Routledge History of Philosophy Volume IV

MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA 313
is the teacher. This does not imply, however, that Spinoza opts for an empiricist
approach to politics. He intends to formulate in a systematic and theoretical way,
and to explain what politicians know from practical experience. He is the
abstruse thinker of David Hume’s essay ‘On Commerce’, who fits the insights of
the shallow thinkers of practical competence within an explanatory whole. And
in this programme, he is as critical as Adam Smith of the ‘men of systems’ who
suppose they can adapt human life to their schemes. In the Tractatus Politicus
the human will as proximate cause has lost the prime position it enjoyed in the
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. In doing so, Spinoza elaborates more fully on
the concept of potestas, or coercive power, as distinct from potentia, or
capability power. Second, the explanation of the origins of the state is more fully
developed. Third, the various forms of government are distinguished and
analysed as to their principles and to the organization that best accords with these
principles. We shall see Spinoza argue for constitutional monarchy as the only
reasonable form of monarchy, and for two types of aristocracy in a reflection of
the differences between city-states like Venice and federative republics like the
Dutch. Democracy is not discussed fully, since Spinoza died before completing
the last chapters of the Tractatus Politicus.
We may describe potentia as a power per se, as the capability that is in a thing,
and potestas as a power ad aliud, as the power over other things. This has
several consequences. First, in the case of states, one might expect that the
capability of a state relates to its power in relation to other states. A state that
acts according to its own nature is less dependent on external causes, that is, on
other states. Whether it effectively is more powerful than other states is a
different matter, because to answer this question we have to look into the
capabilities of these other states. But ceteris paribus we must understand the
more capable state as more powerful.
In a general sense, a state arranged according to reason is more capable. We
can understand this to say that a state that is ordered so as to promote the
common good, and thereby the well-being or the capability of its citizens makes
for a greater aggregated capability. It is in this sense that we can understand
Spinoza’s saying that a democracy is the strongest state (TTP XVI; TP XI, 1)
since it unites the capabilities of its citizens most fully or most absolutely. This
absolute unity requires, however, a rational organization, and therefore citizens
are most free when they abide by the laws of a rational political system.
The relationship between citizens and the superior powers (summae
potestates; in Dutch, Hoogmogende Heren, i.e. Sovereign Lords) is bidirectional,
and has an aggregative aspect. The rule or dominion (imperium) of
the sovereign powers is their capability, determined by the capability of the
multitude that is guided as by one mind (TP II, 15; III, 2). We may well compare
this with Spinoza’s analysis of the individual man: just as in that case, he does
not want to separate the body (politic) from its director (or ruler). The capability
of the sovereign is the organization of the state (in which the sovereign naturally
is an element). So, when Spinoza continues in TP III, 2, by remarking that the