The Journal of the Siam Society Vol. LXIV, Part 1-2, 1976 - Khamkoo

16 Nicholas Tarling
was that he saw more clearly than others that royal identification with
reaction would have been the way to civil war, not to constitutional
monarchy. Some, by contrast, imply tbat he should have identified
himself more closely with the Promoters' regime. He should not have
spent so much time out of Bangkok at Hua Hin or, after the Bowaradej
outbreak, at Songkla or, ultimat~ly, abroad. Perhaps, indeed, he needed
an especially clear head to follow out his own bard-won policy among
old-fashioned counsellors and courtiers. But on the other hand, he
believed, with some justice, that be could have no influence on the
Promoters if he simply endorsed all their actions and became their king.
King Prajadbipok lost his battle, but it is bard to be sure that be
made major mistakes in strategy or tactics. If the revolution was not
to be followed by major bloodshed, then political power was almost
certain to remain for a long time in the bands of the civilian-military
oligarchy that bad seized power; among whom, too, the military would
have a strong, even increasing, influence. The country is still working
out the implications of the revolution. It is searching, rather as the
King searched, for an Assembly that will share power and behave
moderately, diminishing the role both of civilian extremists and of
military politicians.
The fear of intervention helped to induce moderation among the
Promoters, and the King made use of it. He accepted the revolution,
but hoped to affect its outcome. His attitude, the Foreign Office recognised,
was important as a stabilising factor, although a representative
of Vickers, who noted the importance in the coup of the armoured cars
the firm had been selling, also noted that the King 'seemed to have no
desire to make a fight of it nor did any of his advisers appear to have
much in the way of guts•;s4 and Dormer relayed a report 'that the main
reason which prompted the King to accept the revolutionaries' demands,
and return to the capital was the fear of what might befall the royal
princes', held as hostages. 55 Dormer reported in August that relations
between King and Executive Committee were 'perfectly amicable', but
54) Enclosure in Birch to Foreign Office, 13 July 1932, F.O. 371/16261 (F5547/
4260/40).
~51 Dormeqo Silll.OD, 28 July 1932! No. 158 1
F.Q •• 371(16t61 (F~S63(4260(40).