Routledge History of Philosophy Volume IV

MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA 305
1. That it is impossible to deprive men of the freedom to say what they
think.
2. That this freedom can be granted to everyone without infringing the
right and authority of the sovereign, and that the individual citizen can
preserve this freedom without infringing that right, provided that he does
not presume therefrom to make any innovation in the constitution or to do
anything that contravenes the established laws.
3. That every man can possess this freedom without endangering public
peace, and any troubles that may arise from this freedom can be easily held
in check.
4. Finally, that this freedom can be granted without detriment to the
public peace, to piety, and to the right of the sovereign, and indeed it must
be granted if these are to be preserved.
(TTP XX)
The Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, therefore, really contains three distinctive
arguments: one on the role of religion in the state, one on the interpretation of the
Bible, and one on the role of reason in the state. In comparison with the doctrines
of toleration of his compatriots, Spinoza clearly separates the distinct positions
of faith and reason. His attempt at freeing philosophy from theological tutelage is
founded in secularizing the state by referring theology to its proper constraints,
without falling into the trap of absolutism. Not the absolute rule of the state, but
the absolute rule of nature is the point of reference. Let us therefore follow more
closely Spinoza’s conception of the rule of nature in politics. We do so under
three headings: the nature of political order; the constitution of political order;
and the development of political order.
The nature of political order
The formation of a society is advantageous, even absolutely
essential, not merely for security against enemies but for the efficient
organisation of an economy. If men did not afford one another
mutual aid, they would lack both the skill and the time to support and
preserve themselves to the greatest possible extent. All men are not
equally suited to all activities, and no single person would be capable
of supplying all his own needs. Each would find strength and time
fail him if he alone had to plough, sow, reap, grind, cook, weave,
stitch, and perform all the other numerous tasks to support life, not to
mention the arts and sciences which are also indispensable for the
perfection of human nature and its blessedness. We see that those
who live in a barbarous way with no civilising influences lead a
wretched and almost brutish existence, and even so their few poor