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Perception verb complements in Akatek, a Mayan language

Perception verb complements in Akatek, a Mayan language

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4 1. INTRODUCTION<br />

consequence of the fact that it lacks positive belief content.<br />

Dretske (1969), 30<br />

See<strong>in</strong>gn is open to events as well as objects. Events exist <strong>in</strong> time,<br />

objects <strong>in</strong> space. `Events are given dates; objects (<strong>in</strong> contrast to the<br />

th<strong>in</strong>gs which happen to the objects) are not. Events do not have shape<br />

and color; they have no precisely de ned spatial perimeter which segregates<br />

them from neighbor<strong>in</strong>g objects and events' (Dretske (1969),<br />

31). Events are happen<strong>in</strong>gs or occurrences, they <strong>in</strong>volve amovement<br />

or change of some sort. The occasions on which we see an event take<br />

place without a change of some sort be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>volved are exceptional. To<br />

describe the perception of an event as opposed to the perception of an<br />

object D, Dretske suggests the follow<strong>in</strong>g modi cation to (7):<br />

(8) Sseesn an event = the event is visually di erentiated from its<br />

immediate temporal environment by S<br />

With regards to perception expressions, there is a potential for confusion<br />

to arise from not carefully separat<strong>in</strong>g truth implication, i.e. what<br />

we see, from utterance implication, i.e. what we saywe see. Truth<br />

and utterance implication are de ned <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g way (Dretske<br />

(1969), 35):<br />

(9) Truth implication<br />

Q is a truth implication of S's statementifS's statementwould<br />

not be true unless Q were true.<br />

(10) Utterance implication<br />

Q is an utterance implication of S's statement ifS would not,<br />

normally, have made the statement unless Q were true.<br />

First person s<strong>in</strong>gular, present tense, <strong>in</strong>dicative active perceptual reports<br />

imply that the speaker believes what she has seen. In other words,<br />

when say<strong>in</strong>g (11-a), the speaker has (or at least believes herself to<br />

have) identi ed what she claims to see, i.e. the bus. The utterance<br />

implication of (11-a), `I believe that that is a bus', must be kept apart<br />

from the truth implication. The reason is that it is the speaker's say<strong>in</strong>g<br />

she sees a bus and not her see<strong>in</strong>g the bus that implies that she believes<br />

that whatever is approach<strong>in</strong>g her is a bus. Therefore, it would be<br />

paradoxical for her to utter (11-b).<br />

(11) a. I see the bus approach<strong>in</strong>g. Dretske (1969), 36<br />

b. ?I see a bus approach<strong>in</strong>g, but I do not believe a bus is<br />

approach<strong>in</strong>g. Dretske (1969), 37

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