Hockenbury Discovering Psychology 5th txtbk

256 CHAPTER 6 Memoryfalse memoryA distorted or fabricated recollection ofsomething that did not actually occur.schema(SKEE-muh) An organized cluster of informationabout a particular topic.scriptA schema for the typical sequence of aneveryday event.False Memories of a Psychology Professor’sOffice After briefly waiting in the psychologyprofessor’s office shown below,participants were taken to another roomand asked to recall details of the office—the real purpose of the study. Many par -ticipants falsely remembered objects thatwere not actually in the office, such asbooks, a filing cabinet, a telephone, alamp, pens, pencils, and a coffee cup.Why? The details that the participantserroneously remembered were all itemsthat would be consistent with a typicalprofessor’s office (Brewer & Treyens, 1981).Schemas can cause memory errors byprompting us to fill in missing details withschema-consistent information (Kleider &others, 2008).her mother’s body. The result was a false memory, which is a distorted or fabricatedrecollection of something that did not actually happen. Nonetheless, the false memorysubjectively feels authentic and is often accompanied by all the emotionalimpact of a real memory.Schemas, Scripts, and Memory DistortionsThe Influence of Existing Knowledge on What Is RememberedGiven that information presented after a memory is formed can change the contentsof that memory, let’s consider the opposite effect: Can the knowledge you hadbefore an event occurred influence your later memory of the event? If so, how?Since you were a child, you have been actively forming mental representationscalled schemas—organized clusters of knowledge and information about particulartopics. The topic can be almost anything—an object (e.g., a wind chime), a setting(e.g., a movie theater), or a concept (e.g., freedom). One kind of schema, called ascript, involves the typical sequence of actions and behaviors at a common event,such as eating in a restaurant or taking a plane trip.Schemas are useful in organizing and forming new memories. Using the schemasyou already have stored in long-term memory allows you to quickly integrate newexperiences into your knowledge base. For example, consider your schema for“phone.” No longer just a utilitarian communication device, phones can be used toplay games, flirt, or make a fashion statement. As the capabilities and functions ofphones have expanded, your schema has changed to incorporate these new attributes.Your schema for “phone” includes cordless, wireless, and cellular phones, includingdevices that can transmit photos and text messages. So now, when you hear about anew cell phone that can handle your e-mail, cruise the Internet, act as an onboard GPSunit, and that has hundreds of other applications, you can quickly integrate that informationinto your existing schema for “phone.”Although useful, schemas can also contribute to memory distortions. In the classic“psychology professor’s office” study described in the photo caption on the left,students erroneously remembered objects that were not actually present but wereconsistent with their schema of a professor’s office (Brewer & Treyens, 1981). Theschemas we have developed can promote memory errors by prompting us to fill inmissing details with schema-consistent information.But what if a situation contains elements that are inconsistent with our schemasor scripts for that situation? Are inconsistent items more likely to stand out in ourminds and be better remembered? In a word, yes. Numerous studieshave demonstrated that items that are inconsistent with our expectationstend to be better recalled and recognized than items that areconsistent with our expectations (e.g., Kleider & others, 2008;Lampinen & others, 2001).For example, University of Arkansas psychologist James Lampinenand his colleagues (2000) had participants listen to a story about a guynamed Jack who performed some everyday activities, like washing hiscar and taking his dog to the veterinarian for shots. In each scene, Jackperformed some actions that would have been consistent with thescript (e.g., filling a bucket with soapy water, filling out forms at thevet’s office) and some behaviors that were not part of a typical scriptfor the activity (e.g., spraying the neighbor’s kid with the hose, flirtingwith the vet’s receptionist). When tested for details of the story,participants were more likely to recognize and remember the atypicalactions than the consistent actions.Much like the subjects in the professor’s office study, participants inLampinen’s study also experienced compelling false memories. Almostalways, the false memories were for actions that would have been consistentwith the script—if they had actually happened in the story. For