Routledge History of Philosophy Volume IV

74 RENAISSANCE PHILOSOPHY OUTSIDE ITALY
a return to the true Aristotle—the thought being that Aristotle was right after all
and not to be condemned on account of the errors and obscurities of the
scholastics. 28 In reality, however, the distinction between such a pure
Aristotelianism and scholasticism was virtually impossible to sustain. In the
short run, at least, the tacit and unthinking influence of traditional interpretations
of Aristotle, like traditional interpretations of the Bible, was likely to be greater
than new interpretations based on a humanist treatment of the Greek texts.
Moreover the virtual equivalence of Aristotelianism with rationality disposed
many to credit Aristotle with any view that had the authority of reason.
Aristotelian and scholastic philosophy were inevitably confused and the
assignation of individuals to one category rather than another is often highly
problematic. Some of the new scholastics (see pp. 81–3) seem to have played an
important part in ensuring that Aristotle’s texts continued to receive attention.
Indeed it is a remarkable fact that the publication of Aristotle’s texts reached a
high point in the mid-sixteenth century when the Catholic Reformation was at its
peak. 29 The return to Aristotle in philosophy may have seemed like a return to
good order in intellectual life. That, at any rate, seems to have been the thinking
of Ignatius of Loyola, whose quasi-military teaching order, the Society of Jesus
(founded in 1534), was committed to the restoration of papal authority, to
Aquinas in theology and to Aristotle in philosophy.
If it is difficult to treat scholastics and Aristotelians as a separate class, there is
no difficulty about separating the anti-Aristotelians from either of them. One of
the most prominent and influential opponents of Aristotle was the French
convert to Calvinism, Pierre de la Ramée (1515–72), usually known by his Latin
name of Ramus. Ramus’s criticisms fastened on the artificiality of Aristotelian
logic which, in common with other humanists, he claimed was useless for
discovering new truth. What was needed was a ‘natural logic’ that reflected
human thought processes. What was needed was an art of discovery and an art of
judgement. Ramus’s writings were much more influential than they were
original. In particular they helped to focus the preoccupation with method
characteristic of such early modern philosophers as Descartes and Leibniz. 30
SUAREZ AND THE NEW SCHOLASTICISM
I suggested in discussing Christian humanism (pp. 75–7) that part of what was
new about the new scholasticism of the late sixteenth century was its reflection
of humanistic values. This is already evident in the writings of the Dominican
Francisco de Vitoria (c. 1492–1546), who had been acquainted during his time in
Paris with Erasmus, Vives and some of the other leading humanists. Vitoria was
appointed in 1526 to the most important theological chair at Salamanca and it is
partly through this appointment that he was to exercise such a formative
influence on the new scholasticism that flourished in Spain in the late sixteenth
century.