Routledge History of Philosophy Volume IV

310 RENAISSANCE AND SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY RATIONALISM
power’. This appears to be a stipulative definition, since the concept of right
surfaces here for the first time. ‘Right’, or ‘ius’, is evidently presented as an
explication of the freedom that is permitted individuals by the rules that apply to
them, be they natural or civil rules. Inevitably then, civil right equals civil power,
whereby an individual is free to do whatever is in his power. Spinoza is aware,
however, that men have all kinds of explanations for rights differing from his.
They explain rights by divine origins, or as originating from a wise lawgiver, or
from contract. So he preferred to explain them from ‘proximate causes’, that is,
from the human will. But in this Chapter XVI, where the effectiveness of civic
contracts has to be discussed, he can no longer refrain from giving a full
explanation. So let us ask therefore: can one expect that an individual’s power
increases or decreases according to his redefining his rights? Surely not. In this
we might compare Spinoza with Hume, who was to demolish the theory of
contract by arguing that people do not obey a sovereign because they have
contracted to do so, but embellish their obedience by the fiction of a contract. On
the other hand we have seen that a man’s power or capability can increase or
decrease, that is, man can become more active or more passive. Hope and fear
are Spinoza’s main examples. Freedom from fear and hope for advantages are
indications of increasing capabilities. The imagination that obedience will bring
in its wake the promotion of one’s own good is the expression of such a hope. So
we reach the somewhat paradoxical conclusion that, by granting the sovereign a
right to dictate one’s actions, man is promoting his capability. By enlarging
one’s capability, man is enlarging his right (by definition). So Spinoza can only
maintain that might equals right by granting that in a political order the powers
of both individuals and the collectivity are increased. This increase goes with cooperation.
If men were completely rational they would not need the imagery of
the transference of rights to sustain such co-operation. Affection-driven man,
however, cannot co-operate in this way unless forced by a supposedly selfimposed
additional argument to do so. These arguments take the form of rights:
rules that are enforced by sanctions some way or other. Each political
organization has therefore the system of laws it deserves, be it a contract with
God as in the Jewish state or a contract between men as in the Dutch Republic.
The developing state
In the beginning of the next chapter, TTP XVII, Spinoza points out that the
authority of rulers in previous ages used to be strengthened by clothing it in the
garments of divinity. The Persians looked to their kings as Gods. Indeed, men do
not want to be ruled by their equals, but only by outstanding leaders. Moses was
attributed this quality, and rightly so. He gave the Jewish people a very wise
constitution. Spinoza emphasizes the determination of Moses to put all laws and
thereby obedience under the aegis of religion. The Hebrews’ love for their
country was not a mere case of patriotism but of piety and religious duty. And
next to that, the political institutions were arranged according to the ratio