Routledge History of Philosophy Volume IV

SPINOZA: METAPHYSICS AND KNOWLEDGE 279
reason to suppose that Spinoza thinks that propositions known by the second
kind of knowledge are in any respect less true than those known by the third kind.
Rather, the superiority of intuitive knowledge lies in the fact that (ibid.) it is
‘more powerful’ than reason, affecting the mind in a different way. And it is
more powerful precisely because it is not universal knowledge, but is the
knowledge of particular things.
Spinoza’s explanation of the way in which intuitive knowledge is more
powerful involves the difficult propositions (beginning in Proposition 32 of Part
V of the Ethics) in which he expounds his doctrine of the intellectual love of
God. This cannot be discussed here; 91 however, one can perhaps get some idea
of what is meant by the greater power of intuitive knowledge by considering a
hypothetical case. Consider a man who is convinced by Spinoza’s proof (in
Proposition 45 of Part IV of the Ethics) of the universal proposition that hatred
can never be good. Despite his acceptance of the truth of this universal
proposition, such a man may still hate some particular individual who has injured
him. Now contrast such a man with another who has intuitive knowledge of the
proposition in question, that is, who grasps it in the particular instance of a
person who has offended him. The latter kind of knowledge may be called more
powerful in that (as Spinoza would say) it affects his mind in a different way, taking
away his urge to hurt the offender in question. This, it must be stressed, is only a
hypothetical case, offered as a means of throwing light on what Spinoza says. But
what can be said without hesitation is that Spinoza’s theory of knowledge was
not intended to be purely a contribution to epistemology, but has to be seen in an
ethical context.
ABBREVIATIONS
The following abbreviations are used in Chapters 8 and 9.
Spinoza’s works
DPP
E
Ep
G
KV
TDIE
Renati des Cartes Principiorum Philosophiae, Parts I and II
Ethica, ordine geometrico demonstrata. In referring to the
contents of the Ethics, ‘P’ is used for ‘Proposition’ and ‘S’ for
‘Scholium’. So, for example, E II P40S2 refers to Ethics, Part
II, Proposition 40, Scholium 2. ‘Ax’ is used for ‘Axiom’, ‘C’
for ‘Corollary’, ‘D’ for ‘Definition’ and ‘L’ for ‘Lemma’
Epistolae
C.Gebhardt (ed.), Spinoza, Opera (cf. [8.1]); references are to
volume and page
Korte Verhandeling van God, de Mensch en deszelfs Welstand
Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione