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Perception verb complements in Akatek, a Mayan language

Perception verb complements in Akatek, a Mayan language

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54 3. PERCEPTION VERB COMPLEMENTS IN ENGLISH<br />

non-sentential complementtypes, the logical subject is either <strong>in</strong> the accusative<br />

or <strong>in</strong> the genitive case. With the exception of PNOMs, where<br />

the object takes the form of a PP with the preposition of, all objects<br />

rema<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> the accusative case. The <strong>verb</strong> <strong>in</strong> the non-sentential <strong>complements</strong><br />

takes the form of either the <strong>in</strong> nitive with or without to or of<br />

the gerund -<strong>in</strong>g.<br />

Table 2. Complement types under consideration<br />

Complement type Structure PVC Name<br />

F<strong>in</strong>ite complement ;/that + sentence + that-PVC<br />

To-<strong>in</strong> nitive ACC-NP to V(ACC-NP) + to-PVC<br />

POSS-<strong>in</strong>g (GEN-NP) V-<strong>in</strong>g (ACC-NP) - INOM<br />

Ing-of (GEN-NP) V-<strong>in</strong>g (of NP) + PNOM<br />

ACC-<strong>in</strong>g ACC-NP V-<strong>in</strong>g (ACC-NP) + <strong>in</strong>g-PVC<br />

Naked <strong>in</strong> nitive ACC-NP V (ACC-NP) + NI-PVC<br />

1.2. Semantic types. For the <strong>in</strong>terpretation of natural <strong>language</strong>,<br />

follow<strong>in</strong>g Vendler (1967), I dist<strong>in</strong>guish three classes of ontological<br />

entities: 3<br />

1. Physical objects ! objects<br />

2. Events, processes, actions ! events<br />

3. Propositions, facts, results ! propositions<br />

For ease of reference, <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g the terms object, event and<br />

proposition are used to refer to each of the above classes. Objects,<br />

events and propositions are characterized <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g way:<br />

objects are located <strong>in</strong> space. They are, however, not located <strong>in</strong> time<br />

s<strong>in</strong>ce they do not happen, beg<strong>in</strong> or end like events do. Nevertheless,<br />

they do exist for a certa<strong>in</strong> length of time, their existence beg<strong>in</strong>s, lasts<br />

and ends. It follows that objects enterta<strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>direct relationship to<br />

time and a direct one to space and that they are part of the world. The<br />

opposite holds true for events. Events primarily exist <strong>in</strong> time, they<br />

beg<strong>in</strong>, last and end. Thus, they directly relate to time. Events happen<br />

at a certa<strong>in</strong> location but they are not located <strong>in</strong> space. They relate to<br />

space <strong>in</strong> the way objects relate to time, i.e. <strong>in</strong>directly. Both physical<br />

objects and events are part of the world, which dist<strong>in</strong>guishes them<br />

from propositions. Propositions are neither located <strong>in</strong> space nor<br />

<strong>in</strong> time, they do not happen. Propositions are about th<strong>in</strong>gs <strong>in</strong> the<br />

3 Lyons (1977, 1989) establishes a very similar three-way classi cation of ontological<br />

entities. He calls objects rst-order entities, events second-order entities,<br />

and propositions third-order entities and assigns the same properties to them as<br />

Vendler.

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