Routledge History of Philosophy Volume IV

290 RENAISSANCE AND SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY RATIONALISM
as well. One of our further interests will be to define Spinoza’s role as an
interventionist in the political debate and strife of his own times.
From a systematic point of view also, political philosophy presents itself as an
unavoidable sequel to the Ethics. Quite a few propositions of the latter must have
invited or even challenged the author to check the consistency of their
interhuman consequences. Principles like the parallelism of the attributes of
substance, the identity of right and might, and the conception of the individual as
a persisting arrangement of individuals of a different order, all seem to have a
meaning for groups and organizations of men as well. Spinoza will even argue
for his political philosophy by presenting it as a deduction from the Ethics. In
doing so, he takes issue with rival conceptions of politics in his time, coming
forward as a theoretical interventionist as well.
In terms of Hannah Arendt’s distinction between political philosophers (Plato,
Hobbes, Marx, for example) and political thinkers (Machiavelli, Rousseau),
Spinoza must be classified as belonging to both categories. Like the former, he
formulates his political conceptions within a philosophical system, and like the
latter he engages in verbal political action. His practical and his theoretical
interests went hand in hand. His practical involvement in politics is partly evidence
here. Possibly connected to his alleged acquaintance with the pensionary Johan
de Witt, Spinoza’s strong reaction to the murder of the de Witt brothers in 1672
is well documented. It was only the intervention of his landlord that prevented
him from nailing a placard saying ultimi barbarorum (outrage of barbarism) at
the location of the murder. In the Tractatus Politicus he alludes to this episode by
censuring the Dutch ‘regenten’ for using the pensionary as a scapegoat for their
own shortcomings. His visit to the headquarters of the French occupation army in
Utrecht in 1673, for all its possibly purely intellectual purposes, was regarded by
the man in the street as an act bordering on treason. His practical involvement in
politics is also evident from his appreciation of Machiavelli and Pieter de la
Court.
In presenting Spinoza’s moral and political philosophy, therefore, we could
scarcely pass over the contextual element. We may well draw attention to the
anomaly that this context as a matter of fact was. When Spinoza was born, the
seven Provinces were still (since 1568) at war with Spain. Only in 1648 did a
peace treaty materialize; only then was the Dutch Republic de jure accepted in
the European system of states. But being a republic, and a very powerful one, it
was a double anomaly. The relatively egalitarian society of shopkeepers and
traders, governed by brewers and merchants, stood out for a relatively free
intellectual climate. This anomaly stood in need of self-definition, as old
conceptions had run out of relevance and new ones were yet to be invented.
Philosophers and theologians, lawyers and politicians, lay and professional alike,
all had their share in this redefinition of their political situation. Spinoza may be
depicted by some modern commentators as a savage anomaly in relation to the
main traditions of philosophy, but more importantly he was engaged in
surmounting the double anomaly the Dutch confronted. It can be no surprise that