Routledge History of Philosophy Volume IV

MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA 311
utilitatis, the principle of utility. As Lipsius had seen, most patriotism is selfinterest
in disguise, and so it was highly efficient that in the Jewish state it was
made useful to men not to desert their country. These two wise principles that
Moses put at the foundation of the Jewish state were a clear promise of the
stability and continuity of the Jewish state. But this was not going to be the case.
The worship of the golden calf, this undeniable expression of superstition,
made for a change that produced the downfall of the Jewish state in the end. As
Spinoza expresses it, God punished his people by giving it laws that were more a
kind of vengeance than a contribution to their well-being. He decided that from
then on only the Levites, who did not join in the worship of the golden calf,
should have care of the law. This was the germ of decay. The ambitions of the
successors of Moses as well as the zeal of the scribes resulted in the introduction
of kingship and in sectarianism and Pharisaism. From this came civil war and the
downfall of the state in the end. From this Spinoza concludes (a) that the original
constitution of a state should be kept intact, and especially that if a people does
not have a king kingship should not be introduced, (b) that religion should be
separated from politics and (c) that in a state where ambition is permitted both
(a) and (b) will be difficult to follow. Spinoza points to the history of England
where monarchy was supposedly abrogated in 1642, only to be reintroduced
under a different name under Cromwell, and reinstituted in its original form in
1660. The Dutch Republic proves the same. There never was a king, and the
short experiment with Queen Elizabeth’s lieutenant Leicester was bound to fail.
A political system is an intricate mechanism that cannot be changed overnight.
The predominant suggestion from the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus is that
there is a grand secular trend according to which superstition is gradually
overcome, and that more rational political systems are more free and more
powerful. Spinoza seems more interested to suggest the superiority of the Dutch
Republic by rhetorical comparison than to provide his readers with a full theory.
Indeed, in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus his aim must have been to make an
intervention in Dutch political life. He points out that ambition leads to war for
honour’s sake (as de la Court had seen) and to curtailing the people’s freedom, to
the downfall of the state if one makes the same mistakes as the Jewish people,
that is, elects kings and admits the zeal of the scribes. Indeed, this was exactly
what was threatening to happen around the Synod of Dordt (1618–19), and
would have happened if the death of Prince Maurice had not curtailed the
process.
Along what lines did the philosopher Spinoza expect his intervention to be
effective? What constituted the force of his argument? Was he hoping to
contribute to the collective imagery of the state? Or to its explanation? We have
seen that intervention was Spinoza’s most central concern. He adapted his mode
of explanation to his audience, although in Chapters XVI and XVII he could not
circumvent references to the order and concatenation of things that is the real
explanation. However, his decision to explain in terms of the will was indeed an
adaptation to his audience. Spinoza’s final chapter of the Tractatus Theologico-