Routledge History of Philosophy Volume IV

382 LEIBNIZ: TRUTH, KNOWLEDGE AND METAPHYSICS
32 See Loeb [11.55], 279.
33 It is worth noting here that, strictly speaking, there is a logical gap between 3 and 4
themselves. If 4 is derived from 3, then it is tacitly assumed that every state of a
substance must have a cause. If, on the other hand, 3 is derived from 4, then it is
tacitly assumed that there is no causal overdetermination. Both these assumptions
would be congenial to Leibniz.
34 Parkinson [11.58], 147.
35 ibid., p. 151.
36 Loeb [11.55], 286.
37 ‘First Truths’, C 521, L 269. See Loeb [11.55], 286.
38 See Sleigh [11.27], 11.
39 See, for example, New System, G IV 484, L 457.
40 On the development of Leibniz’s philosophy, see Broad [11.29], 87; D.Garber,
‘Leibniz and the Foundations of Physics: The Middle Years’, in K.Okruhlik and
J.R.Brown (eds) The Natural Philosophy of Leibniz (Dordrecht, Reidel, 1985), pp.
27–130.
41 Leibniz to De Volder, 30 June 1704, G II 270, L 537.
42 Monadology 4, G VII 607, L 643.
43 Revision note of 1697–1700 to ‘A New Method for Learning and Teaching
Jurisprudence’, A VI.i p. 286, L 91n.
44 R.McRae [11.69], 60.
45 Whether God is a monad is not entirely clear. However, there are places where
Leibniz seems to say that God is a monad—for example, Grua II 558.
46 See Broad [11.29], 75, for a helpful discussion of these issues.
47 Leibniz to De Volder, undated, G II 275, AG 181.
48 M.Furth, ‘Monadology’, in Frankfurt [11.32], 99–135, esp. p. 122; Loeb [11.55],
304–5.
49 Leibniz to Des Bosses, 16 June 1712, G II 451–2, L 605.
50 Furth, in [11.32], 118–19.
51 See, for example, Leibniz to Des Bosses, 31 July 1709, G II 379; Leibniz to Des
Bosses, January 1710, G II 399.
52 See, for example, Leibniz to Arnauld, 9 October 1687, G II 118–19, MP 152.
53 Leibniz to Des Bosses, 29 May 1716, GP II 517, AG 203.
54 See, for example, Broad [11.29], 91. For criticisms of the ‘misperception’
interpretation, see Rutherford [11.59], 11–28.
55 ‘Nowhere does Leibniz himself assert that he believes it…. Thus the vinculum
substantiale is rather the concession of a diplomatist than the creed of a
philosopher’ (Russell [11.38], 152; cf. Broad [11.29], 124–5).
56 cf. Broad [11.29], 127.
57 Leibniz to Des Bosses, 20 September 1712, G II 459, L 607.
58 C.D.Broad, ‘Leibniz’s Last Controversy with the Newtonians’, in Woolhouse [11.
62], 171.
59 Leibniz’s First Paper to Clarke, G VII 352, L 675.
60 Leibniz’s Third Paper to Clarke, G VII 363, L 682.
61 cf. Broad, in [11.62], 158–9.
62 Leibniz’s Third Paper to Clarke, G VII 364, L 682–3.
63 Alexander [11.12], xxiii; Broad, in [11.62], 166.
64 Leibniz’s Fifth Paper to Clarke, G VII 403–4, L 705.