Routledge History of Philosophy Volume IV

RENAISSANCE AND SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY RATIONALISM 383
65 Leibniz’s Fourth Paper to Clarke, G VII 372, L 687.
66 Leibniz’s Fifth Paper to Clarke, G VII 395, L 700.
67 N.Malebranche, The Search After Truth, 6.2.3.
68 ibid.
69 See the Preface to an edition of Nizolius, G IV 148. For an illuminating discussion
of these issues, see H.Ishiguro, ‘Pre-established Harmony versus Constant
Conjunction’, in A.Kenny (ed.) Rationalism, Empiricism, and Idealism (Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 61–85.
70 Monadology 7, G VII 607; L 643.
71 ‘Notes on Some Comments by Michel Angelo Fardella’, AG 105; F de C 323.
72 Discourse on Metaphysics 33, G IV 458, L 324.
73 Monadology 33, G VI 620, L 651; Principles of Nature and of Grace 3, G VI 599,
L 637.
74 See Chapter 10 for a discussion of Leibniz’s attitude towards Malebranche’s
occasionalism. See also Sleigh [11.27], 150–70.
75 See Leibniz to Arnauld, 28 November/8 December 1686, G II 74, MP 92; cf. Leibniz
to Arnauld, 30 April 1687, G II 90, MP 113.
76 See Leibniz to Arnauld, 9 October 1687, G II 112, MP 143–4.
77 Ethics Part 2, Proposition 16, Corollary 2.
78 Leibniz to Arnauld, 9 October 1687, G II 112, MP 144.
79 Ethics Part 2, Proposition 12.
80 First Set of Replies, AT VII 107, CSM II 77.
81 NE Preface, A VI.vi, RB 53. (Translation modified.)
82 ibid., p. 58.
83 ibid., p. 54.
84 J.Cottingham, The Rationalists (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 152.
85 NE Preface, A VI.vi, RB 54.
86 ibid.
87 See Leibniz’s appeal to the law of continuity, ibid., p. 56.
88 Leibniz to Treuer, 21 May 1708; see Jolley [11.22], 117; cf. Principles of Nature
and of Grace 4, G VI 600, L 637.
89 McRae argues that Leibniz’s position on the issue of whether animals have
sensation is contradictory. ‘On the one hand what distinguishes animals from lower
forms of life is sensation or feeling, but on the other hand apperception is a
necessary condition of sensation, and apperception distinguishes human beings
from animals’ (McRae [11.69], 30). Leibniz certainly holds that self-consciousness
distinguishes man from other animals, but whether he consistently equates selfconsciousness
with apperception is less clear.
90 See Jolley [11.22], 104.
91 Leibniz to Jaquelot, 28 April 1704, G III 473.
92 ‘Critical Thoughts on the General Part of Descartes’s Principles’, G IV 360, L 391.
93 ibid., G IV 357, L 385.
94 This controversy was initiated by Arnauld’s On True and False Ideas (1683) which
attacked Malebranche’s theory of ideas. On this controversy see S. Nadler, Arnauld
and the Cartesian Philosophy of Ideas (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press,
1989); Jolley [11.65].
95 On True and False Ideas, ch. 5, Definition 3.
96 Search After Truth 3.2.6.