Routledge History of Philosophy Volume IV

RENAISSANCE AND SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY RATIONALISM 73
the mechanical philosophy. Gassendi wrote a book attacking Fludd, and the
moderns, especially the rationalists, tended to dismiss the occult philosophers
and Neoplatonists generally precisely because they rejected such ‘hidden’ or
unintelligible factors in the explanations for phenomena. 26
ARISTOTELIANISM AND ITS OPPONENTS
During the medieval period, Aristotle’s authority was undisputed and he was
usually referred to simply as ‘the philosopher’. But, though Aristotle remained
by far the single most important philosopher during the Renaissance, this
monopoly came to an end. Some of the Italian Renaissance humanists like
Lorenzo Valla (see Chapter 1) associated Aristotle with the scholasticism they
rejected. Others, however, such as Ermolao Barbaro (1454–93), sought to revive
what they regarded as the true Aristotle, studied in the Greek, as against the
distorted Aristotelian doctrines taught by the scholastics. Some, like Ficino,
turned to other traditions, particularly the Platonic. Others, like Giovanni Pico
della Mirandola, sought to reconcile Aristotle with those other traditions. These
were just some of the responses available also to those outside Italy.
Martin Luther seems to have taken the extreme view of Valla and largely
opposed himself to all philosophy, taking the view that Christianity had been
corrupted by the Greek philosophical influence. Such a view could hardly be
sustained in the long run in view of the central role that philosophy played both
in the articulation of theological doctrine and in the educational curriculum. Not
surprisingly, therefore, one of Luther’s closest associates, Philipp Melanchthon
(1497–1560), went back to an eclectic Aristotelianism. Melanchthon played a
key role in the consolidation of Lutheranism in Germany, partly through his
published works such as the Loci communes. Though this was a basically
theological work, Melanchthon adopted a broadly Aristotelian framework. At the
same time he was willing to interpret Aristotle in a modern way (for instance, as
a nominalist) and, where the defence of religion might be advantaged by it, he
did not refrain from incorporating notions that are quite foreign to
Aristotelianism, such as the doctrine of innate principles.
Within the German university context a kind of Renaissance Aristotelianism
became possible which embraced the humanist critique of the scholastics but
insisted that they had distorted Aristotle’s meaning. This had been the position of
the so-called ‘father of German humanism’, Roelof Huysman (1444–85), known
by his Latin name of Rodolphus Agricola. It was to become a common humanist
position—one held, for instance, by the French humanist Jacques Lefèvre
d’Étaples (c. 1460–1536), who sought to reform Aristotelianism via more
accurate texts. 27
The thought that the scholastics had debased Aristotle and departed from his
true teachings invited, within the Protestant context, a comparison with the
religious Reformation and its return to the correct text and true teachings of the
Bible. There could be reformers (reformatores) in philosophy who would call for