Routledge History of Philosophy Volume IV

284 RENAISSANCE AND SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY RATIONALISM
74 E I P32C1, E I P33 and 33S1.
75 E I A6, E II D4.
76 cf. J.J.McIntosh, ‘Spinoza’s Epistemological Views’, in G.N.A.Vesey (ed.) Reason
and Reality, Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, vol. 5 (1970–1) (London,
Macmillan, 1972), p. 38; also G.H.R.Parkinson, ‘“Truth is its Own Standard”.
Aspects of Spinoza’s Theory of Truth’, in Shahan and Biro [8.40], 42–5.
77 In the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione (G ii, 10–12), Spinoza recognizes four
kinds of knowledge, the first two of which correspond to the first of the three kinds
recognized in the Ethics. The Short Treatise recognizes three kinds only, but the
account that it offers of these is sketchy.
78 Spinoza also counts as an example of the first kind of knowledge what he calls
‘knowledge from signs’ (E II P40S2; cf. E II P18S). This raises interesting
questions concerning Spinoza’s views about language, which I have discussed in my
‘Language and Knowledge in Spinoza’, reprinted in Grene [8.33], 73–100.
79 It is not clear how Spinoza would have attempted to justify his view that induction
is a kind of knowledge.
80 E II P38–9, P40 and S2; cf. E V P36S.
81 This is in fact a literal translation of the Greek term ‘koinai ennoai’, used by Euclid
to refer to the axioms of his system.
82 cf. Aristotle, Topics, I 5, 102 a18–19. On ‘essence’ in Spinoza, cf. p. 282.
83 E I P33S2.
84 E II P41.
85 E V P31 and S.
86 E V P36S.
87 See also TDIE, G ii, 12, and KV II.1, G i, 54–5.
88 For this conversation, see Descartes’ Conversation with Burman, ed. and trans.
J.G.Cottingham (Oxford, Clarendon, 1976), esp. p. 4 (also CSM iii, 333).
89 Burman’s record of the conversation remained in manuscript until 1896. In
principle, Spinoza could have had access to the manuscript, but there is no
evidence that he had any contact with Burman, or with the Cartesian philosopher
Clauberg, who also contributed to the manuscript.
90 The reference is probably to E I P15, mentioned in E V P36S. It could perhaps be
to E I P25, but this itself involves a reference to E I P15.
91 This doctrine, and the related doctrine of the eternity of the human mind, has been
severely criticized. See, for example, Bennett [8.28], 357–63, 369–75; Delahunty
[8.30], 279–305; Martha Kneale, ‘Eternity and Sempiternity’, in Grene [8.33], 227–
40. A more sympathetic account is given by Joachim [8.35], 230–3, 298–309.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Original language editions
8.1 Gebhardt, C. (ed.) Spinoza, Opera, Heidelberg, Winter, 4 vols, 1924–8.
8.2 van Vloten, J. and Land, J.P.N. (eds) Benedicti de Spinoza Opera quotquot reperta
sunt, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1st edn, 2 vols, 1882–3; 2nd edn, 3 vols, 1895; 3rd edn, 4
vols, 1914.