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So, in contrast, an outside director in the same situation who does not resign faces the<br />

risk of experiencing a loss of reputation as an outside director when the bad news<br />

breaks. Such a loss of reputation may make it harder for the director to obtain other<br />

board seats and perhaps even to keep the seats he already has. Furthermore, the<br />

director would likely face an increase in his workload as the firm undergoes change<br />

and restructuring. We believe that all these references to the directors may be<br />

submitted under the auspices of the principle of responsibility of the Board of<br />

Directors.<br />

8. THE MANAGEMENT FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF CORPORATE<br />

GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES: BETWEEN COMPETENCE, ABILITIES,<br />

REPUTATION AND RESPONSIBILITY<br />

A clear delineation of requirements for managerial positions in an enterprise, of the<br />

skills required for them is specific to the dualist system of corporate governance. If<br />

managers are elected by the Board of Directors from outside the enterprise, then most<br />

likely they are chosen on the basis of competence and skills, as evidenced by learning<br />

and experience. In the monist system, the choice for Chief Executive Officer can be<br />

considered subjective. In Romania, the practiced system is no clearly defined, given<br />

that art. 143, par. (3), says that the president of Board of Directors can be Chief<br />

Executive Officer, offering this way the possibility for en enterprise to choose it.<br />

We believe that the most appropriate would be for managers to be fully delimited<br />

from the Board of Directors, so there could be a proper coordination at the enterprise<br />

level. To support this statement, we must specify that the Companies Law the<br />

organization of the dualist system in Romania, as Supervisory Board and the<br />

Directorate, which are two separate entities, with separate responsibilities.<br />

Related to Romania, corporate governance principles issued by Bucharest Stock<br />

Exchange, do not have a separate chapter focusing on the responsibilities of<br />

management for achieving a high level of corporate governance, it is evident that<br />

management has an essential role to play if a company is to meet the governance<br />

standards of the revised principles. The principles underline the fact that high ethical<br />

standards, are in the long term interest of the company: they are essential if the<br />

company is to be regarded as being credible and trustworthy. Many companies have<br />

found it useful to develop company codes of conduct, often based on professional<br />

standards and, sometimes, broader codes of behavior. There is a mention though to<br />

the confidentiality of documents and information received, kept and signed during the<br />

mandate period.<br />

In terms of reputation, the problem is the conflict of interest which can arise in<br />

managers’ case, regardless their level. They have the obligation to tell the truth, but<br />

simultaneously have incentives, so they are motivated to send biased information to<br />

the users. In the context of financial reporting, managers are relevant information<br />

providers, who jointly produce financial reports with the auditors. Incentives for<br />

biased reporting may arise for managers when bonuses are linked to performance<br />

(Koch and Schmidt, 2010).<br />

~ 608 ~

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