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shareholders as companies’ owners and also towards other interested parties. In<br />

literature there are a number of studies that place financial information in its real<br />

context, marked by constraints and imperfections. Seen as a typical information<br />

system, accounting differs from other information systems on three levels: “by the<br />

specificity of the principles supporting the profession; by the specificity of processed<br />

data and by the specificity of processing methods” (Grenier, 2000: 1122). Therefore,<br />

Grenier and Bonnebouche are the promoters of a scheme including accounting<br />

principles in the representation process. “These principles interpose between the<br />

reality to be represented and the observer (at the level of observation principles –<br />

prudence, quantification), between the reality and the information’s user (at the level<br />

of principles concerning representation’s construction), or between the user and the<br />

observer (at the level of deontological principles – sincerity, regularity)” (Grenier,<br />

2000: 1123). Listed companies from modern economy surpass the legal reporting<br />

duties and develop a true “financial communication strategy” (Guimard, 1997: 342).<br />

Fraudulent financial statements represent a threat for users’ trust. Those statements<br />

have captured the attention of business community, accounting professionals,<br />

academic environment and also of regulators. At present, we could notice the<br />

necessity to prevent financial frauds and to detect those strategies able to keep away<br />

this type of incidents. Fraud risk could be reduced by combining detection and<br />

prevention measures. Michael R. Young (2003) who has spent almost twenty years<br />

defending accounting firms accused of fraud recognizes that the introduction of the<br />

Sarbanes-Oxley Act could be useful. Experience proves us that violation of laws and<br />

regulations is, in general, the result of deficiencies within corporate governance and<br />

internal control. Independence and financial sophistication of members are regarded<br />

as challenges for audit committees. Therefore, in order to get a future success, audit<br />

committees should ensure that the organization has determined initially a viable audit<br />

function.<br />

However, audit committees’ presence in the bosom of companies aims to prevent the<br />

production and transmission of fraudulent financial statements. Audit committee is<br />

held to make sure that financial statements are not the result of accounting errors or<br />

frauds. Some authors have studied the usefulness of an audit committee in preventing<br />

frauds. Audit committee could play a significant role in preventing, detecting and<br />

investigating frauds. As long as we are talking about prevention, the main aspect for<br />

audit committees in preventing frauds consists in observing management and external<br />

auditors’ expectations. In addition, it is necessary for an audit committee to manifest<br />

zero tolerance when it detects errors; audit committee should take seriously into<br />

account any attempt to defraud, to investigate it subsequently and to act accordingly<br />

to the importance of the event.<br />

Two empirical studies validate the audit committee usefulness (McMullen, 1996;<br />

Uzun et al., 2004) and other two deny this usefulness (Beasley, 1996; Carcello &<br />

Nagy, 2004). McMullen (1996) detects a significant negative relation between the<br />

presence of an audit committee and fraud. The lack of reliability regarding financial<br />

information has less severe consequences. However, not the same thing occurs when<br />

correcting accounting results. Firms with audit committees are associated with fewer<br />

shareholder lawsuits alleging fraud, fewer quarterly earnings restatements, fewer SEC<br />

(Security Exchange Commission) enforcement actions, fewer illegal acts and fewer<br />

instances of auditor turnover when there is an auditor-client accounting disagreement<br />

(McMullen, 1996). Research studies follow various types of measures when they<br />

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