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Routledge History of Philosophy Volume IV

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172 RENAISSANCE AND SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY RATIONALISM<br />

particular geometrical figure or construction as the solution to a problem and,<br />

until this is done, the ancients considered that the problem had not been solved.<br />

Parallel constraints applied in arithmetic. Arithmetical analysis yields only an<br />

indeterminate solution, and we need a final synthetic stage corresponding to the<br />

geometrical solution; this is the numerical exploitation <strong>of</strong> the indeterminate<br />

solution, where we compute determinate numbers. Now in traditional terms the<br />

Geometry is an exercise in problematical analysis, but Descartes completely<br />

rejects the traditional requirement that, following such an analysis, synthesis is<br />

needed to construct or compute a determinate figure or number. For the<br />

mathematicians <strong>of</strong> Antiquity this was the point <strong>of</strong> the exercise, and it was only if<br />

such a determinate figure or number could be constructed or computed that one<br />

could be said to have solved the problem. Towards the end <strong>of</strong> the Alexandrian<br />

era, most notably in Diophantus’s Arithmetica, we do begin to find the search for<br />

problems and solutions concerned with general magnitudes, but these are never<br />

considered an end in themselves, and they are regarded as auxiliary techniques<br />

allowing the computation <strong>of</strong> a determinate number, which is the ultimate point <strong>of</strong><br />

the exercise. Descartes’s approach is completely and explicitly at odds with this.<br />

As early as Rule 16 <strong>of</strong> the Rules he spells out the contrast between his procedure<br />

and the traditional one:<br />

It must be pointed out that while arithmeticians have usually designated<br />

each magnitude by several units, i.e. by a number, we on the contrary<br />

abstract from numbers themselves just as we did above [Rule 14] from<br />

geometrical figures, or from anything else. Our reason for doing this is<br />

partly to avoid the tedium <strong>of</strong> a long and unnecessary calculation, but<br />

mainly to see that those parts <strong>of</strong> the problem which are the essential ones<br />

always remain distinct and are not obscured by useless numbers. If for<br />

example we are trying to find the hypotenuse <strong>of</strong> a right-angled triangle<br />

whose given sides are 9 and 12, the arithmeticians will say that it is ′<br />

(225), i.e. 15. We, on the other hand, will write a and b for 9 and 12, and<br />

find that the hypotenuse is ′ (a 2 + b 2 ), leaving the two parts <strong>of</strong> the<br />

expression, a 2 and b 2 , distinct, whereas in the number they are run<br />

together…. We who seek to develop a clear and distinct knowledge <strong>of</strong><br />

these things insist on these distinctions. Arithmeticians, on the other hand,<br />

are satisfied if the required result turns up, even if they do not see how it<br />

depends on what has been given, but in fact it is in knowledge <strong>of</strong> this kind<br />

alone that science consists. 32<br />

In sum, for Descartes, concern with general magnitudes is constitutive <strong>of</strong> the<br />

mathematical enterprise.<br />

Descartes’s algebra transcends the need to establish converses, because he is<br />

dealing with equations, whose converses always hold, and it transcends the<br />

traditional view that one solves a problem only when one has constructed a<br />

determinate figure or computed a determinate number. But Descartes goes further

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