Routledge History of Philosophy Volume IV

MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA 315
In the Latin of Spinoza we find that the multitude ‘ex communi aliquo affectu
naturaliter convenire’, that is, ‘from some shared emotion agree by nature’.
‘Agreement’ being a somewhat more precise translation than Elwes’s ‘coming
together’, we find here the principle of co-operation explained that we had been
looking for in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. In the shared or common
emotion we see the civil state arise. What kind of emotion is Spinoza thinking
of? In TP III, 6, he points to the removal of general fear and the prevention of
general sufferings as a natural cause of the state. These ‘communes miserias’
seem to refer to the emotion of misericordia, compassion. We find it again in TP
I, 5, together with jealousy or envy, vengeance, and ambition and glory. These
passions predominate in an ordinary man, especially since men are led more by
passion than by reason. Anyone who thinks otherwise believes in a chimera or in
a Utopia, or in the golden age of the poets (TP I, 1). It is clear, however, that we
need something more than just these passions. Thomas Hobbes would explain
the war of all men against all men from these passions. How can Spinoza come
to the explanation of the state? We have to take a close look at the term
‘convenire’, agree.
We will then be dealing with the pre-political, state, that is, as long as the
condition is not realized ‘that all, governing and governed alike, whether they
will or no, shall do what makes for the general welfare: that is, that all, whether
of their own impulse, or by force or necessity, shall be compelled to live
according to the dictate of reason’ (TP VI, 3). As long as this condition is not
realized, any order that may arise is not stable. People may agree for a moment,
but disintegrate in the next. How can such an unstable agreement develop into a
stable one? This may happen if such a temporary agreement induces people to
agree on further points, leading to patterns of behaviour, habits and preferences
that can be redefined as a political order. Spinoza seems to suggest this much
when he says that compassion can induce men to alleviate the misery of others,
from ambition or love of glory. Such ambitious men may want to continue to
attract the praise of others, because they see it as a consequence of their help.
Others may want the same, and thereby ambition becomes a motive for political
leadership. Now, jealousy could follow if there is not room enough for all
ambitious men, and fear and hate might follow as well. In that case, the evolution
is thwarted. But if the surrounding world poses enough challenges, the effects
may well be positive. Then, ‘love of liberty, desire to increase their property, and
hope of gaining the honours of dominion’ (TP X, 8) will be the sure emotions
leading to a stable political order. Interdependence of emotions makes for
political order, but this process may equally well degenerate according to the
circumstances.
This dual character of emotive interdependence provides a good explanation
of Spinoza’s use of positive and negative examples of political order. Positive
examples (the kingdom of Aragon, the Dutch Republic) are indicative of the
necessary conditions for their respective forms of government; negative
examples (the Jewish state, Rome, France, Venice) show disturbing factors. On