Routledge History of Philosophy Volume IV

RENAISSANCE AND SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY RATIONALISM 145
Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 685–712, at p. 685. Compare also M.
N.Morris, ‘Science as Scientia’, Physis 23 (1981) 171–96, and S.Ross, ‘“Scientist”:
the Story of a Word’, Annals of Science 18 (1964) 65–85.
4 cf. R.Yeo, ‘An Idol of the Market Place: Baconianism in 19th-century England’,
History of Science 23 (1985) 251–98; Pérez-Ramos [4.62], 7–30.
5 Apud R.C.Cochrane, ‘Francis Bacon and the Rise of the Mechanical Arts in 18thcentury
England’, Annals of Science 11 (1956) 137–56, at p. 156. Compare also
A.Finch, On the Inductive Philosophy: Including a Parallel between Lord Bacon
and A.Comte as Philosophers (London, 1872).
6 I. Lakatos, ‘Changes in the Problem of Inductive Logic’, in his The Problem of
Inductive Logic (Amsterdam, 1968), pp. 315–427, at p. 318; A.Koyré, Etudes
d’histoire de la pensée scientifique (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1966).
To speak of Bacon as one of the founding fathers of modern science, Koyré argues
on p. 7, would be a mauvaise plaisanterie.
7 Francis Bacon. From Magic to Science [4.70]. This book is a turning point as
regards the revival of Baconian studies in our century.
8 For an example of this kind of literature, cf. Farrington [4.35]; Christopher Hill,
The Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution (Oxford, 1965); Frances Yates,
The Rosicrucian Enlightenment (London, Routledge, 1972); Lisa Jardine [4.45].
9 Dictionary of the History of Ideas, 4 vols, chief ed. P.Wiener (New York, 1968–
73), s.v. Baconianism, i, pp. 172–9, at p. 172.
10 ‘Mathematical versus Experimental Tradition in Western Science’, The Essential
Tension (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 31–66, esp. pp. 41–52.
11 On the notion of ‘scientific style’, cf. Crombie [4.25].
12 cf. T.S.Kuhn, note 10; Pérez-Ramos [4.62], 33ff.
13 L.Jonathan Cohen, The Implications of Induction (London, Methuen, 1970); The
Probable and the Provable (Oxford, 1977); [4.22], 219–31; ‘What has Inductive
Logic to Do with Causality’, in L.J.Cohen and M.B.Hesse (eds) Applications of
Inductive Logic (Oxford, Clarendon, 1980); An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Induction and Probability (Oxford, 1988). Some of Cohen’s ideas about Bacon’s
‘inductive’ gradualism seem to have been foreshadowed by J.M.Keynes in A
Treatise on Probability (first published London, Macmillan, 1929), ed.
R.B.Braithwaite (London, Macmillan, 1973), esp. pp. 299ff.
14 A brief and accurate description of Bacon’s gnoseological plan is given by M.
B.Hesse in ‘Francis Bacon’s Philosophy of Science’, in Vickers [4.14], 114–39,
esp. p. 114. This plan should proceed as follows:
(1) The classification of the sciences. (2) Directions concerning the
Interpretation of Nature; i.e. the new inductive logic. (3) The Phenomena
Universi, or natural history. (4) The Ladder of the Intellect, that is, examples
of the application of the method in climbing from Phenomena on the ladder
of axioms to the ‘Summary Law of Nature’. (5) Anticipations of the New
Philosophy, that is, tentative generalizations which Bacon considers of
insufficient interest and importance to justify him in leaping ahead of the
inductive method. (6) The New Philosophy or Active Science, which will
exhibit the whole result of induction in an ordered system of axioms. If men
will apply themselves to this method, Bacon thinks that the system will be