Mapping the aliran of the academic discipline of entrepreneurship: A ...

for an agent or a community of agents. This definition is consistent with the usage
of ontology as set-of-concept-definitions, but more general [p907].
This idea of ontology as a conceptualisation is discussed further in the next section with
reference to the entity of the discourse.
2.1.2 Discourse - the intermediate states
2.1.2.00 This section examines the entity of the discourse, as it is in Model A in Graphic
2a, being logos. The Foucauldian concepts of discourse are then discussed and there is an
emphasis on the way Foucault’s concept of a discourse changes over the times from 1963
to 1981-82 with his College de France lecture series.
2.1.2.01 Foucault [2005, p322], Schmidt [2006, p52], and Heidegger [1993, p80, also in
Mulhall, 2005, p24], all comment on the term ‘logos’ in that from the time of Descartes
logos has been translated as being reason, sometimes as speech. However, these three
differ from the Cartesian translation of the term and suggest that logos is ‘an account of’
everything that has a ‘relationship with or to’ [Heidegger, 1993, p80] something else. Krell
offers the definition of discourse as “as the power to gather and preserve things that are
manifest in their being” [in Heidegger, 1993, p19]. Given this differing translation,
Descartes’ objectivist expression ‘I think, therefore I am’ could be subjectively interpreted
as: ‘We discourse, therefore we are’. The ability to perceive the manifest relationships and
to give an account of these relationships is seen as a viable alternative over the ability to
simply think. Watson [1998, p196] discusses a similar concept when ‘thinking and thinker
are put in relation – discursively or logically.’
2.1.2.02 The infinitude of knowledge of the ontic state, as discussed in 2.1.1, is quantified
within discourse by this concept of logos. The discursive requirement that there be ‘an
account of’ the manifest relationships defines this quantification. Discourse, however, does
not ha ve the same justified finitude of knowledge as the discipline.
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