the Female Body GOVERNING

Beyond X-X and X-Y 273
and a male man. The United Kingdom’s legal view of sex is based on
the divorce case of Corbett v. Corbett (1970) where Lord Justice Ormrod
set the legal defi nition of sex as comprising chromosomal factors,
gonadal factors, genital factors, psychological factors, and in some
cases, hormonal factors. The idea of scientifi c knowledge as truth, and
the idea of sex as a biological category discoverable through scientifi c
evidence intertwine in these juridical deliberations and the resulting
“sex test” (MacNamee, 2004). The increasing importance attributed to
sex chromosomes since the Corbett judgment can be seen in a ruling by
the Texas appeals panel in 1999, which determined that Christie Lee
Littleton as a postoperation transsexual was still a male. In the legal
judgment the Chief Justice stated, “the male chromosomes do not change
with either hormonal treatment or sex reassignment surgery. Biologically
a postoperative female transsexual is still a male” (Littleton v. Prange,
1999). Thus, biology is rooted in the chromosomes, regardless of the
body’s sex development or sex performance. This illustrates a marked
geneticization of the body and society, which has resulted in the “sex”
chromosomes being given a controlling and deterministic role over the
other factors that the legal “sex test” set. At the heart of this is the idea
that the sex chromosomes are the biological “reality” of the person’s sex.
Central to the Chief Justice’s argument is the idea of a biological sex,
defi ned by static binary sex chromosomes. The two “sex” chromosomes
seem to have surpassed their status of biological markers and become
the female and male chromosomes.
The third example of institutional governance of sex-gender is an
interesting contrast to birth registration and marriage that both seek to
denote a person’s sex as either female or male. The U.K. passport application
asks for the person’s sex but incorporates the realization that in the
human adult, gender is adaptable. The question that asks for the person’s
sex (female or male) carries the clarifi cation, “If you permanently live
in a different gender to that which you were born, it may be possible
for this acquired gender to be shown in your passport; indicate your
new gender here” (U.K. Passport Service, 2004). This wording seems to
indicate that a person is born “in a gender” rather than a sex. However,
the U.K. Passport Service exhibits an apparent institutional willingness
to allow transsexuals to assume a new gender, but not register a change
in sex. This raises signifi cant questions regarding the split between
gender and sex within institutional governance structures, and how they
lead to the governmentality of sex and consequently gender.
Feminists argued in the 1970s that a distinction should be created
between sex and gender in an effort to counter the idea that “sex was
destiny” and to separate the culturally constructed gender from the