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RENAISSANCE AND SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY RATIONALISM 149
of Science 38 (1987) 49–74, esp. pp. 58ff.; C.C.W.Taylor, ‘Aristotle’s
Epistemology’, in Stephen Everson (ed.), Epistemology (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1990), pp. 116–42.
35 See Pérez-Ramos [4.62], 72–82, for examples taken from Petrus Hispanus to
Albert the Great and Aquinas.
36 Most notably, J.S.Mill, ‘Of Inductions Improperly So-called’, A System of Logic,
Ratiocinative and Inductive (first published 1843; London, 1884), III, 2, pp. 188–
99.
37 cf. Wilhelm Risse, Logik der Neuzeit, 2 vols (Stuttgart, Frommann, 1964), I,
passim.
38 cf. W.Schmidt-Biggeman, op. cit.; M.B.Hesse, ‘Francis Bacon’s Philosophy of
Science’, in Vickers [4.14], esp. pp. 212–31.
39 ‘Nous nous complétons, Vérulamius et moi. Mes conseils serviront à étayer dans
ses grandes lignes l’explication de l’univers; ceux de Vérulamius permettront de
préciser les détails pour les expériences nécessaires’, Oeuvres de Descartes, ed.
G.Adam and P.Tannery, 12 vols (Paris, 1897–1910), i, 318; cf. also ii, 597f., and
iii, 307. For other references amongst continental philosophers and the Cartesian
perception of Bacon, cf. A.I.Sabba, Theories of Light from Descartes to Newton
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn, 1982), pp. 33ff., esp. pp. 170–
80. For a different approach, cf. Malherbe, ‘L’induction baconienne: de l’échec
métaphysique à l’échec logique’, in Fattori [4.12], 179–200.
40 F.Kambartel, Erfharung und Struktur. Bausteine zu einer Kritik des Empirismus
und Formalismus (Frankfurt-am-Main, 2nd edn, 1976), pp. 81ff., on the notion of
historia and the various senses of experientia (vaga, literata,…); cf. Malherbe,
‘L’expérience et l’induction chez Bacon’, Malherbe and Pousseur [4.13], 113–34.
41 Cohen, An Introduction…(cited in note 13), p. 195.
42 The felicitous phrase experimentum crucis is not Bacon’s but Boyle’s. He first used
it in Defence of the Doctrine touching the Spring and Weight of the Air (1662).
Others attribute its (independent) coinage to Robert Hooke in Micrographia
(1665).
43 For these procedures, cf. Horton [4.43], 241–78, and Pérez-Ramos [4.62], 243–54.
44 Pérez-Ramos [4.62], 257. Reproduced by kind permission of Oxford University
Press.
45 This principle (as against the sole principle of instantiation) appears as much in
inductivist epistemologies as the modus tollens procedures; cf. J.S.Mill, A System
of Logic, III, 10, 10, and Adolf Grünbaum, ‘Is Falsifiability the Touchstone of
Scientific Rationality? Karl Popper versus Inductivism’, Boston Studies in the
Philosophy of Science 39 (1976) 213–52. For a detailed account, stressing this
aspect of Bacon’s ars inveniendi, cf. Peter Urbach [4.77], where Bacon is presented
as a proto-Popperian. See my criticism of this book: ‘Francis Bacon and the
Disputations of the Learned’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42
(1991) in press.
46 cf. Emerton [4.32], 76–105. A comprehensive summary of the whole learned
dispute is to be found in Pérez-Ramos [4.62], 116f., nn. 4 and 6.
47 Peter Alexander admirably sums up the whole issue in Ideas, Qualities and
Corpuscles. Locke and Boyle on the External World (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1985). For the doctrines contained in university manuals, cf. P.Reif,