Routledge History of Philosophy Volume IV

OCCASIONALISM 327
we see. In such cases, we say that the motion of bodies is explained by the fact
that other bodies collided with them, ‘thus alleging the occasion for the cause’. 50
The human body is moved by the same mind that moves all other bodies. We
observe that when we will to move our body in a certain way, it moves
accordingly. But we also know that motions occur in our body in the absence of
volitions, and that motions sometimes fail to occur even though we will them.
Hence our will is neither necessary nor sufficient for bodily movement. Our
weakness shows us that we do not cause motion simply by willing it. This
impotence of our will is due to our being dependent on something else for our
existence.
But if we consider that this permanent defect of our mind comes only from
its not being through itself, and that if it were through itself, it would lack
nothing, so that all that it willed would exist; we would readily apprehend
that there is a first Mind, who, being through himself, needs only his will in
order to do everything; and that, nothing being lacking to him, as soon as
he wills that what is capable of being moved should be in motion, that
must necessarily happen. 51
God exercises his power according to laws he has laid down: laws of collision
between bodies; and, between minds and bodies, laws by which certain motions
in the body are followed by certain perceptions in the mind, and volitions of the
mind are followed by bodily movements. 52 Although bodies do not really cause
motion, one body can be said to act upon another, ‘when on its occasion, this
other body begins to be arranged or moved otherwise than it was previously’. 53 A
body can be said to act upon a mind if this body, or a mode of it, is perceived by
the mind, ‘so that on its occasion, this mind has thoughts that it did not have
previously’. 54 A mind can be said to act on a body if, as soon as the mind wills
that the body should be moved in a certain direction, the body is so moved. One
can say that our mind acts on our body, even though
it is not really our mind that causes the movement…. And, as one is
obliged to acknowledge that the collision of two bodies is an occasion for
the power that moves the first to move the second, one should have no
difficulty in conceiving that our will is an occasion for the power that
already moves a body to direct its movement in a certain direction
corresponding to this thought. 55
In the Discernement, Cordemoy deprives bodies of all causal efficacy, and
human minds of the power to move bodies. In the Discours physique de la
parole, he adds that minds do not cause any of their own perceptions: ‘It is as
impossible for our souls to have new perceptions without God, as it is impossible
for bodies to have new motions without him,’ 56 Thus Cordemoy is a more