Mapping the aliran of the academic discipline of entrepreneurship: A ...

one” [Foucault, 1980, p109, also in Chomsky and Foucault, 2006, p140]. The fact that
Foucault uses the term savoir, rather than connaissance, is indicative of the view in which
he holds the discipline of ps ychiatry. Gutting [1994, p113] has said that Foucault “wrote
extensively about the interconnected disciplines of psychiatry, criminology, pedagogy, and
clinical medicine, but was reluctant to extend his arguments beyond what he called these
“dubious” disciplines”. The term has acquired some attraction with Wallerstein [2004,
p166], an intellectual, titling one of the chapters in ‘The uncertainties of knowledge’ as
“Anthropo logy, Sociology and other dubious disciplines”. While there is no citation to
Foucault a number of the ‘concepts’ expressed by Wallerstein bear resemblance to
Foucault’s ideas.
2.3.3.03 Dreyfus and Rabinow [1983, p xxiv] introduce Foucault’s dubious disciplines.
They further describe that there are
…two distinct categories: on one hand, the relatively stable practices and objects of
those disciplines that Kuhn calls normal sciences and Foucault calls sciences which
have passed the threshold of scientificity, and, on the other hand, the shifting
practices and objects of the sciences which have not crossed this threshold [Dreyfus
and Rabinow, 1983, p116].
2.3.3.04 Foucault [2004, p209] does, on the other hand, describe three (not two as
mentioned by Dreyfus and Rabinow above) categories. The first are constituted sciences
that have crossed their threshold of for malization, such as mathematics, which has never
had a history of not being mathematics. The analysis of the history of such science is only
pos sible by recurrent ana lysis. Second are those at the actual threshold of scientificity but
for which there are still questions as to their crossing the threshold. Third are those
pseudosciences that move the epistemological threshold point to claim the status of
scientificity. What such disciplines considers connaissance knowledges may, in
Foucauldian terms, still be savoir knowledges.
If it is established that a particular discursive formation has not succeeded in
crossing the threshold of epistemologization, then archaeology has freed us to shift
to the question of what role this pseudos cience, this do ubt ful science, plays in the
larger context [Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, p117].
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