The Journal of the Siam Society Vol. LXIV, Part 1-2, 1976 - Khamkoo

KING PRAJADHIPOK AND TIU; APl'Lt CAI\'1'
13
Randall thought that this despatch confirmed the view that
any marked move towards the left in Siam would increase the
rapprochement between Siam and Japan, and that the latter
are steadily pursuing peaceful penetration there. Unless
this, however, is done with great discretion, the suspicion of
the Siamese is likely to be aroused and an anti-Japanese
reaction would occur. Direct methods of counteracting the
Japanese penetration are hardly possible but it may be
suggested that if our general prestige in the Far East is
clearly maintained, tbe danger of our influence in Siam being
destroyed would be obviated.
'It illustrates the kind of thing that will happen to an .even greater
extent', Orde echoed, 'if we do not resist Japanese pretensions to behave
as they like in the Far East.' Wellesley thought the Japanese held the
'trump cards. . . . They are determined to become, and will become,
the dominant power in the Far East. I don't see how we can prevent
it.' Lord Stanhope, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, suggested Japan
could be kept lean. •Japan's finances are far from being in a flourishing
condition. She depends on China for a large part of her trade, and
China is not prepared to eat out of Japan's hand unless she is urged by
other Powers to do so , ... ' 47
The debate on Siam thus merged into the debate on Japan. Britain,
it was recognised, had few means of resisting Japan, if any, but the role
of China could be important. It was also important to uphold British
prestige so far as possible. For that, too, might influence the attitude
of others, such as the Siamese. Britain must at least remain one of the
pivots of Siam's foreign policy. So far as their policy towards Siam
itself was concerned, the British bad sought to appear neutral in the
revolution and after it. They bad many ties with the old regime. But
they recognised that the best hope of retaining an influence in Siam-asi9e
from retaining prestige in the Far East as a whole--was to maintain good
relations with the new regime. It was necessary, therefore, not to be
identified with opposition to it. On tbe other band, anti-foreign or
'extremist' or 'Communist' policies would be. unwelcome, and 'modera-
4 7) Crosby to Foreign Secretary, 25 September 19 34, No. 200, F.O. 3 71 I 18 210
(F6575/3035/40).
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