Mapping the aliran of the academic discipline of entrepreneurship: A ...

2.1.2.12 However I believe that it was not until the College de France lecture series of
1981-82, first published in English in 2001 as ‘The hermeneutics of the subject’, that
Foucault started to have a less fluctuating meaning to discourse and introduces the term
‘true discourse’ [Foucault, 2005, p243]. He also starts to make the connection to logos as
described above. It goes beyond the textual, to the relationships, to the ability for
preparedness for events. I believe that this later lecture series presents a deeper and more
comprehensive understanding of discourse, than the earlier Foucault texts, that were more
trepiditious in outlook.
2.1.2.13 It is this enlarged Foucauldian definition of discourse that is included in Model A
in Graphic 2a. I have generally ignored the concepts of power within this definition of
discourse because I tend towards the idea that the exercise of power is more significant to
the contextualisation of knowledge in the discipline as discussed in the next section;
however this is not to say that power is not also exercised in the discourse.
2.1.3 Disciplines – power of the right
2.1.3.00 This section discusses the discipline and the Foucauldian power exercised, that
defines its boundaries with the discourse. The triangular nature of the power relationship
between power, right and truth effects is discussed and depicted graphically as ‘Foucault’s
Triangle’. As in the previous section, greater detail is given to the differences in Foucault’s
thinking between 1971 and 1976, this time as pertaining to disciplines.
2.1.3.01 The discipline, as the circle inside the rectangle of discourse in Mode l A in
Graphic 2a, is a subset of discourse(s).
2.1.3.02 I have defined discipline as that part of the discourse where epistemology
justifies, as in ‘epistemic justification’ [Bonjour, 1998], the ontology. The epistemic
stringe ncies of the discipline separate it from the discursive state. I have also assumed in
Model A in Graphic 2a that the epistemic states referred to by Primas [1990, cited in
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