Hockenbury Discovering Psychology 5th txtbk

162 CHAPTER 4 Consciousness and Its VariationsCRITICAL THINKINGIs Hypnosis a Special State of Consciousness?Are the changes in perception, thinking, and behaviors thatoccur during hypnosis the result of a “special” or “altered” stateof consciousness? Here, we’ll consider the evidence for threecompeting points of view on this issue.The State View: Hypnosis Involves a Special StateConsidered the traditional viewpoint, the “state” explanationcontends that hypnosis is a unique state of consciousness, distinctlydifferent from normal waking consciousness (Kosslyn &others, 2000). The state view is perhaps best represented byHilgard’s neodissociation theory of hypnosis. According to thisview, consciousness is split into two simultaneous streams ofmental activity during hypnosis. One stream of mental activityremains conscious, but a second stream of mental activity—theone responding to the hypnotist’s suggestions—is “dissociated”from awareness. So according to the neodissociation theory, thehypnotized young woman shown on page 160 reported no painbecause the painful sensations were dissociated from awareness.The Non-State View: Ordinary Psychological ProcessesSome psychologists flatly reject the notion that hypnoticallyinduced changes involve a “special” state of consciousness.According to the social-cognitive view of hypnosis, subjects areresponding to the social demands of the hypnosis situation. Theyact the way they think good hypnotic subjects are supposed toact, conforming to the expectations of the hypnotist, their ownexpectations, and situational cues. In this view, the “hypnotized”young woman on page 160 reported no pain because that’swhat she expected to happen during the hypnosis session.To back up the social-cognitive theory of hypnosis, NicholasSpanos (1991, 1994, 2005) and his colleagues amassed animpressive array of evidence showing that highly motivatedpeople often perform just as well as hypnotized subjects indemonstrating pain reduction, amnesia, age regression, andhallucinations. Studies of people who simply pretended to behypnotized have shown similar results. On the basis of such findings,non-state theorists contend that hypnosis can be explainedin terms of rather ordinary psychological processes, includingimagination, situational expectations, role enactment, compliance,and conformity (Wagstaff, 1999; Wagstaff & Cole, 2005).PET Scans During Hypnosis:Does the Brain Respond Differently?Researcher Stephen Kosslyn and his colleagues (2000) conducteda brain-imaging study. Highly hypnotizable volunteers viewedtwo images of rectangles, one in bright colors and one in shadesof gray, while lying in a PET scanner. The researchers measuredLeft-hemispherecolor areasLRight-hemispherecolor areaactivity in brain regions involved in color perception. While hypnotized,the participants were instructed to perform three tasks:(a) to see the images as they were; (b) to mentally “drain” colorfrom the colored rectangles in order to see them in shades ofgray; and (c) to mentally “add” color to the gray rectangles.These last two tasks were hypnosis-induced hallucinations.What did the PET scans reveal? When the hypnotized participantswere instructed to perceive colored rectangles, color regions in thebrain activated, regardless of whether the participants were showncolored or gray rectangles. When participants were instructed toperceive gray rectangles, color regions in the brain deactivated,regardless of whether the participants were shown colored or grayrectangles. In other words, brain activity reflected the hypnosisinducedhallucinations—not the actual images that were shown tothe participants. On the basis of these findings, Kosslyn (2001) concluded,“Hypnosis is not simply ‘role playing,’ but does in fact reflectthe existence of a distinct mental brain state.”The Imaginative Suggestibility View: ImaginationPsychologists Irving Kirsch and Wayne Braffman (2001) dismissthe idea that hypnotic subjects are merely acting. But they alsocontend that brain-imaging studies don’t necessarily prove thathypnosis is a unique state. Rather, Kirsch and Braffman maintainthat such studies emphasize individual differences in imaginativesuggestibility—the degree to which a person is able to experiencean imaginary state of affairs as if it were real.Braffman and Kirsch (1999) have shown that many highly suggestibleparticipants were just as responsive to suggestions whenthey had not been hypnotized as when they had been hypnotized.“Hypnotic responses reveal an astounding capacity thatsome people have to alter their experience in profound ways,”Kirsch and Braffman (2001) write. “Hypnosis is only one of theways in which this capacity is revealed. It can also be evoked—and almost to the same extent—without inducing hypnosis.”Despite the controversy over how best to explain hypnoticeffects, psychologists do agree that hypnosis can be a highly effectivetherapeutic technique (Lynn & Kirsch, 2006; Kihlstrom, 2007).RCRITICAL THINKING QUESTIONS Does the fact that highly motivated subjects can “fake” hypnoticeffects invalidate the notion of hypnosis as a uniquestate of consciousness? Why or why not? What kinds of evidence could prove or disprove the notionthat hypnosis is a unique state of consciousness?