Routledge History of Philosophy Volume IV

148 FRANCIS BACON AND MAN’S TWO-FACED KINGDOM
31 For such archetypes, see Plato, Cratylus 390 A, Euthydemus 289 A–D, Republic
601 E-602 A; and Aristotle, Politica 128 a 17ff. J.Hintikka has studied this
question in Knowledge and the Known (Dordrecht and Boston, Reidel, 1974),
passim, and has been criticized by J.L.Mackie in ‘A Reply to Hintikka’s Article
“Practical versus Theoretical Reason”, in S.Körner (ed.) Practical Reason (New
Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 103–13. For a profound
anthropological insight into that archetype (the maker is the knower par
excellence), cf. Mircea Eliade, Forgerons et Alchimistes (Paris, Flammarion,
1956), ch. x: homo faber and homo sapiens coincide for the faber knows in the
most obvious and convincing way, i.e. by doing, making or producing things.
32 cf. W.Krohn, ‘Social Change and Epistemic Thought (Reflections on the Origins of
the Experimental Method)’, in I.Hronsky, M.Fehér and B.Dajka (eds) Scientific
Knowledge Socialized (Dordrecht, 1988), pp. 165–78:
‘The goal of the new science is a knowledge by which “one will be
capable of all manner of works” (omnis operum potentia) in contrast with
the “felicitous contemplation” (felicitas contemplativa) of classical
philosophy (I, 144; IV, 32). For Bacon, causes are related to knowledge just
as rules are to action. The equivalence between the knowledge of causes and
the ability to produce something can be regarded in both directions: not only
are our actions more manageable as a result of the
knowledge of the laws of Nature, but the laws of Nature can be
understood better when our point of departure is not the observation of
Nature, but the vexationes artis, Nature under constraint and vexed (I, 140;
IV, 29)…. This makes his [i.e. Bacon’s] turning from Aristotle that much
more noticeable, as his claim that a condition for the understanding of
Nature is our interfering with it is irreconcilable with the Aristotelian concept
of knowledge…. According to Bacon, laws have to be investigated with a
view to the type of praeceptum (doctrine), directio (direction), deductio
(guidance) one needs to produce something’
(I, 229; IV, 124, pp. 171f.) Paolo Rossi had already stressed this point ([4.71],
esp. Appendix ii, ‘Truth and Utility in Bacon’, pp. 148–73). For an exegesis of the
crucial term opus/work, cf. Pérez-Ramos [4.62], 135–49.
33 cf. Karl-Otto Apel, ‘Das Problem einer philosophischen Theorie der
Rationalitätstypen’, in G.H.Schnädelbach (ed.), Rationalität (Frankfurt-am-Main,
1984) pp. 15–31.
34 cf. G.Buchdahl, Induction and Necessity in the Philosophy of Aristotle (London,
1963); ‘Die bei Aristoteles’, Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie
der Wissenschaften (Phil.-hist. Klasse) (1964); W.Schmidt, Theorie der Induktion:
Die prinzipielle Bedeutung der epag g bei Aristoteles (Munich, 1974); Nelly
Tsouyopoulos, ‘Die Induktive Methode und das Induktionsproblem in der
griechischen Philosophie’, Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 5 (1974)
94–122; J.R.Milton, ‘Induction before Hume’, British Journal for the Philosophy