwe spricht eben nic
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366 From Anti-Metaphysics to Non-Py
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Respective Justice through Thick an
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Normativity and Novelty Tine Wilde,
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References Baz, Avnar: 2000, ‘Wha
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374 Towards an Intercultural Phenom
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Das Problem des metaphysischen Subj
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378 Das Problem des metaphysischen
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380 Das Problem des metaphysischen
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