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ISBN 978-952-5726-09-1 (Print)<br />

Proceedings of the Second International Symposium on Networking and Network Security (ISNNS ’10)<br />

Jinggangshan, P. R. China, 2-4, April. 2010, pp. 093-096<br />

An Alarm Flow Decomposition Method for<br />

Security Threat Evaluation<br />

Jie Ma, and Zhitang Li<br />

Computer Science Department,<br />

Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Hubei Wuhan, China<br />

mjhust@163.com<br />

Abstract—How to analyze security alarms automatically and<br />

find useful information form them has attract a lot of<br />

interests. Although many alarm correlation approaches and<br />

risk assessment methods have been proposed, most of them<br />

were implemented with high computational complexity and<br />

time consuming, and they can not deal well with huge<br />

number of security alarms. This work focus on performing<br />

an real-time security threat evaluation. We aggregate<br />

individual alarms to alarm flows, and then process the flows<br />

instead of individual alarms. Using the Singular Spectrum<br />

Analysis (SSA) approach, we found that the alarm flow has<br />

a small intrinsic dimension, and the alarm flow can be<br />

decomposed into leading components and residual<br />

components. Leading components represent the basic part<br />

and residual components represent the noise part of the flow.<br />

To capture the main features of the leading components<br />

forming the alarm flow, we accomplish the security threat<br />

evaluation. Case based experiments real network data<br />

shows the effectiveness of the method. To the best of our<br />

knowledge, this is the first study that applies SSA on the<br />

analysis of IDS alarm flows.<br />

Index Terms—alarm flow, threat evaluation, SSA<br />

I. INTRODUCTION<br />

Internet has become a mission-critical infrastructure<br />

for governments, companies, institutions, and millions of<br />

every-day users. Because of this significant increase<br />

reliance on the Internet–based services, security and<br />

survivability of networks has become a primary concern.<br />

Intrusion Detection System (IDS) plays a vital role in the<br />

overall security infrastructure, as one last defense against<br />

attacks after secure network architecture design, secure<br />

program design and firewalls [1]. It gathers information<br />

form some key points in the computer networks, properly<br />

analyzes it and detect violations of the monitored<br />

system’s security policy. so as to extend the security<br />

management capability of the system administrators and<br />

improve the integrity of information security<br />

infrastructure.<br />

However, IDS are becoming unable to provide proper<br />

analysis and effective defense mechanism. They often<br />

report a massive number of elementary alarms of lowlevel<br />

security-related events. Since be overwhelmed by<br />

these alarms, administrators almost unable to make<br />

proper security threat evaluations in real-time. For this<br />

reason, some alarm correlation approaches were proposed.<br />

Ning et al. developed a an intrusion alarm correlator [2][3]<br />

to help human analysts to recognize multi-step attacks.<br />

Lee et al. [4][5] built a framework based on data mining<br />

techniques, such as sequential patterns mining and<br />

episodes rules, to search causal relationships between<br />

alarms to improve attack detection while maintaining a<br />

low false positive rate. Cuppens [6][7] build alert<br />

correlation systems based on matching the pre/postconditions<br />

of individual alarms. The idea of the approach<br />

is that prior attack steps prepare for later ones. Julisch<br />

proposed to find alarm clusters and generalized forms of<br />

false alarms to identify root causes [8][9], and those<br />

alarms which are not possible attributed to the root causes<br />

can be filtered out. Although these correlation approaches<br />

enable to improve the alarm handling efficiency from<br />

micro prospective, they are hard to work well with<br />

massive security alarms and with large-scale network<br />

environment.<br />

Recently, some online security threat evaluation and<br />

risk assessment methods have been developed. There are<br />

approaches employing a graph-based representation of<br />

systems [10][11], where an integrated, topological<br />

approach to network vulnerability analysis is used. But,<br />

these approaches usually follow a static procedure and<br />

cannot meet the changes in a dynamic network<br />

environment. Gehani [12] put forward a host-based<br />

method for real-time risk assessment. The model<br />

evaluates the threat probability from intrusion reports and<br />

uses predetermined attack scenarios to calculate the risk.<br />

Arnes [13] uses the Hidden Markov Model to compute<br />

the probability of the security status of the system based<br />

on observations from reporting of intrusion detection<br />

sensors. However, there are several limitations faced by<br />

these approaches. Since the high computational<br />

complexity and time cost, these approaches are still can<br />

not deal well with huge number of security alarms. In<br />

addition, the models used in these approaches should be<br />

retrained to adapt to new knowledge. Hence, it seems to<br />

be inefficient in reducing the human workload.<br />

The focus of our work is to perform the security threat<br />

evaluation in real-time. Since IDS have the ability to<br />

perform online attack detection and can dynamically<br />

report security incidents which the network is suffering,<br />

we chose IDS alarms as our processing objects and use<br />

them to make threat evaluations. Different form the<br />

approaches mentioned above, we use aggregated alarm<br />

flows instead of individual alarms. We model the alarm<br />

flow as a time series, which is a sequence of alarm<br />

intensity observations i.e. the number of alarms in a<br />

sampling interval as a time series. Only alarms generated<br />

by the same IDS and with the same signature can be<br />

© 2010 ACADEMY PUBLISHER<br />

AP-PROC-CS-10CN006<br />

93

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