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Routledge History of Philosophy Volume IV

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DESCARTES: METAPHYSICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 215<br />

92 Conversation with Burman, AT V 163; CB 28.<br />

93 Imagination and sensation are faculties ‘sine quibus totum me possum dare &<br />

distincte intelligere’ (AT VII 78; CSM II 54). The ‘hybrid’ faculties <strong>of</strong> sensation<br />

and imagination are <strong>of</strong>ten singled out for special treatment by Descartes. Compare<br />

a passage earlier in the same Meditation, which asserts that imagination is not a<br />

necessary constituent <strong>of</strong> my essence as a thinking thing: vim imaginandi, prout<br />

differt a vi intelligendi, ad mei ipsius, hoc est ad mentis meae essentiam non<br />

requiri (AT VII 73; CSM II 51). For more on the ‘hybrid’ faculties, see<br />

J.Cottingham, Descartes [6.11], I22ff.<br />

94 Sixth Meditation: AT VII 81; CSM II 56.<br />

95 To this should be added motion, which Descartes sometimes describes as a<br />

straightforward mode <strong>of</strong> extension (AT II 650; CSMK 217), but which, in the<br />

Principles, is said to be specially imparted to matter by divine action (see<br />

Principles, Part II, arts 36ff.<br />

96 AT III 665; CSMK 218.<br />

97 Letter <strong>of</strong> 28 June 1643, AT III 692 and 694; CSMK 227 and 228.<br />

98 ibid.<br />

99 Passions <strong>of</strong> the Soul, Part I, art. 42 (AT XI 360; CSM I 344). Descartes regarded<br />

the pineal gland (or conarion) as the ‘principal seat <strong>of</strong> the soul’ and the locus <strong>of</strong><br />

psycho-physical interactions; cf. Passions, Part I, arts 31 and 32.<br />

100 See for example Passions, Part I, art. 39.<br />

101 See p. 211.<br />

102 See Principles, II, 36 and 40.<br />

103 It should be noted that some recent commentators have argued that Descartes did<br />

not in fact regard interaction between heterogeneous substances as problematic.<br />

See R.C.Richardson, ‘The Scandal <strong>of</strong> Cartesian Interactionism’ [6.51]. For criticism<br />

<strong>of</strong> this view, see J.Cottingham, The Rationalists [6.12], 212f. and 202.<br />

104 Comments on a Certain Broadsheet: AT VIIIB 359; CSM I 304. Compare also<br />

Optics, Section Six: AT VI 130; CSM I 167. For more on the ‘occasionalist’<br />

elements in Descartes’s account <strong>of</strong> mind and body, see J.Cottingham, ‘Descartes on<br />

Colour’, Proceedings <strong>of</strong> the Aristotelian Society 90 (1989–90) Part 3, 231–46.<br />

BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />

Original language edition<br />

6.1 Adam, C. and Tannery, P. (eds) Œuvres de Descartes, 1877–1913; Paris, Vrin/<br />

CNRS, revised edn, 12 vols, 1964–76.<br />

English translation<br />

6.2 Cottingham, J., Stooth<strong>of</strong>f, R. and Murdoch, D. (eds) The Philosophical Writings <strong>of</strong><br />

Descartes, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2 vols, 1985. <strong>Volume</strong> III (The<br />

Correspondence) by the same translators and Anthony Kenny, Cambridge University<br />

Press, 1991.

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