Routledge History of Philosophy Volume IV

294 RENAISSANCE AND SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY RATIONALISM
morality on the basis of ‘the fundamental law of self-preservation’, and third a
political philosophy. In the 1680 reprint of the book, Velthuysen repressed his
youthful expressions of enthusiasm for Hobbes without, however, changing the
substance or even the wording of his own views. He might not have been a
Hobbesian at all, but a ‘modern’ in search of support.
Velthuysen’s target is to formulate the principles of morality from a
naturalistic point of view. His argument is on a level with Burgersdijk’s use of the
doctrine of secondary causes. God has created the world and man in particular to
some purpose, some end. In doing so He must have willed the means necessary
to this end (here God is compared with someone who builds a house). Man’s
nature, especially his natural appetites and the sparks of reason, are the means he
has provided mankind with. Therefore, man is totally justified in using these
means, most of all since he is only slowly recovering from the dark times after
the Fall, learning by experience the principles that, before the Fall, he followed
from the goodness of his nature. Inevitably ‘nature incites’, where reason fell
short. Nature does not provide man in vain (non frustra) with his natural
inclinations. Pudency or shame is one of Velthuysen’s favourite social
mechanisms by which decency is inculcated in man. The natural appetites and
social mechanisms explain most of the historical development of moral codes in
human society. We understand from this perspective why, for example, in our
‘more enlightened age’ we sustain monogamy against polygamy as was the moral
practice in the Old Testament, and still is among the Turks. Justice, however,
should be understood from the ‘fundamental law of self-preservation’. Man has a
right to put things and animals to his own use, but not his fellow creatures. He
has a right to defend himself against others’ invasion of his goods and person,
and to punish them, but not to invade others’ rights in turn. This would be unjust,
and injustice collides with God’s purpose with the world. This Ciceronian-
Grotian conception of justice is the basis for Velthuysen’s political theory. A
sovereign is essential to the proper functioning of the body politic. A sovereign
body can perform this function even better than one person, since the
accommodation of divergent interests is central to politics. The sovereign is
either absolute, or party to a contract. Against an absolute ruler the people have
no right at all, although even an absolute ruler has to refrain from doing certain
things (i.e. neglecting justice, usurping the citizens’ property, violating women
or chastity in general) because that would result in the ruin of the state. In
religion, Velthuysen argues that the sovereign has to respect the accepted beliefs,
and should not follow up claims from religious zealots because religious matters
are not decided by a majority. A tyrannical sovereign has to be admonished by
the lesser magistrates.
Velthuysen’s political philosophy, all in all, falls short of the naturalistic
principles of his ethical theory, as the Grotian conception of justice dominates here.
In this respect, we find a more radical approach in de la Court.