Routledge History of Philosophy Volume IV

314 RENAISSANCE AND SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY RATIONALISM
right of a subject is the lesser the greater the capability of the collectivity, we
understand this in the same way: in a well-organized state neither sovereign nor
subject can live according to their appetites alone, but are directed towards the
common good, and thereby to their own.
Spinoza distinguished four ways in which this societal direction can take place.
By taking away one’s arms and means of defence, or by preventing one’s escape,
the state constrains one in a bodily way. By inspiring someone with fear, or by
obliging one by favours, the state rules body and mind alike. These four ways of
directing someone’s behaviour are forms of power over an individual, and are
the ways in which the state is present as an external cause. This presence is
inherently dynamic. It can only operate via the emotions of its target, and may
lead to such diverse reactions as anger, hatred or hope, and devotion (i.e. love
together with awe). These emotions may have an aggregative effect, as when, for
example, some policy leads to collective indignation because of a wrong done to
a subject. The collectivity may then become directed as by a different mind and
endanger the rule of the sovereign, and thereby the stability or even continuity of
the state. Naturally, indignation is likely to result when the interests of subjects
are infringed upon, or when one who earns praise is declared unjust.
In this respect, Spinoza tries to come to grips with the barbarous and slavish
Turkish empire, which he deems despicable although very stable. ‘Yet if slavery,
barbarism, and desolation are to be called peace, men can have no worse
misfortune’ (TP VI, 4). His argument is a dissection of the true nature of absolute
monarchies, where in fact more often the whims of concubines and minions
decide. Repeating the analysis of de la Court, Spinoza demonstrates that in an
absolute monarchy the king is always afraid of his subjects, and even of his own
children, and ‘will look more for his own safety, and not try to consult his
subjects’ interests, but try to plot against them, especially against those who are
renowned for learning, or have influence through wealth’ (TP VI, 6). It is clear
that Spinoza measures states not according to their stability, but according to
their rationality.
In this perspective Spinoza again investigates the origins of the state. Unlike
the emphasis on the will and the ensuing contract in the Tractatus Theologico-
Politicus, now he tries to explain by causal mechanisms.
Inasmuch as men are led, as we have said, more by passion than reason, it
follows, that a multitude comes together, and wishes to be guided, as it
were, by one mind, not at the suggestion of reason, but by some common
passion—that is (Ch. III, 3), common hope, or fear, or the desire of
avenging some common hurt. But since fear of solitude exists in all men,
because no one in solitude is strong enough to defend himself, and procure
the necessaries of life, it follows that men naturally aspire to the civil state;
nor can it happen that men should ever utterly dissolve it.
(TP VI, 1)