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The Journal of the Siam Society Vol. LXIV, Part 1-2, 1976 - Khamkoo

The Journal of the Siam Society Vol. LXIV, Part 1-2, 1976 - Khamkoo

The Journal of the Siam Society Vol. LXIV, Part 1-2, 1976 - Khamkoo

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KING PRAJAIJIIIPOK AND THR APPLE CART 15<br />

<strong>The</strong> Promoters were a minority <strong>of</strong> civilian and military leaders.<br />

Extremism might be modified by fear <strong>of</strong> foreign intervention, though <strong>the</strong><br />

British denied <strong>the</strong>y would intervene, and <strong>the</strong> threat could rebound on<br />

those who used it. Extremism might also be modified perhaps by<br />

threats <strong>of</strong> abdication. But some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> leftrwing would have found that<br />

welcome, particularly if it could be made to seem <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> King's<br />

own decision, so that <strong>the</strong>y did not incur blame from peasant masses<br />

loyal to <strong>the</strong> King. <strong>The</strong> best check on extremism and <strong>the</strong> best route to<br />

constitutional monarchy, King Prajadhipok believed, would be free<br />

elections, which might at once make <strong>Siam</strong>ese politics more democratic<br />

and more conservative. Yet <strong>the</strong> Promoters, entrenched in Senate and<br />

Executive Committee, believed this, too. <strong>The</strong> King had only <strong>the</strong> same<br />

limited means to bring <strong>the</strong>m round. <strong>The</strong> threat <strong>of</strong> foreign intervention<br />

was unhelpful. Threats <strong>of</strong> abdication had some value, but ultimately<br />

<strong>the</strong> bluff was called. <strong>The</strong> King's 'main <strong>the</strong>sis' was 'that he bad given up<br />

his absolute power to <strong>the</strong> whole Thai people and not to any group'. 5 I<br />

His function would be purely ceremonial only when <strong>Siam</strong> was truly<br />

democratic. 52 His prercoup constitutional plans resembled those <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

Promoters in <strong>the</strong>ir gradualist approach to democracy. But <strong>the</strong>re were<br />

significant differences. <strong>The</strong> King had planned meantime to retain a<br />

real veto power on legislation and to choose tbe nominated members <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Assembly. With <strong>the</strong> Promoters installed, those plans were<br />

difficult to realise. If <strong>the</strong>y proved impossible, <strong>the</strong> King would have lost<br />

his powers to <strong>the</strong> Promoter's, not to <strong>the</strong> people. Earlier and freer<br />

elections would become essential.<br />

Contemporaries were <strong>of</strong>ten impatient with <strong>the</strong> King, and historians<br />

have misunderstood him. He should have mobilised popular support in<br />

<strong>the</strong> conservative cause, it is implied. His poor, eyesight-he had cataracts<br />

in both eyes-and his fear <strong>of</strong> physical violence contributed to his failure<br />

to do so. He was, as he himself admitted, indecisive: 'he himself once<br />

told me that he saw both sides <strong>of</strong> every question, which quality made<br />

him a philosopher but not a resolute monarch•.s3 But surely <strong>the</strong> fact<br />

51) Chula Chakrabongse, p. 185.<br />

52) Thawatt, p. 251.<br />

P] Chula CIJ.akrabon¥se, p. 156,

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